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Abstract
In the grammar of storytelling, character is formed from context. The narrative produces
character from the character’s interaction with the narrative framework. This framework is a
massive structure of already existing relations and interrelations that character needs to fit itself
into in order to understand its own place in society. The authors I chose to work with are directly
influenced by this framework, by the changing social conditions of the period in which they
write. Because the concepts of free will and individuality have long been institutionalized and
taken for granted in North America, they are elements which must be scrutinized when authors
write characters whose material existence in the socioeconomic sphere determines their overali
status and position of power. But classifying on the basis of social position leads to stereotype
and when stereotypes become predorninant, character inevitably seems to build towards a
familiar type. How, then, can character possibly redeem itself?
This study takes as its starting point the development of character types in North
American Literature, beginning in its Introduction with the characters in the medieval morality
play, Everyman. The progress ofcharacter is then charted tlwough to its Romantic renditions as
the Individual who, far from the allegorical flatness of Eveiyrnan, possesses an inner life, the
depths ofwhich may be thousands ofleagues from the surface. By the first halfofthe twentieth
century, characters were easily available to cognizant readers who leamed how to fully know,
fully psychologize, characters according to newly popular approaches to character that
complicated and complexifled personality, such as that of Freud. But by the late twentieth
century, these approaches become too well understood by readers. Detail in physical description,
objects within a scene, even weather, are mere elements intended to infuse hfe into the character.
But how can this exercise in mathematics create life? At best, this approach presents a series of
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equations that yields only a type of character. And, when a reader recognizes a type, her
cognitive facultiesfihl in the character with the residual information she has stored from ail the
stories, fairytales, newspaper articles and personal narratives she has ever been exposed to. In
essence, she ‘skips’ over the character that is present in the text because so much information
from these intertexts flood her mmd. Instead, she will see only what is common and familiar:
what fits into type.
The construction of these paradigms of cognition are both learned and, as Jung taught,
innate. Over time, societal shifis have a great effect on the human ability and capacity to
interpret, translate, make sense of—to know. The second section ofthis dissertation,
“Commodity Fiction,” analyzes the changes that occurred in Western society that affected the
individual mindset, such as industrialization, which effectively reduces the individual to a cog
functioning in the machinery of society. Since the assembly-line (or storyline) had become such
a well-established metaphor for living in society, it inevitably encroached upon characters in
literature as a system ofbelief, replacing the power of a higher being or of self-reliance. “Buying
into a story” also meant buying into a newly-changing lifestyle that replaced Truths with fictions.
It became apparent that society (including govemmental and political institutions) was
merely a sophisticated, interlocking system of smoothly-running machinery. At the same time, it
became illogical to beÏieve that those who inhabited this narrative machinery could really be
complex beings, with complicated desires and motivations. For the machine to run so efficiently,
then, it made sense that the inhabitants ofthe structure must be similar fits, or exactly the same:
“copies of copies.” While the previous section deals with “buying into lifestyles,” Section Three:
“Character as Commodity” deals with “buying into character types.”
y
n Sections Four and Five, I analyze two contemporary writers, Bret Easton Ellis and
Douglas Coupland, respectively, whose works intertwine with these issues and offer a way out of
systematized knowing. As members of a fairiy recent literary tendency, referred to by literary
critic James Annesiey as writers of”biank fiction,” these two writers present “flat” or “surface”
characters for readeriy consumption. Seemingly very littie about what motivates or influences
these characters can be construed from the text. What is conventionally derived from the text,
then, is a literai translation of syrnbol—what bas ied to the replacement of thinking with
referring. Interestingly, in an article for The New Repitblic, Coupland writes, “Demonize the
symbolic analysts” (“55 Statements about the Culture” 10). Symbolic analysts, as Robert B.
Reich writes,
soïve, identify, and broker probiems by manipulating symbols. They simpiify reaÏity into
abstract images that can 5e rearranged, juggled, experimented with. . . The manipulations
are done with analytic toois. . . [which] may be mathematical algorithms, legai
arguments, financial gimmicks, scientific principies, psychological insights about how to
persuade or to amuse, systems of induction or deduction, or any other set of techniques
for doing conceptual puzzles. (Reich, Work ofNations 178)
The common reader has corne to approach literature in rnuch the sarne way—a puzzle that can be
sotved by manipulating symbots. But perhaps those new pieces of information—the affect that
life in contemporary society produces—cannot easily be put forth in conventional symbol or
through the actions of a conventional character. Often the reader, consciously or unconsciousiy,
skips over this excess of information.
“Skipping over” characters because of their apparent flatness or redundancy resuits in the
skipping over ofdetail that may be crucial to a ‘fuller’ reading ofthe character, and also to the
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wrongful assumption that altemate readings ofthese characters can supply no other
interpretation. The fallacy here is of leaving out information that would affect the reading of the
character; the reader’s mmd, of course, is willing to a certain extent to ignore certain details or to
file them away as anomalies that bear no meaning against a seemingly perfected exegesis. On the
other hand, this information sometirnes provides the interpreter with a site upon which différance
cornes into play. from this approach, character flnds ways ofthwarting the dissecting pin, of
reflising the stereotyped label. This is possible by the salvaging of the unassimilable descriptive
detail, the slightest of gestures or thoughts, or the casual off-handed remark. In this way, a flat
character such as Herman Melville’s Bartleby can no longer be written off or rationalized as “an
irreparable loss to literature,” as Bartleby’s employer reads him. This study shows that it ïs
precisely this loss of the conventional character in literature that, paradoxically, leaves the reader
with much to gain.
Keywords: American literature, Canadian literature, Douglas Coupland, characterization, Bret
Easton Ellis, narrative, postmodemism
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Résumé
Dans la grammaire de la narration, le personnage est façonné par le contexte. La narration
le caractérise à partir de ses interactions avec le cadre du récit. Ce cadre est une lourde trame de
relations et d’interrelations préexistantes, dans laquelle le personnage doit s’insérer pour
comprendre sa place dans la société. Les auteurs que j’ai choisi d’étudier subissent directement
l’influence de ce cadre, des changements sociaux qui marquent leur époque. Les notions de libre-
arbitre et d’individualité font partie depuis longtemps du cadre institutionnel en Amérique du
Nord, au point d’y être tenues pour acquises; un examen attentif de ces concepts s’impose donc
quand un auteur crée un personnage qui tire son statut social et son pouvoir de sa place dans la
sphère socioéconomique. Mais toute classification fondée sur la position sociale mène au
stéréotype. Or, là où prédominent les stéréotypes, les personnages évoluent irrémédiablement
vers des types familiers. Comment pourraient-ils y échapper?
L’étude qui suit examine l’évolution des personnages-types dans la littérature nord-
américaine, avec, en introduction, ceux de la moralité médiévale Evetyman. Nous suivons les
progrès du persoimage jusqu’à son incarnation romantique dans l’Individu, si étranger à la
superficialité allégorique d’Eveiyman par la vie intérieure qu’il cultive à des profondeurs parfois
insondables. Dans la première moitié du XXe siècle, les personnages se dévoilent aisément aux
lecteurs informés qui ont appris à les connaître, à déchiffrer leur psychologie en s’appuyant sur
certaines méthodes récemment popularisées, qui tendent à donner plus d’épaisseur, de
complexité à leurs caractères, comme celle de Freud. À la fin du siècle, ces méthodes sont
toutefois trop bien connues des lecteurs. L’attention accordée à l’apparence physique, aux objets
qui meublent la scène, au temps qu’il fait, même, est censée donner vie au personnage, mais
comment un aride exercice mathématique pourrait-il créer la vie? Au mieux, il fournit une série
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d’équations qui se résout en un type. Et quand les lecteurs reconnaissent un type, leur intellect
complète aussitôt le portrait avec le résidu des romans, contes, articles et récits vécus qu’ils ont
déjà lus. Ils «escamotent» le personnage qu’ils ont sous les yeux parce que leur esprit, saturé
d’images intertextuelles, ne veut percevoir que ses aspects connus, familiers.
Ces paradigmes de la connaissance sont construits, mais aussi innés, comme l’enseignait Jung.
En longue durée, les mutations sociales ont des effets puissants sur nos facultés et capacités
d’interprétation, de traduction, de décodage
— de compréhension. La deuxième partie de cette
thèse, «Commodity Fiction », analyse les mutations de la société occidentale qui ont modifié les
mentalités individuelles, notamment l’industrialisation, qui réduit l’individu à un simple rouage
de la machine sociale. La chaîne de montage s’est si bien imposée comme métaphore de la vie
dans cette société que son inexorabilité a déteint sur les personnages de roman, sapant leur foi
dans le pouvoir de l’initiative individuelle. Quand la lectrice adhérait au récit, elle adhérait en
même temps à un mode de vie nouveau qui remplaçait les Vérités par des fictions.
La société (y compris ses institutions publiques et politiques) étant réduite à une
mécanique, à un système perfectionné de pièces imbriquées, les habitants de la machine narrative
pouvaient difficilement justifier une identité, des désirs et des motivations complexes. La
machine ne fonctionnerait efficacement que s’ils sortaient du même moule, s’ils étaient
semblables, sinon identiques s des «copies de copies ». Après l’adhésion aux styles de vie, nous
examinons l’adhésion aux types de caractères dans le troisième chapitre, «Character as
commodity ».
Les chapitres quatre et cinq sont consacrés respectivement à Bret Easton Ellis et Douglas
Coupland, deux écrivains contemporains dont l’oeuvre s’inscrit dans cette problématique, mais
échappe à la reconnaissance systématique. Membres d’un courant littéraire relativement neuf ils
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écrivent de la «blank fiction » selon l’expression du critique James Annesley: des romans dont
les personnages, parfaitement «lisses », ne révèlent que leur surface. Le texte ne livre presque
rien sur leurs motivations ni sur les pressions qu’ils subissent. L’interprétation conventionnelle
devient une traduction littérale de symboles — le renvoi remplace la reflexion. Ce que
Coupland résume ainsi dans The New Republic: «Démoniser les analystes symboliques » (« 55
Statements about the Culture» 10). Comme l’écrit Robert B. Reich, les analystes symboliques
résolvent, définissent et interprètent les problèmes par la manipulation de symboles. Ils
simplifient la réalité, la réduisent à des images abstraites avec lesquelles on peut jouer,
jongler, expérimenter.. . Ces manipulations exigent un outillage analytique...
algorithmes mathématiques, raisonnements juridiques, montages financiers, principes
scientifiques, aptitudes psychologiques à persuader ou amuser, systèmes inductifs,
déductifs ou autres procédés permettant de résoudre une énignie conceptuelle. (Reich,
Work ofNations 178)
Le lecteur moyen approche aujourd’hui la littérature d’une manière assez similaire —
comme une énigme à résoudre par la manipulation de symboles. Il se peut, toutefois, que les
nouveaux éléments d’information
— l’affect produit par la vie dans la société contemporaine
— se
traduisent mal dans la symbolique habituelle ou la conduite d’un personnage conventionnel. Le
lecteur sera alors tenté d’« escamoter », consciemment ou non, cette information jugée
superfétatoire.
En «escamotant» des traits de caractère apparemment superficiels ou redondants, il
escamote des détails peut-être essentiels à une interprétation plus «complète » du personnage et
peut s’imaginer, à tort, qu’une relecture n’apporterait aucun éclairage nouveau. L’erreur consiste
ici à rejeter des renseignements susceptibles de modifier la compréhension du personnage; le
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lecteur choisit de négliger ou de traiter comme une aberration le détail impossible à concilier
avec une exégèse sans faille apparente. Pourtant, cette information peut parfois inspirer à
l’interprète un regard dffe’rent. Vu sous cet angle, le personnage ne peut plus être épinglé ni
étiqueté. Ce qui rend la chose possible, c’est la récupération du détail descriptif inassimilable, du
petit geste, de la pensée fugitive, de la remarque désinvolte. Du coup, un personnage sans relief
comme le Bartleby de Herman Melville ne peut plus être écarté ni justifié par la « perte
irréparable pour la littérature » qu’invoque son employeur. Ma thèse montre que cette perte, cette
disparition du personnage conventionnel de roman, est, de façon paradoxale, un gain substantiel
pour le lecteur.
Mot clés: caractérisation, Douglas Coupland, Bret Easton Ellis, littérature américaine, littérature
canadienne, narratif, postmodemism
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Introduction:
The Ordinary Man Makes Do
From the first literary depiction of the office cubicle in Melv
ille’s “Bartleby, the
Scrivener” to the cÏockwork machinezy of Chaplin’s Modem Times, artis
ts from the 19th and
20th centuries have portrayed the glory of technology with an acc
ompanying paradoxical
horror that arises from the processing and packaging of human
lives. The lack of heroism, the
kind that is worthy of admiration, resulted in a distancing from
the romance of the preceding
century. Emerson, Wordsworth, and Coleridge strove to uncov
er the glorious depths and
heights of the sublime, which could often be attained tbroug
h spiritual revolution. Often, they
left the burgeonmg cities and rejoined nature rather than suffocate in the wake of
technological innovation. As industrialization took hold and sp
read, however, the writer’s
focus began to change. No longer would he cloister himself aw
ay and ignore the smokestacks
ofthe wasteland. No longer did individualization and freedom
invoke great feelings ofbelief
in expansionism and progress. Instead of spiraling inward to g
reat depths, or upwards
towards metaphysical union, modem man found himself stm
ggling to find space in an ever
shrinking box: the office or work cubicle became a physicaÏ manifestation
ofthe
demographie ordering of society.
Section I ofthis study describes how, by the end ofthe
19th centuly, individuals had
more than willingly allowed themselves to be labeled and
sorted; more often, they themselves
strove to find social tities to designate themselves as “som
ebodies” who were distinct from
others in society, as Deirdre Shauna Lyiich discusses in he
r The Econorny of Character. Ibis
is an important phenomenon to note, one that marked the r
etum from society’s focus on the
IndividuaÏ to its dependence on social hierarchies and demographic g
rids to ascertain human
value and worth. But the apparent exhilaration of this ac
tivity floundered as individuality
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seemed to recede from these labels. This
modem stage finds its roots as far back as
Herman
Melville’s short story “Bartleby: the Scnve
ner,” one of the alienated “modem men”
or the
Modem Man, as he is referred to by Mauric
e Friedman in Probternatic RebeÏ, his study of
alienated characters in literature. from the w
ide-open landscapes and endlessness ofthe
romantic idyli, our cognitive structures have
no doubt changed; they have apparently b
een
shaped by the twenticth century and industr
ialization to mimic the important technologie
s
that marked our era: the production une, the
computer and the binary code. Thus we look
for
signs, for symbols, for motifs that are easily
translatable, easiÏy consumable and tumed into a
product. For this reason, literary works will be
approached from the perspective of cntical
and popular reception; it is the consensual in
terpretation of fiction that builds the stage for
a
more radical interpretive approach. As welI,
the concept ofcharacters as icons or products
will be developed through already-existing f
iterary studies, including those of the champi
on
of the “new nove!,” Alain Robbe-Grillet, wh
ich criticize the practice of evaluating narrat
ive
description as a revelation of the psychosocial
nature of a character.
Section II outiines a vision of ‘progress’ in th
is reaim of art, a progression from the
absolutes of mies and convention, to Ïoss of fonnal co
nvention, to loss of almost any
convention which is where we are today. As th
e focus on classical forms and conventions
waned, new ideas of freedom and liberalism
took hold; the sense of a work of art evoking
feelings of admiration or sublime was a great
er reward than the sense of admiration for t
he
correctness of an object’s outer fonn, as in the classical ag
e of art. Part ofthis may be linked
to the increasing presence of institutional f
orms in society, structures which began to m
ake us
think after them. Foucault in Discipline a
nd Pt,nish shows how the subject not only began to
think in the received form of logic that was
passed through the structures which held h
im, but
began to propagate it forward, through to th
e relationships and effects he had within s
ociety.
More and more, as the twentieth century
progressed, the art form feu back to a sort
of
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structure that bespoke of “form” and “function,” yet lacked the familiar sense of completion
and beauty that the classical emphasis on these things produced. The problem was that the
“structure” of forms, while flot necessanly manifest in the actual art object, had been
mtemahzed in the artist’s psyche. The difference in the artists’ rendenngs between the two
time periods is obvious; whiÏe classicists upheld structure as a way to present their imaginary,
the imaginaries of artists today are built on top ofthe structure. The modem complaint that
ail stories have been done would seem justified. Where writers of romanticism often escaped
from the burgeoning cities to reflect on beauty, writers today may escape physicaiiy but
remain psychicaiiy entrenched within both positive and negative processes of
industrialization. Critics such as fredric Jameson argue that postmodemisrn began when
society abandoned the production une as a sustaming metaphor ofmotivational drive and
took up the consumption of the production une instead. This development has a great impact
on the focus of this smdy, especially when it is considered in the light of Michel de Certeau’s
tue Practice ofEvetyday Lfe, in which the author writes,
To a rationalized, expansionist and at thc same time centralized, clamorous, and
spectacular production corresponds another production, called “consumption.” The
latter is devious, it is dispersed, but it insinuates itself everywhere, silently and almost
invisibly, because it does flot manifest itseif through its own products, but rather
through its ways ofusing the products imposed by a dominant economic order. (xiii
xiv)
It is also about this time that the writer’s consumption of narrative (codes) vent into
overdrive and remains today, pumping out the same process that narrative provides a
sequence for, rather than the writer stepping back for a moment and attempting to change the
product for a moment and go into a new direction. This naturally derives from the
sociological acknowledgement that, to some degree, most people’s everyday appearance is a
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good part production, even part “packaging.” This is discussed in Section III, where it is
noted that characters on a page, over whom it is assumed the author has total control, must be
products in the tmest sense of the word. The authors studiedhere seem to be aware ofthe
truth behind Robbe-Grillet’s criticism; they tend flot to supply much physical detail. Even the
main character in Ellis’s Arnerican Psycho, who obsessively lists, via interior monologue,
brands and pnces of each product he uses, stiil neglects physical description of himself.
Accordingly, most popular fiction ofthe late twentieth centuiy maintains a strong grip
on narrative as its saving vaLue. But as Vladimir Propp’s Morphology ofthe folk-tale shows,
there are a limited number of narratives available. The question, then, is whether there is a
way to figure character into the plot so as to significantly alter the meaning of the narrative.
Wliat if character, long despised for its flatness or, conversely, for its overpsychologized
portrayal, were able to act as an agent of its own fate? To take himself somewhere other than
where the overarching narrative intends to deposit him? De Certeau writes that even those
artists who are consurners have the power (o make something new from their acts ofusing otd
formulas: there is “a whole literature called “popular” . . . [that] present[sj [itsetf] essentially
as “arts or making” this or that, i.e., as combinatory or utilizing modes ofconsumption. These
practices bring into play a “popular” ratio, a way of thinking investcd in a way of acting, an
art of combination which cannot be dissociated from an art ofusing” (Practice xii). This
study hopes to uncover a way to read characters in a way that usurps the narrative meant to
contain them. The similarity they share is that of the “ordinary man,” (o whom de Certeau
dedicates TIte Practice ofEvetyday Lfe:
To the ordinary man.
b a common hero, an ubiquitous character, walking in countless thousands on the
streets. . . . What are we asking this oracle whose voice is ahnost indistinguishable
from the rumble ofhistoiy to license us, to authonze us to say, whcn we dedicate to
4
him the wnting that one formerly offered in praise of the gods or the inspiring muses..
The increasingly sociotogical and anthropological perspective of inquity privileges
the anonymous and the everyday in which zoom lenses eut out metonymic details—
parts for the wholc. Slowly the representatives that formerly symbolized families,
groups, and orders disappear from the stage they dominated during the epoch of the
name. We witness the advent of the number. li cornes along with democracy, the large
city, administrations, cybemetics. It is a flexible and continuous mass, woven tight
like a fabric with neither nps nor damed patches, a multitude of quantified heroes
who lose names and faces as they become the ciphered river of the streets, a mobile
language of computations and rationalities that belong to no one. (y)
Section IV will begin with a discussion ofthe tendency to vaÏorize onc type of
reading over another, taking into account the “interpretive communities” of Stanley Fish.
Concurrenfly, a particular sociohistoncal time period manifests itself in different ways on the
wnter’s rendering (as well as on the reader’s interpretation). Referring to Philippe Sollers’s
Writing and die Experience ofLimits, it will be shown that a simple “demonstration” of
character motivation orfeeling is flot aiways sufficient to revealing true motivation or
meaning. Sollers believes the reader must be persuaded of something new. It is assumed that
once a new perspective is glimpsed, one must mvestigate to find whether some kind of
“intellectual proof’ exists. In order to find this proof, this study uses an approach that
bonows from Russian formalism, deconstruction and sociology. But, at base, it begins from
the feeling that arises when one fmishes reading a novel and experiences a sense ofclosure
that is insincere. Or the feeling that the character finally “sees the light” and changes his ways
‘only because he knows it is expected of him.
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Because of this change in reading habits, Bloom is forced to cail for “the recove,y of
tue ironie” (25). This is one of his major principles for “the restoration of reading.” As he
writes,
Think of the endless irony of Hamiet, who when he says one thing almost invanably
means another, frequently indeed the opposite of what he says. But with this principle,
I am close to despair, since you can no more teach someone to be ironic than you cari
mstmct (hem to become solitary. And yet the Ïoss of irony is the death ofreading, and
of what had been civilized in our natures. (25)
Irony, the space between what is said and what is meant, depends very much on the
reader, as well as on the author’s apparent intention. The three kinds of “tactics,” in the de
Certeauean sense, employed by the character that is the focus of this study wilt be shown, at
times, to introduce irony into the narrative. The first tactic that empowers character is the
Russian fonnalist concept of “making strange,” what will be referred to here as “overblown.”
The second is by creating a state of Derridean undecideability, or aporia. The third tactic a
cliaracter may choose is to present a “mask” behind which he proves to be “missing-in
action.”
“Tactical” readings of works by Bret Easton Ellis and Douglas Coupland will be
presented, alongside their more traditional readings. These authors are significant because
they often share the sensibility of using their characters’ material subjectivities as the bases of
their characterizations. But what is original, and important, about their renderings is that they
introduce a significant amount ofmaterial, alongside their postmodem characterizations, that
work against stereotype. In this way, the character jubilantly defies being ‘flattened’ by a
reader’s tendency to allot character(istics) only to certain “types” and dismiss that which does
flot fit.
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It will be argued that the fictions of Coupland and Ellis preclude a “mathematical”
symbology by utilizing methods that do flot allow easy appropriation by traditional methods
of literary interpretation. What will be referred to as the ‘narrative’ in their works is a
traditional interpretation, using current practices ofinterpretation. These will flot be
‘absolute’ readings, but readings in which a general “interpretive comrnunity” would find
most concordance. following this, the sarne works will be read in a different manner. These
subsequent readings add value to the works by highlighting the existence of an excess of
meaning, which will have a great impact on the way the main characters are viewed. As with
de Certcau’s tactics, this reading
introduces an “art” which is anything but passive. It resembles rather that art whose
theory was developed by medieval poets and rornancers: an innovation infiltrated into
the text and even into the terms ofa tradition. linbricated within the strategies of
rnodemity (which identify creation with the invention of a personal language, whether
cultural or scientific), the procedures of contemporary consumption appear to
constitute subtie art of”renters” who know how to insinuate their countless
differences into the dominant text. In the Middle Ages, the text was framed by the
four, or seven, interpretations of which it was held to be susceptible. And it was a
book. Today, this text no longer cornes from a tradition. It is imposed by the
generation of a production technocracy. It is no longer a referential book, but a whole
society made into a book, into the writing ofthe anonymous law of production.
(Tue Practice ofEvetyday Lfe xiii)
It is hoped that this “creation” allows the characters in Ellis and Coupland to redeem
themselves, or recover agency, by throwing a wrench into the machine of narratival
accommodation.
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Section I
A Short llistory of “Character”:
From Everyman to the Romantic Individual
to the Automaton
If a kind of characterological history is attempted when identifying the sociohistorical
underpinnings of character and characterization, a particular theme ultirnately cornes into focus.
From its ancient beginnings, character seerns to have (r)evolved ftorn Aristotle’s functional
representations, to the rounded ‘individuals’ who becorne rnuch more fully realized during the
descriptive age of Realism, then to the experimental age of Modernisrn, and back to the flattened
outiines that, once again, approacli allegory. Although it appears that the allegory manages to
survive to the end of the second millennium, its purposive nature changes in important and
meaningful ways.
I. The Inclusive Spîrït of Everyman
Evervman: A Morality Ptay was written at the end of the 15 century. The particular
genre to which the allegory belonged (and which also included mystery or miracle plays)
maintained its populanty between the 51h and 15th centuries. In the play, Death cornes for
Everyman, and when Everyman attempts to persuade his friends, including Beauty, Worldly
Goods, and Kindred to go with him, they each refuse. In the end, only Good Deeds is willing to
go with him. The moral is that doing good deeds in life should be highly valued, rather than
$
worldly objects or other things of a similarly transitory nature. In lier article “from Eveiyman
and Elckerfljc to Hofmansthal and Kafka,” Helen Adoif points out that
from its first appearance on the late mediaeval stage, Eveiyman had the tendency to
attract and to assimilate new motifs and to alter their meaning. . . . Thus Eveiyman,
having served religious tenets ofthe pre-Reformation and Reformation eras, survived into
our times and is as poignant. . . [in the] waxing atomic age, as it was in the waning
Middle Ages. (204)
That Everyman was written anonymously invested the morality play with a cachet of equality
and brotherhood, establishing the positive social aspects ofovercoming social hierarchies.
Allegories that are wntten today maintain the traditional concept ofuniversal equality; the
difference from the medieval version ofthe allegory is that the alteration of meaning that Adoif
identifies in Everyrnan is radicalized, such that the dynamic in contemporary allegory between
traditional and ‘new’ meanings produces the theme that democracy alone does flot guarantee
emancipation. Although the more obvious class markers ofhierarchy have disappeared from the
social sphere since the days of Everyman, a hierarchy based on socioeconomic authority has
remained entrenched and as powerful as ever because of its intemalization, not only by the
collective but also by the personal unconscious. While in the past anonymity united the nameless
and faceless in a spirit of brotherhood, anonymity today unites the nameless and faceless with the
curse ofalienation: together, they are eut off from communing.
What attracts the reader to the allegory ofEveiyrnan is this existential theme, as well as
its continued relevance which obtains for a broader audience. But why should the theme of
Everyman stili obtain in a (post)modem world? To answer this question, another question must
be answered first: Is character an intrinsic set of qualities, or something that is a resuit of shaping
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and circumstance? Indeed, this study will approach the ‘ordering’ ofcharacter by the
socioeconomic framework, including but flot limited to the work-world. Today, the world of
work endows one with a title and a readymade lifestyle; however, choosing to inhabit a
readymade position shapes character into a final mold that is more functional than ‘full’ and,
even more alarming, divests character of agency. As an institution, the (post)modem work-world
depersonalizes and then dehurnanizes individual character—of real-life individuals as well as
those portrayed in literature—such that it may be said that the purpose of modem work is to
streamiine human life into an extremely basic functionality; the strategies used in effecting this
“docile” state of existence are what Michel Foucault calls “disciplinary technologies.” According
to Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, “[w]ithout the insertion of disciplined, orderly
individuals into the machinery of production, the... demands of capitalism would have been
stymied” (135). These individual characters are consistently molded to better fit the
socioeconomic system.
At this point, it is helpful to delineate an approach from which character may be studied
in a fruitful and useful manner. In an article published in Critical Inquiiy, Rawdon Wilson points
out that, at its base, it is a difficuit task: “It is flot possible to face a text and announce ‘I shah
now talk about character’ in the same way that one might say ‘I shail now talk about plot’ or
‘metaphor” (“The Bright Chimera” 730). He summarizes the ways of examining character as
follows:
(1) characters are products ofthe author’s mind—memories, encapsulations ofhis
experience or else (one might say) split-offslivers ofhis mmd or self;
(2) characters are functions ofthe text in which they appear—embodiments oftheme and
idea—to be considered much as tokens, pieces, or counters in a game;
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(3) characters are entireÎy artificial, constructs to be analyzed in terms ofthe
compositional techniques that have gone into their making;
(4) characters are, for the purposes of critical reading, to be considered as if they were
actual persons, and the emphasis in criticism—its sole business, in fact—to discuss the
response they engender in an intelligent reader. (730)
As Wilson emphasizes, the categories are flot discrete. Certainly, any sophisticated methodology
would make use of more than one of them, and this study brings each into play at certain times,
focusing eventually on approaching character as a function of the text.
Then, to differentiate between the uses of ‘character’ and ‘personality’ in theoretical
discussion, it is useful to tum to Christopher Gill’s articulation of the differences in his article
“The Character-Personality Distinction”:
I have associated the term ‘character’ with the process ofmaking moral judgements; and
Ï have taken this process to involve (i) placing people in a determinate ethical ftamework
and (ii) treating them as psychological and moral ‘agents’, that is, as the originators of
intentional actions fr which they are normally held responsible and which are treated as
indices of goodness or badness of character. The term ‘personality’, on the other hand, I
have associated with responses of a different type. I have connected it with a response to
people that is empathetic rather than moral: that is, with the desire to identify oneselfwith
another person, to ‘get inside her skin,’ rather than to appraise her ‘from the outside.’ I
have also connected it with a concem with the person as unique individual (or as the
possessor ofa ‘real’ or ‘authentic’ self) rather than as the bearer ofcharacter-traits which
are assessed by reference to general moral norms. I have aÏso associated it wïth a
perspective in which the person is seen as psychologically passive; that is, as someone
li
whose nature and behaviour are determined by forces which faïl outside her control as an
agent and perhaps outside her consciousness as weil. In defining the distinction in this
way, I have drawn on some commonplace connotations ofthe terms ‘character’ and
‘personality,’ especially the association of ‘character’ with moral appraisal, and that of
‘personality’ both with unique individuality or identity and with ‘scientific’ approaches to
the person. I am well aware that the meanings of the two terms, in so far as they are
distinguished at ail, are flot aiways distinguished in quite this way. My main aim lias flot
been simply to reproduce ordinary usage but to regiment or simplify it, so as to define
more clearly two different ways ofviewing persons, both in real life and in literature.
(Gui 2-3)
Thus, personality may be delineated only if the character has been a priori defined as authentic
(realistic, truc to life—humanized) since, along the fines of Sigmund Freud, a character requires
that common basis ofhuman psychology from which to draw.
In this study, character is generally approached with an aim to emphasizing (1)
authenticity: where the character lends itselfto a reading that problematizes itselfprimarily
through its engagement with the socioeconomic framework (largely through the character’s
relationship to the institution ofwork as a disciplinary structure); and (2) agency: instances or
possibilities of empowerment through, or perhaps by evading, the narrative or institutional
framework. As weIl, it is crucial to keep in mmd that “cliaracter is only one part of ‘the total
image ofhuman existence’ that a literary work presents” (Pelling 261). In some works, the
narrative and socioeconomic ftameworks seem to overlïe each other: in fact, the literary narrative
is posited as a framework built on the veiy material conditions that provide the institutional
structure of contemporary society. These sometimes hidden ideologies produce literary
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narratives as well as social institutions. The nature ofthis ideoiogy-producing framework (both
narrative and socioeconomic) is that it creates, intentionaliy and unintentionaily, areas of
privilege which function to keep out; spaces that are accessible to ail; and ‘plots’ of space which
successfully keep in (ail this leads irresistibly to an image of the Author literally ‘plotting’ his
evil machinations). The lacunae, or gaps, that remain to be found in between these ‘plots’ of
space ultimately are one ofthe foci ofthis project.
The danger in attempting a kind of literary history is that contexts in which authors write
may be finessed to a degree in order to uphold a chosen evolutionary theme, thereby priviieging
the neatness of a streamiined approach over real, historicai events. On the other hand, it is crucial
to attempt to show that connections of humanity as depicted in literature—whatever these
connections may be—maintain over time and throughout changing social conditions. This is
ofien one of the first things that is emphasized to students of literature, and as long as the urge to
find a shared commonality among different time-periods and cuitures does flot fail into
homogenization, this movement towards finding the “human intelligibiiity’ ofthe scene”
(Pelling 254) is a worthy pursuit.
When the pursuit is ofthe ‘individual’, however, the terrain can prove rough. As Pelling
writes, the “individual’ has aiways proved a slippery figure” (y). This is because, as society and
its conventions change, ideas about literature and how to gauge the value of the elements (flot
oniy character, but plot, theme, etc.) within it, change as well. Different historical periods are
mled by dïfferent literary conventions and movements and, in gauging the importance of a
writer’s work, one element of, or approach to, literature is often privileged over the other. For
example, “the modem expectation of idiosyncrasy [to ‘mark’ character] contrasts with the Greek
taste for the normative, and that is a matter of our and their unreflective popular assumptions, not
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just of generic expectations” (vi). Or, “in Hindu culture, for instance [with which “Greek culture
aligns more closely”j, the concept of a person is more holistic and assumes a greater dependence
on social context,. [meaning that] aduits are far readier to categorize both deviant and socially
commended behaviour of others in terms of circumstances rather than dispositions” (247). StilI,
Pelling finds significant historical traces ofthe ‘individual’:
He was discovered by the lyric poets, we are told; or in Athens, at the end ofthe fifth
century; or by Plato, with his portrait of Socrates; or in the Hellenistic age, or by the
Roman poets, or by the Antonines; or by Augustine. Perhaps he has been there ail the
time, lurking in Homer’s Achilles and Odysseus. $till, lie had evidently fled away again
by the early Middle Ages, only to be rediscovered first in 1050-1200; then, according to
Burckhardt’s famous analysis, in Renaissance Itaiy; then again in the sixteenth,
seventeenth, or eighteenth centuries. (y)
Again, it “ait depends on what we mean” and, for Pelling as for the aims ofthis project, what
may be inferred by the term ‘individuals’ are “men who followed their own nature (phusis) and
despised artificial human conventions (nomoi)... . [This] idea became more sophisticated in
later antiquity, with much more scope for individual variations of values and aims” (vi).
Determining the status and situation of the individual in society necessitates an
understanding ofthe effects ofthe nature of work in that society. To properly evaluate modem
work, one must revisit what may 5e Ioosely considered the originary site of ‘authentic’ work.
Almost two millennia before Eveîyman was written, Virgil began the long process of writing his
Georgics from 36 to 29 B.C. The Georgics is a long poem that aims to glorify work. Images of
labourers in these poems are not ‘stock’ characters that lack individuality, as those found in
many contemporary works of literature. In fact, the worker is extolled, and the work itself is
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honoured as a method of bringing oneseif doser to God, and doser to a more authentic daily life.
The type of work portrayed in these poems is extremely important. The labourer in the georgic
works the land and enjoys the effort he puts into producing the fruits ofhis labour. The general
theme ofthe poem is that by nurturing a close relationship with the earth, and a genuine
appreciation for the growing cycles of nature, one will gain a powerftfl sense of satisfaction and
“cairn.” There is a natural rhythm ofiife to which the worker is attuned, and this creates the truly
authentic individual. His calendar runs on the changing ofthe seasons, rather than on social
engagements or the political situation. As Thomas Bailey writes in his article “Searching for ‘A
Life that Will Not Cheat You,” “Virgil could comment on contemporary Roman politics by
seeming to ignore them [in his poetry, just as] contemporary writers ofthe georgic in spuming
the contemporary world of the city are making political statements” (Bailey, par. 6). Not only do
these poets build a spiritual and physical retreat from the burgeoning city, they could also reject
“the econornic and political systems which keep [urban] culture in place” (par. 6). This is
extremely important because it maintains a crucial distance ftom the political and socioeconomic
forces that impose excessive order on the everyday life of the modem worker. Yet, as Bailey
reminds the reader, while Virgil offered a comforting retreat for the reader in his Georgics, he “is
overwhelmingly a poet ofanxiety” (par. 3). In fact, the calm and reassurance ofthe georgics
were a counter-reaction to an increasingly unstable world, one which, if magnified in scope, can
be seen to resemble contemporary society. It is noteworthy that the genre of the georgic, or
“work poem,” has survived throughout the centuries, with poets contributing from diverse fields
of work. for example, Tom Wayman is a prolific writer who uses work, such as teaching, but
including manual labour, as subjects for his poetry. In the introduction to his collection ofpoetry,
Did I Miss Anything?, lie acknowledges that the workplace constitutes its own “society” in which
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“democratic rights and fteedoms” of individuais are suspended. Interestingiy, this elernent is flot
completely absent from the old georgics which glonfied agricultural work that was simpler and
more “natural” than work one might have found in the bustie and disingenuousness of town. As
David Siavitt believes, “No matter how clear or careful the work, [the worker suffers the anxiety
ofknowing that] ït can ail vanish in an instant” (Slavitt qtd. in Bailey, par. 3). That is to say, the
fear of”redundancy” that is oflen considered specific to the modem worker may have long roots,
and even the work that was valorized by Virgil may fali victim to a degree of the innovation
found in the contemporary workplace.
While this agency or its lack comprises only one component of a character, it is
especialiy important because it directiy affects the character’s abiiity to engage the reader. Virgil,
along with other poets ofthe georgic-style camp, would consider an authentic lifestyle to yield a
more authentic character. This quality of authenticity has the abiiity to add to or detract from the
reader’s interest in the story such that it is a crucial elernent in any critical discussion of
literature. Perhaps for this reason it is aiso an area fraught with controversy. Writing about three
hundred years earlier, Aristotie placed less emphasis on “working the earth” to evoke
authenticity in his persona, and more emphasis on the literary conventions which must regulate
the actions represented in poetry. That “men in action” (ch. II) are objects of representation is a
recurring statement in his Poetics, written around 350 B.C. In writing about literature and art in
general, Aristotie spoke ofien of”imitation” as an important human instinct. In fact, he suggests
that man finds more pieasure in an imitation that is highly-wrought than in the thing itself. As
weil, he emphasizes, it is the situation that interests the reader. “Tragedy is an imitation, not of
men, but of an action and of life” (ch. VI). For Aristotie, “Dramatic action.. . is flot with a view
to the representation ofcharacter: character cornes in as subsidiary to the actions” (ch. VI) $uch
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a view suggests a devalorizing of character. Although he offers the “proof. . . that novices in the
art attain to finish of diction and precision of portraiture [characterizationJ before they can
construct the plot,” he also admits that “The tragedies of most of our modem poets fail in the
rendering of character; and ofpoets in general this is oflen true” (eh. VI). He goes on to say that
“Character holds the second place. A similar fact is seen in painting. The most beautiful colors,
laid on confusedly, will flot give as much pleasure as the chalk outline of a portrait” (cli. VI). It is
the importance of this “chalk outline” that maintains significance tbrough to modem day.
Indeed, in the Conclusion to Characterisation and IndividuaÏity in Greek Literature,
Christopher Pelling writes that Aristotle “certainly does not share the modem prejudice that the
function of action is to reveal character” (Pelling 256). for Aristotie, the function of action is to
precipitate catharsis, or “emotional purging” in the reader. If the artist creates a convincing
imitation of circumstance, the reader will imitate the emotions of the character, either by
“taki[ingj the moulU of any character. . . [or being] lified out ofhis proper self’ (eh. XVII). The
suggestion that characters are subject-positions that the reader variously inhabits is intriguing,
especially for thinkers of Aristotle’s day who conceptualized themselves as contnbuting to a
greater collective (the Church, Society) rather than the differentiation of self. Although he
emphasizes the art of imitation in producing successful writing, he acknowledges the human
limits of empathy. When lie writes that “sameness of incident [action] soon produces satiety, and
makes tragedies fail on the stage” (eh. XXIV), one wonders whether there is also a saturation
point for sameness of character.
In America, by the early 1 600s, the concepts of the individual and individual thinking
faced a great challenge, particularly from changes to the constitution of the country. An immense
number ofpeople from the colonies in Great Britain came to New England within a span of
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several decades. Settiers of the Plymouth Colony were known as Fiigrim Fathers, and those from
the Massachusetts Bay Colony were mostly Puritans. Puntans believed strongiy in the following:
1. Original $in: every person is boni sinful
2. Unconditional Election: God “saves” whom he wishes, not ail
3. Limited Atonement: Jesus died for the chosen only, flot everyone
4. Inesistibie Grace: this is freely given and caimot be eamed or denied
5. Perseverance ofthe Saints: saints have the power to interpret God’s will
and to live uprightiy (Reuben, sec. I)
These convictions had a great effect on the way Puritans thought about and wrote literature. One
important example is that they used ‘types’ to understand and to propagate biblical teachings:
“Moses prefigures Jesus, Jonah’s patience is reflected in Jesus’ ordeal on the cross, and Moses’
journey out of Egypt is played out in the Pilgrims’ crossing of the Atiantic.” As well, they
interpreted “natural phenomena like flooding, bountifiul harvest, invasion oflocusts, and
iightening” as “God’s wrath and reward” (Reuben, sec. I). These beliefs contributed to a literary
tradition that relied heavily, if not compÏetely, on received notions of symbol and mythology.
While the Puritan work ethic positively influenced the development of the colonies, and the state
ofthe nation, in general, there was certainly a point at which the Puntan lifestyle began to decay.
Some ofthe reasons posited for this corrosion are “manifestations ofpnde, especially among the
new rich,” a “decay in family government,” the “rise in lawsuits and lawyers” and a “decay in
business morality” (Reuben, sec. VII), such as lying and underpaying which, interestingly
enough, may be said ofpostindustrial societies. Ultimateiy, the religious and social regulations
led many to be dissatisfied with the lifestyle, yeaming for something else. One of the reasons for
this was the “Dislike of a closed life” (sec. VI), in which interpretation of ail rules, teachings,
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writings and events were decided upon by those holding power and enforced upon the rest. Very
oflen, this is what attracted Puritans to new ideas of individuaiism and seif-reliance.
As Gutenberg’s pnnting press gained popuiarity, these ideas, which had originally been
available to a privileged few, began to circulate wideiy. As Marshall McLuhan writes in The
Gutenberg GaÏaxy, “The portability of the book, like that ofthe easel-painting, added much to
the new cuit of individualism” (206). Books containing allegorical character types in the manner
of Paul Bunyan’s Piigrim ‘s Progress (167$) “in which, for instance, it is clear what Obstinate
means as a character” (Docherty 10), and Joseph Hail’s Characters of Virtues and Vices (160$),
which gives descriptions of familiar stereotypes like “the Wiseman” and “the Busybody,” began
to lose public interest. Eventually, the “l7th century fashion of character-writing culminated in
France [in 1694] with the much-admired Les Charactères of Jean de la Bruyère” (Sonjae, par. 8).
Just 25 years later, DanieÏ Defoe would write Robinson Crusoe to great popular and critical
acclaim, signifying the movement from depicting type in literature towards a more “unfettered
human person.” Although the character of Crusoe would be seen as “a modem Everyman,” he
was an Everyman infused with the spirit of agency, “isolated [yetJ . . . refus[ing] to succumb to
misfortune.” The book “defined the spirit ofthe age that lay ahead: an age of enterprise and
individuaiism, ofhope and confidence in the benefits ofmaterial civilization” (Sonjae, par. 16)
rather than its dehumanizing potential. These and other new ideas ftom Romantic thinkers began
to intrigue people. Instead oflooking at the world “scientifically’ for a truth that could be
verified in this material civilization,” the individual would search deeper in oneseif, or, in
Metaphysical terms, upwards towards a higher reaim, in order to ‘know’ truth. Indeed,
The denuding of conscious life and its reduction to a single level created the new world
of the unconscious in the seventeenth century. The stage ha[d] been cieared for the
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archetypes or postures of individual mmd, and {was] ready for the archetypes of the
collective unconscious. (McLuhan 244).
Roughly speaking, the documenting of a variety of character ‘types,’ as in Bunyan’s and Hail’s
books, might be seen in the seventeenth century as one writer’s manifestation ofunconscious
archetypes. Thus, whereas the older viewpoint wouid be that a person would generally fali under
one type, the new way of thinking was that the individual personality could possess traits from
one or more, or ail, ofthese types. Personality, and the generaily accepted understanding of
personaiity, became complicated. Peopie became aware that the surface was oniy part of their
reality, and that there were other unseen, unquantifiable elements to human nature. Appearance
was probiematized, and a whoie new world ofunderstanding opened up. This “denuding of
conscious life” and exploration of other kinds of awareness led to a new vogue of diary-writing.
This was a new kind of literary expression that took over from “character ‘writing,” which was
the practice of sketching character types that represented familiar types of people or groups,
along the unes of Bunyan and Hall. At this time, people began to be aware of the fact that there
was more to tend to than the surface; everyone possessed a “self,” that may have been just as, if
not more, important than their outer appearances. In Volume 3: “The Care of the Self’ of Michei
Foucault’s Histoiy ofSexuality, the theorist discusses the motivation behind se/improvement.
He refers to Socrates’s message in his Apology, which “remind[s] men that they need to concem
themselves not with their riches, flot with their honor, but with themselves and with their souls”
(Foucault 44). Thus, the emphasis shifis from the care and formation ofthe outer appearance to
that of the inner character. People had been fundamentally occupied with the status of their souls
during the previous centuries, shown by the principle of evaluating character based on the
character’s morality (‘goodness’ or ‘badness’), and aiso the character’s fears about life after
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death. “Morality plays spoke to medieval man’s anxiety about being prepared for death, or
‘dying weii’; they offer their audience a sort of ars moriendi (Latin for ‘the art of dying [well]’)”
(Schwartz, par. 1). Over a long period oftime, popular attitude began to shift towards living weIl,
too, as greater emphasis was placed on rationai, scientific thought and life in the materiai world.
In the past “scholars had been guided by the teachings ofthe church, and people had concemed
themselves with actions leading to heavenly rewards. The writings of ancient, pagan Greece and
Rome, caiied the ‘classics,’ had been greatly ignored” (Anrienberg, par. 3). In the new age,
Humanists became “inftuenced by the knowledge ofthese ancient [Greek and Roman]
civilizations and by the emphasis piaced on man, his intellect, and his life on Earth” (par. 4).
ii. The Agency of the Romantic Individual
The viability of the mies of tradition and government that had been passed down began to
be examined as new ways of thinking were celebrated. By the late eighteenth century, Aristotie’ s
emphasis on imitation would be criticized by Wiiliam Biake, who saw the copying of pre
existing forms of expression as redundant rather than the tme creation of the human imagination
that was sorely needed. In his many works, the Romantic poet-engraver drew a “firm and
determinate ‘bounding une’ (so to speak). . . in his mmd between the prevailing eighteenth
century conception of art as ‘imitation,’ mled by the repressive and backward-looking daughters
ofMemory, and art as ‘inspiration,’ released by the prophetic agents ofthe Divine Imagination”
(Klonsky 20). Most Blakean crities agree that his ideas about social strictures and their
deleterious effects on human consciousness were tmiy prophetic, especiaiiy for a poet of the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Indeed, his warnings about the ramifications of
reguiating the human imagination are very much cogent today. Like other Romantic poets, he
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viewed the prevailing dependency on purely scientific thought as extremely detrimental to
present and future generations ofhumankind. Pattems ofthinking, at the time, were based on
rational, empirical observation, in the manner of Newton, Bacon and Locke. Blake railed against
these “Satans”:
Newton says Doubt
Aye thats the way to make ail Nature out
Doubt Doubt & don’t believe without experiment
That is the very thing that Jesus meant
When he said Only Believe Believe & Try
Try Try & neyer mmd the Reason why.
(Blake, “To Nobodaddy” 184)
Here, the poet-prophet ridicules the scientific need to prove beyond a doubt before beliefcan
occur. Beliefpresupposes the inability to test the supposition; earthly proofwould naturally tum
believing into knowing, the intangible into the institution. Blake continues,
Mock on Mock on Voltaire Rousseau
Mock on Mock on tis ail in vain
You throw the sand against the wind
And the wind blows it back again. (184)
Though he addresses these proponents ofReason and Science, Blake not only disparages these
empirical thinkers for their “single-vision”; priests, teachers and other representatives of
institutional thought are just as guilty, for they enforce regulations without examination and,
thus, are “blind” leaders. These accepted forms of thought confine the human imagination,
creating “self-clos’d” man (his focus in The Book ofUrizen) and recalling the “[d]islike ofa
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closed life” that underrnined the Puritan lifestyle. The “self-clos’d” man is suggested in Blake’s
engraved “Preludium” to America: A Prophecy, where Orc, the spirit ofrebellion, literally
appears as if he is closing in upon himself. The chains lie ultimately frees himself from are flot
necessariiy depicted in ail of Blake’s illuminations, since the chains are often mental. In this
character is found the “captive,” “the slave grinding at the miii” and “the inchained soul,” arnong
others (Blake 112). According to Blakean mythology, this figure stands for an individual who
does not use lis natural faculties in order to experience the world; rather, he stays cocooned in
his own unexamined self. His point-of-view relies upon a knowledge that is imposed upon him,
instead of one which he cornes to understand for himself.
The institutions which impose point-of-view upon the unexamined self are symbolized by
patriarchal types, some ofwhorn are called “Nobodaddy,” Urizen, the Workmaster, or “Priests in
rustiing scaies / [who] Rush into reptile coverts” (America. A Prophecy 119). Urizen, who
possesses the “brazen lawbooks,” symbolizes the absolute rule of religion, government, and
authority and the institutions which accompany each. As has been pointed out by rnany Blake
critics, “Urizen” is a pun on “Your Reason,” and also suggests “horizon,” that is, the limit ofthe
material world. Blake saw these figures as literai and symbolic “priests,” often cloistering
themselves and others in order to enforce and maintain unexarnined laws. For hirn,
institutionalized religion was a “doctrine. . . constituting a rnechanisrn for gaining political
power over men and women through controi of their minds” (Nesfield-Cookson 17). He writes
of”rnental chains” and the “bonds of religion” (America: A Prophecy 116, 119). Blake
considered the practice of cloistering among priests exceptionaily reprehensible because it only
separated and alienated humankind. This separation is illustrated symbolicaliy in Blake’s work
when Urizen is shown with his compass, measuring, dividing and ruling the world. This is a
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prescient depiction of uncannily similar theories by postmodemists such as Jean Baudrillard,
who recognized that once “the social” is gauged, each individual is ‘slotted’ (or ‘socialized’) into
the framework; and also Michel Foucault, who identified the historical development of the
framework.
Blake asked the reader to “look ‘within’ to recognize the ‘without,’ to look ‘without’ to
recognize the ‘within’; to overcome set pattems, habits and conventions” (Nesfield-Cookson 12-
13). These “set patterns, habits and conventions” are ways of institutional thinking that limit the
human imagination such that many are doomed to live the “Sleep of Reason” or Rationality or
Science; in other words, they live the “closed life.” To experience the world through one’s own
faculties, sensual and imaginative, means that one will find the “New Jerusalem,” that is,
spiritual freedom. Like other Romantic thinkers, the poet identifies the concept that the
institution ofwork is a major factor in the desensitization ôfhumankind. He delineates between a
truly productive labour, and the highly industrialized work that had already begun to reveal
alarming social ramifications. This “alienated work” is associated with prison and “actual
dungeons” in the poet’s engravings (Punter 235). Again, Blake shows a highly astute
perceptiveness in that “the significance ofthe associations which [he] makes between different
compartments of social life is brought out in Horkheimer and Adomo’s study [The Dialectic of
Enlightenment (1972)], where they comment that prison is an image of the world of industrial
labour taken to its ‘logical conclusion” (235). An extremely prolific poet and engraver, Blake
was a man who was aiways working, for he “understood the value of steady, plodding, day-by
day work” (Johnson and Grant xxiii). Indeed, he understood that “The achievement of
communality through labour defeats even Etemal Death.” However, he also recognized that
“industrial labour, because it removes individuals from their products, carnes with it the danger
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that a kind of abstraction can intervene between man and his work” (Punter 229; emphasis
added). Indeed, when he describes a scene of impending rebellion, it is interesting to note that it
is the businessmen whose first job it is to put down their inauthentic dealings:
fury! rage! madness! in a wind swept through America,
And the red flames of Orc that folded roaring fierce around
The angry shores, and the fierce nishing bf th’inhabitants together:
The citizens ofNew York close their books & lock their chests;
The mariners of Boston drop their anchors and unlade;
The scribe of Pennsyivania casts his pen upon the earth;
The builder of Virginia tbrows lis hammer down in fear.
(America: A Prophecy 117)
To reunite with one’ s true self, then, one must first get away from commerce and apply
oneselfto the real work ofrealizing a new world. As David Punter writes, “the change in
perception which Blake looks toward must also be. . . [a change in] methods of work and the
organisation of social life” (236-37).
The necessity to reconnect with authentic labour is also found in Emerson’s influential
essay, “Self-Reiiance” (1841): “Do your work,” he writes, “and I shah know you. Do your work,
and you shah reinforce yourself’ (Essays 38). Emerson was another thinker who had identified
the disparity between a life of work that is faithful to the human spirit, and that of a more
industrial type that reduces the human spirit to mere functionality. In his essay, “On Character,”
he warns against the flattening ofthe individual by upholding the man who “animates ail he can,
and [who] sees only what he animates” (Essays 330). Here, the wnter suggests not only that man
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may avoid being dehumanized by institutional constraints, but that it is possible for him actualty
to anirnate or infuse the institution with humanity, a truly revolutionary concept today, let alone
in the mid-nineteenth century. Just as Blake called for a movement away from the received
institutions that upheld the “single vision” of Reason and Rationality, Emerson famously
declared “consistency [to be) the hobgoblin of littie minds” and, also, that “imitation is suicide”
(41). Emerson believed “Men have looked away from themselves and at things so long, that they
have corne to esteem the religious, leamed, and civil institutions as guards of property, and they
deprecate assaults on these, because they feel them to be assaults on property” (64). Emerson’s
“things” are insubstantial; they are only words that have been written or spoken by history and
blindly upheld as incontrovertible. Like Urizen’s “brazen lawbooks,” they invoke fear and
deference. But when the imagination conforms to that which constrains it, it becomes controlled
ftom the inside; and this policing ofthe self requires no threat ofphysical enforcement. It is also
at this stage that the risk ofthe human spirit extinguishing is at its highest. Emerson urges,
“Whoso would be a man, must be a nonconformist.... Nothing is at last sacred but the integrity
ofyour own mmd” (35). Here, Emerson espouses the Blakean urgency for man to question the
ftamework ofhistorical tradition into which he has been bom. Nothing, he says, should be
upheld without interrogation, because to do so necessarily entails the undermining ofone’s own
self. Recalling the engraver’s “Sleep ofReason,” lie writes, “Higher natures overpower lower
ones by affecting them with a certain sleep. The faculties are locked up, and offer no resistance”
(328) “1 am ashamed to think how easily we capitulate to badges and names, to large societies
and dead institutions,” he continues, in “Seif-Reliance” (36). He maintains, in “On Character,”
that “No institution will be better than the institutor” (333). In fact, like Blake, lie prophesied that
the force of the individual character would not only usurp institutional mie, but begin to draw out
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power and effect real change in human organization. This “force of character..
. will convert
judge, jury, soldier, and king;.. . will rule animal and minera! virtues, and blend with the
courses ofsap, ofrivers, ofwinds, of stars, and of moral agents” (343). The cal! for individuals
to step back from themselves to examine and renegotiate their daily lives is flot only prophetic. It
is also extremely grim in that when Emerson comments on the curiousness of “the periodical
disuse and perishing of means and machinery, which were introduced with loud laudation a few
years or centuries before” (63), he unknowingly launches a fairly new discourse of obsolescence,
one that would only increase in relevance and, indeed, grimness, as the possibility of human
obsolescence becomes more and more real.
These themes in Emerson’s writing, most importantly the emphasïs on relying on the
individual self in order to navigate the increasingly institutionalized world, are found in the
teachings ofWalt Whitman. Whitman found the life that was highly organized by authority to be
“slothful and heavy.” for him, the hero was one who “[neyer stagnatesj in the flat ofcustom or
obedience or legislation” (Whitman, “Preface” 1962). He marveled at the compliance ofthose
who allowed themselves to be govemed by tradition without evér examining those traditions
with a critical eye. “Has any one fancied he could sit at last under some authority,” he asked,
“and rest satisfied with explanations and realize and be content and full?” (1972). “Authority,”
for Whitman, also included organized religion, which lie saw as an “enemy ofnatural human
pleasure and virtue” (Baym 1954). Like Blake, he too saw a need to reexamine the role ofthe
priest in society, opting instead for a kind of spiritual guide that may be found in the poets and
thinkers ofthe age, as well as inside ofeach and every individual. In his “Preface,” he writes,
There will soon be no more priests. Their work is done. They may wait awhile...
perhaps a generation or two,. . . dropping off by degrees. A superior breed shah take
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their place. . . . [T]he gangs ofkosmos and prophets en masse shah take their place. A
new order shah arise and they shah be the priests ofman, and every man shah be his own
priest. (Whitman 1972)
Advocating the replacement of the priest by ‘ordinary’ man is a provocative statement but, in the
mid-nineteenth century, it approached heresy. By asserting flot only that the average man was
better off resorting to himself as a source for spiritual guidance and information, but that the
priest himsehf was ineffective, Whitman suggested that the church was outmoded. Indeed, he
writes, “reexamine ail you have been told at school or church or in any book, dismiss whatever
insuits your own soul” (Whitman 1963). For the poet, the individual “does flot stop for reguhation
[for] he is the president ofregulation” (1963). Whether this “regulation” is found in religion,
“custom or obedience or legishation,” the poet spoke out against any institution that either
crushed the human spirit or brought about spiritual stagnation littie by littie. Interestingly, this
did flot mean a complete refutation of ail that had gone before him; in fact,
Whitman declared that the American poet would flot repudiate past beliefs but would
incorporate them into newer ones, just as Americans are composed of ail peoples. To be
commensurate with this new American stock, the poet would incarnate the American
geography, occupations, and the people themsehves in a new and transcendent poetic
form. The great poet would find encouragement and support in the sciences and in
branches ofhistory, since his poetry would flot be escapist and otherworldly but solidly
tied to verifiable knowledge. (Baym 1954-55)
Whitman, then, was clearly a progressive poet and thinker. Rather than merely reacting to the
past in unthinking rebehhion, he incorporated what was useful to him and discarded the rest. This
practice contributed to the force ofhis “powerful language ofresistance” (Baym 1972).
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Whitman’s use of the customs and traditions which he found available to him are seen as acts of
disobedience. Even the fact that lie was “the first author ofworkingclass origins to reach
prominence in the United States” may be seen as an act of transgression (Martin, “Walt
Whitman” 1). Indeed, “the essential significance of Whitman’s vision. . . [is that it] retums to a
state ofprimal consciousness that is prepatriarchal” (Martin, The Hornosexuat Tradition 14).
Thus, it may be said to avoid the sociohistorical ftamework in which it is created. On the other
hand, Whitman’s writings also actively engage with “grand narratives,” as Jean-François Lyotard
refers to them, when he ‘plays’ with common notions ofmanliness and patriotism (Martin, “Walt
Whitman” 1). For example, in short stories like “The Child’s Champion” or “The Child and the
Profligate” (1841), he manages flot onty to publish a homosexual Ïove story but do so under the
pretext of a much more acceptable tale:
[T]lie moral purity tract allowed, as it aiways does, for a disguised presentation of a
transgressive subtext: By situating the love story between men in the context of a warning
about the dangers of drink, Whitman not only enables the publication of his material, but
indeed identifies homosexuality not with vice but against it. (Martin, “Walt Whitman” 1)
Not satisfied merely with presenting a homosexual story to the public, or even to upend the
traditional narrative (which would merely reinscribe the authority of the structure), the poet
introduces to the framework an ingredient which may remain unnoticed by some, but will
regardless remain forever to be discovered by one who “sees” the truth behind the cloak of
standardization.
0f Whitman’s works, Martin writes, “The power of love begins with the personal but
extends to the social as well and is ultimately political, since it affirms a deep-rooted democracy
and brotherhood across racial and national unes” (The Homosexuat Tradition 14-1 5). Thus,
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along with other Romantics, Whitman’s emphasis on a democratic society suggests the existence
of an Everyman that possesses the collective power of those who are “seers” of the objective
truth behind the institutional façade. These “seers” or prophets, however, are flot iimited in
number, but are carried in potential in each and every member ofhumankind. And the potential
of each of these individuals is that of liberator of oneseif. This is what Whitman means when he
writes, “when ail life and ail the souis ofmen and women are discharged from any part ofthe
earth—then only shah the instinct of hiberty be discharged from that part of the earth” (Whitman
196$).
While democracy was Whitman’s main focus for commendation as welÏ as prescription
for rejuvenating American hife, the poet did flot distinguish between freedom and hiberty, or view
democracy in any way that might detract from its virtues. It was not oniy the poet-prophets of the
age who stepped back from society in order to evaluate institutional processes and their effects
upon the individual in America and in Britain. French writer Alexis de Tocqueville observed
Americans and the American lifestyle and, in doing so, yielded a critical analysis ofthe concepts
ofdemocracy and iiberty. Many protested that de Tocqueville’s conclusions were unjustly harsh
but, more than a century later, many of the issues he highlighted maintain the interest of a great
number of social and political writers. These conclusions, gathered while on tour during the
1830s, are presented in his Democracy in America. Atthe time ofthe publication of this book,
the Lowehi Miils had already become “the center of the industrial world” (Loweli National
Historical Park, “Loweli Milis” 3). In fact, the “city’s population jumped from 2,500 people in
the early I 800s to 3 3,000 people in the mid I 800s.” The milhs themselves employed over 10,000
workers, and most of these were young women. In a magazine article pubhished in The
Harbinger in 1836, the writers report on “the exhausting nature ofthe labor in the miils, and
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[the] manner in which the young women—the operatives—lived in their boardinghouses, six
sleeping in a room, poorly ventiiated” (“An Account of a Visitor to Loweli” 1). The choice of the
word “operative” is revealing in that it is suggestive, at once, ofthe individuai’s loss ofhurnanity
and her use-value as a functionary in the miii. The miii, or “factory system,” is “the first germ of
the industrial or commercial feudalism that is to spread over our land” (“An Account” 1). Here,
the use ofthe word “germ” becomes even more telling. Whiie the worker is dehumanized by the
word “operative,” the institution is conversely invested with an organic characteristic more
suited to something that is natural and growing. But, the writer reminds the reader, Loweli Miils
is part of an “industriai discipline (shouid we flot rather say industrial tyranny?)” (“An Account”
I). This “discipline” neatiy finesses the worker into a readymade shape that best suits the single
function required of him. 0f course, the boom in productivity was very encouraging to
supervisors, but also, to some extent, to workers who feit that they were contributing to the
American economy. Workers were oflen commended for their productivity in ways that related
labour to the ‘chosen’ status oftheir souls, recailing the work ethic ofthe Puntan settiers. for
example, in a lecture given by Wiliiam Ellery Channing in 1839 entitled “On the Elevation ofthe
Laboring Classes,” Channing’s intent was to deliver a “sanctification of labor.” However, his
speech proved to be “uneasily constrained by the reality ofmechanization and specialization,
which has the deleterious effect of narrowing, stupefying, and even flattening out individual
character, until a man working may look more like a ‘machine than like a man” (Weinstein 2).
for some, the glorification ofmachinery and machine-like processes overtook the idea of
glorifying the body, such that the rhetoric surrounding ‘production’ wouid lose much ofthe
sanctity of the God-in-human discourse to the seduction of that ofthe innovative Machine-in
human rhetoric.
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The most important element to the popular conceptualization of ‘the worker’ is also what
constitutes the failure of industrialization; that is, by increasing efforts to maximize productivity,
worker relations decrease. In his Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville explains,
When an artisan engages constantly and uniquely in the manufacture of a single
object, in the end he performs this work with singular dexterity. But at the same time he
loses the general faculty of applying his mmd to the direction of the work. Each day he
becomes more skillful and less industrious, and one can say that the man in him is
degraded in proportion as the worker is perfected.
What should one expect from a man who has used twenty years of bis life in
making pinheads? And to what, in him, can that powerful human intelligence which has
so often moved the world be applied from now on if flot to the search for the best means
of making pinheads!
When a worker has consumed a considerable portion of his existence in this
manner, his thought is forever halted at the daily object ofhis labors; his body has
contracted certain fixed habits from which he is no longer permitted to depart. In a word,
he no longer belongs to himself, but to the profession he has chosen. (vol. 2, pt. 2, ch. 20)
Thus, rather than one’s soul being chosen for salvation in the afierlife, it is one’s ‘calling’ that
began to attain this degree of sanctification; that is, the glory once reserved for the divine
election to a state of a grace soon transferred to the mundane world of daily human labour.
Concurrently, a new notion of ‘individualism’ began to take hold of the worker’s imagination.
As the worker’s job streamlined into a single task, his responsibility and emotional
connectedness to the group decreased. As de Tocqueville writes in Democracy in America,
“Individualism is a reflective and peaceable sentiment that disposes each citizen to isolate
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himeseifftom the mass ofthose like him and to withdraw to one side with his family and his
friends, so that after having thus created a little society for his own use, he witlingly abandons
society at large to itself’ (vol. 2, pt. 2, ch. 2). “Abandoning “society at large” is the origin of
modern-day apathy. He continues,
As conditions are equalized, one finds a great number of individuals who, flot
being wealthy or powerfiil enough to exert a great influence over the fates of those like
them, have nevertheless acquired or preserved enough enlightenment and goods to be
able to be seif-sufficient. These owe nothing to anyone, they expect 50 to speak nothing
from anyone; they are in the habit of always considering themselves in isolation, and they
willingly fancy that their whole destiny is in their hands. (vol. 2, pt. 2, eh. 2)
The supposed ‘equalizing’ of appalling conditions at Loweil Miils only brings worker motivation
to a peak of individualistic desperation. Later, the apparent democracy of the assembly-line in
the early twentieth century would produce parallel alienating effects in its workers. It is argued,
as well, that postmodem workplaces in which physical hierarchies are apparently leveled (for
example, different levels of management share the same floor in office buildings, and boundaries
such as walls and cubicle dividers are removed) produce a similar resuit. At the sarne time,
consumerism began to develop into a powerful force, as the need for new things began to
blossom with intense ftequency. De Tocqueviile refers to this force simply as “a taste for weil
being”:
If commerce and industry cause the desire for well-being to increase, that cornes from the
fact that every passion is fortified as one is more occupied with it and is increased by ail
the efforts by which one attempts to assuage it. Ail the causes that make love ofthe goods
of this world predorninate in the human heart develop industry and commerce. Equality is
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one of these causes. It favors commerce flot only directly in giving men a taste for trade,
but indirectly in fortifying and generalizing the love of weÏl-being in their souls. (vol. 2,
pt.2,ch. 19,n. 1)
The “desire for well-being,” or what has been otherwise called the “desire for desire,” is situated
by de Tocqueville as a characteristically American drive. “[L]ove of the goods ofthis world” is
what motivates Americans; it is not the ‘natural’ instinct for commerce or industry upon which
the writer aims bis disparagement. More importantly, what he considers “equality of conditions”
should be closely examined. Should equality flot be venerated completely, rather than be
subjected to the tone that it is given in the above passage? In fact, upon the end ofhis tour of
America, de TocqueviÏÏe had some startiing statements to make. America had aiways celebrated
equality with great pride; however, the observer sets out b explain and support his theory that
equality in America resulted in decreasing rather than increasing liberty for its citizens. This is
rather a startiing point ofview, and de Tocqueville’s statement was in no way indirect. He
writes, “I know of no country in which there is so littie independence ofmind and real fteedom
of discussion as in America” (vol. 1, pt. 2, ch. 7). He explains that Americans are “blind” to the
“evils” that are produced by “extreme equality... [which] insinuate themselves gradually into
the social body” (vol. 2, pt. 2, ch. 1). The major “evil” that he sees is the “sÏavery” that
democracy produces in America. In fact, he writes, democracy in America is simply producing a
degraded version ofmonarchy, one in which there is no real feeling of obligation to any other but
oneseif. In this society, individuals have “neither common spirit nor objects, neither common
traditions nor hopes. There are then members, but no corps” (vol. 2, pt. 2, ch. 20). “Members”
possess nothing except for the “desire for desire,” which is individualistic at its core, and pits
each one against every other. De Tocqueville writes,
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As in aristocratic communities ail the citizens occupy fixed positions, one above
another; the result is that each of them aiways sees a man above himself whose patronage
is necessary to him, and below himself another man whose co-operation lie may daim.
Men living in aristocratie ages are therefore almost aiways closely attached to
something placed out of their own sphere, and they are often disposed to forget
themselves. It is tnie that in these ages the notion ofhuman fellowship is faint and that
men seldom think of sacrificing themselves for mankind; but they often sacrifice
themselves for other men.
In democratic times, on the contrary, when the duties of each individual to the
race are much more clear, devoted service to any one man becomes more rare; the bond
ofhuman affection is extended, but it is relaxed. (vol. 2, pt. 2, cli. 2)
This is revealing especially when seen in relation to postmodem workplaces, which are touted as
“democratic”; in these workplaces, however, workers are exposed to the democratic process of
being let go; often, the requirements ofthe market are what dictates who is fired rather than a
merit-based system. Dependence on a transient and unstable system such as this lias definite
psychological ramifications on the worker’s sense ofselfand, also, lis sense ofhimselfwithin
society. As de Tocqueville writes, “Between worker and master, relations are frequent, but there
is no genuine association” (vol. 2, pt. 2, eh. 20). At least, he writes, “The territorial aristocracy
ofpast centuries was obliged by law or believed itselfto be obliged by mores to corne to the aid
of its servants and to relieve their miseries. But the manzfacturing aristocracy of our day, afler
having impoverished and brutalized the men whom it uses, leaves them to be nourished by public
charity in times oferisïs” (vol. 2, pt. 2, eh. 20; emphasis added). In modem workplaces,
espeeially, there is little “association” between workers, or obligation amongst them; even less
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exists among workers and the companies that hire them. The chance of an individual becorning
upwardly mobile in the company that originally hired him is much rarer than a career made up of
several lateral moves within different organizations. In a society in which one’s livelihood is
constantly threatened, the individual is forced to attend to his own survival. There is no room for
sacrificing oneseif for other men as “human fellowship [becomes] faint.” In a society such as
this, deep feeling such as Whitman’s brotherhood and camaraderie corne dangerously close to
non-existence. Also abandoned is Emerson’s “profound good understanding” or the “happiness
which postpones ail other gratifications, and makes politics, and commerce, and churches,
cheap” (Emerson 340, 341).
If the degradation ofhuman fellowship entails the degradation ofpolitics, commerce,
churches, and other hurnan institutions, then what follows for the institution of work? If the
dedication to work has become a dedication to making rnoney, then how does this affect human
character that has been built upon the bedrock ofthe early settiers’ Puritan work ethic and, thus,
derives from work much of its self-identification? Today, one’ s choice of career is flot the
lifestyle choice it once was; rather, it is a means to making money that changes as rnarket
requirements changes. In general the postmodern worker is said to average three career changes
over a span of a lifetime. But de Tocqueville identifies a similar trend as early as the mid
nineteenth century. In Democracy in America, he states that even the more practical kind of
labour involved in agriculture is no more considered a solid means of subsistence for the farmer
and his family. Instead, the farmer “brings land into tillage in order to seli it again, and flot to
farm it: he builds a farmhouse on the speculation that, as the state of the country will soon be
changed by the increase of population, a good price may be obtained for it” (vol. 2, pt. 2, eh. 19).
The emphasis attaches itself to the monetaiy value of that work—something that is decided upon
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by the movements ofthe national economy—and flot an intrinsic value to the labour and the
products ofthat labour. This dynamic is fiirther complicated as the advance oftechnology and
innovation removed its focus from a single worker’s productivity and placed it on the
productivity of a single machine, one that may not even necessitate the contribution of one
worker to render it effective. When the worker applies himselfto one specialized aspect of
production, he further debilitates himselfby forgoing an overali understanding of the process and
how future changes in society and technology will further affect that process. Emphasis is flot
placed on crafi, or quality, or comprehension of the process in its entirety—instead, the emphasis
is on speed. The outcomes of this process are frightening:
While the workman concentrates bis faculties more and more upon the study of a single
detail, the master surveys an extensive whole, and the mmd ofthe latter is enlarged in
proportion as that of the former is narrowed. In a short time the one will require nothing
but physical strength without intelligence; the other stands in need of science, and almost
ofgenius, to ensure success. (vol. 2, pt. 2, ch. 20).
Here, by indicating the streamlïning of disparate individuals into one of only two types, de
Tocqueville presages the managers and engineers ofKurt Vonnegut’s futuristic fiction Player
Piano (1952). However, a more subtie envisioning of the heavy pressures of a hypercapitalized
America cari easily show that members ofsociety are generally grouped as those in commerce
and those who are flot. Even those who are in vocations which eau for a focus on handicraft or
medicine may be subjected to the ‘business end ofthings’ much more than in the past. There is a
greater need to ‘seli oneseif above and beyond the labour one does, including both physical a
nd
intellectual. for de Tocqueville, this kind ofdemocracy creates two men: “This man resembles
more and more the administrator ofa vast empire; that man, a brute” (vol. 2, pt. 2, eh. 20). As the
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emphasis on speed increases into the twentieth century, Frederick WinsÏow Taylor and Henry
Ford would induce significant modifications in the evolution ofhuman character. Again, as if he
could foreteil the future, de Tocqueville warns Americans of the changes to corne. “As the
pnnciple of the division of labor is more extensively applied,” he writes, “the workman becomes
more weak, rnore narrow-minded, and more dependent [on the machine that affords him the
work ofa specialized task]. The art advances, the artisan recedes” (vol. 2, pt. 2, ch. 20).
Shortly after de Tocqueville made his observations about America, Bntish writer Charles
Dickens made his own tour through several major cities in America and Canada. His
observations ofthe four months he spent on the continent are chronicled in his book American
Notes (1842). In it, he details his own experience ofthe Loweli miÏls. Unlike deToquevllÏe, he
finds the workers to be “healthy in appearance, many ofthem remarkabiy so, and [having] the
manners and deportrnent of young wornen: not of degraded brutes of burden” (“Generai
Appearance of Miii Workers” 1). It is important to remember that Dickens “as joumalist is oniy
considering [with pnde and wonder] the machine in itself, flot as part of its social and moral
environment. But once these vivid evocations oftechnology are placed wïthin a social context, as
in Dombey and Sons and Hard Times, the machine becomes a symbol for the sins of society as a
whole” (Sussman 48). Thus, although Dickens would soon go on to write Hard Tirnes, an
indictment ofindustrialization’s effects on the individual, his endorsement ofthe Loweil miils is
part of a faction that saw in technologicai development a positive indicator of progress and a
reason to believe in the ever-increasing promise of innovation. Wnters in this group produced
utopian noveis, in which the commingling ofhumankind and technology had positive effects on
society, whule those who weighed the negative effects ofprogress more heavily wrote novels that
may be considered dystopic.
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At the same time, slavery had become a nationwide issue that affected the individual as
welI as the national self-concept. As historian Eric Foner writes,
frederick Jackson Tumer, the great historian ofthe late l9th century, said it was on the
ftontier that democracy was born, that American ideas ofequality were bom,
individualism. But the frontier also carried with it the expansion of slavery. The
westward expansion of slavery was one of the most dynamic economic and social
processes going on in this country. The westward expansion carried slavery down into the
Southwest, into Mississippi, Alabama, crossing the Mississippi River into Louisiana.
finally, by the I 840’s, it was pouring into Texas. So the expansion of slavery, which
became the major political question ofthe 1850’s, was flot just a political issue. It was a
fact of life that every American had experienced during this period. (foner, “Westward
Expansion” par. I)
As this class system had expanded to its widest range, Karl Marx and fnedrich Engels’s
Manfesto ofthe Cornmunist Party (184$) would be published. Although it would flot be
available in English until 1888, the idea oftwo classes struggiing against each other, rather than
a hierarchical society more suited to the old aristocracy, was an accurate description of what was
happening in America. They write,
In the earlier epoclis of history, we find almost everywhere a complicated
arrangement of society into various orders, a manifold gradation of social rank. In ancient
Rome we have patricians, knights, plebians, slaves; in the middle ages, feudal lords,
vassals, guild-masters, joumeymen, apprentices, serfs; in almost ah ofthese classes,
again, subordinate gradations.
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The modem bourgeois society that has sprouted from the mins of feudal society
has flot donc away with class antagonisms. It has but established new classes, new
conditions of oppression, new forms of stmggle in place of the old ones.
Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, however, this distinct feature:
it lias simplified class antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and more spiitting up into
two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing cadi other—Bourgeoisie
and Proletariat. (I: Bourgeois and Proletariat” 32 1-22)
Recalling de Tocqueville’s observations on America over a decade earlier, Marx and Engels also
describe how the movement from a feudal system to one of democratic trade had resulted in the
degrading of human interaction. The bourgeoisie
has pitilessly tom asunder the motley feudal tics that bound man to lis “natural
superiors,” and lias lefi no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest,
than callous “cash payment.” It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious
fervor, of chivairous enthusiasm, of Philistine sentimentalisrn, in the icy water of
egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of
the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable
freedom—free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political
illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation. (3 23-24)
This “nexus between man and man” is what de Tocqueville referred to as an “association”
between men; both may be the germ ofWhitman’s “adhesiveness.” Without this ingredient,
humanity becomes marginalized and subject to what Whitman referred to, in his poem “In Paths
Untrodden,” as tic “clank of the world” (Leaves ofGrass); then, human emotions such as
“fervor,” “enthusiasm” and “sentimentalism” seem to be uncalled for, especially as “egotistical
40
calculation” takes over ail reiationships. Even his relation to work is corrupted as the bourgeoisie
“strip[s] ofits halo every occupation hitherto honored and looked up to with reverent awe. It bas
converted the physician, the iawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science, into its paid wage
laborers” (Marx and Engels 324). Thus, rather than work being a glorification ofone’s inner
character, it becomes something that flattens, or detracts from, the individual. He becomes a ‘cog
in the machine’ even if bis job seems on the surface to be as far away from the factory-system as
the poet. Dependence upon the same underiying socioeconomic ftamework in order to subsist
means that vocations as disparate as those listed above are flot independent of each other at ail. In
fact,
Owing to the extensive use of machinery, and to the division of labor, the work of
the proletarians has iost ail individual character, and, consequently, ail charm for the
workman. He becomes an appendage of the machine, and it is only the most simpie, most
monotonous, and most easily acquired lmack, that is required ofhim. Hence, the cost of
production of a workman is restricted, almost entirely, to the means of subsistence that he
requires for maintenance, and for the propagation of his race. But the price of a
commodity, and therefore aiso oflabor, is equal to its cost of production. In proportion,
therefore, as the repulsiveness of the work increases, the wage decreases. What is more,
in proportion as the use ofmachinery and division oflabor increases, in the same
proportion the burden oftoil also increases, whether by prolongation ofthe working
hours, by the increase of the work exacted in a given time, or by increased speed of
machinery, etc. (Marx and Engels 328)
That modem work loses “ail charm for the workman” is an intriguing concept. “Charm” can
mean “appeal” or “attraction”; but it aiso stands for words such as “magnetism,” “fascination”
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and “lure,” words that denote a “magical” quality. Whenever something possesses a magical
quality, it may be understood that that quality is, as per its definition, unquantifiable. Thus, what
the authors suggest is that real work, that is, a vocation in which man thrives and produces, is
something that cannot simply be broken down into its component pieces. However, as “the use
of machinery and division of labor increases,” that magicai quality falis away.
Myron Magnet discusses this magical quality through the work of Gabriel in Charles
Dickens’s novel Barnaby Rudge:
Gabnel is a crafisman, flot a laborer, making useful and beautiful objects with his own
hands, to his own constantiy varying designs, according to his own methods, and at his
own pace. He is seif-employed and has control over every step of production: he is his
own saiesman, bookkeeper, and purchasing agent. What he makes is truiy his own work,
bearing his imprint, the product ofhis hand and his brain alike. No wonder, then, that
Dickens imagines Gabriel’s labor to be strenuous but not toilsome, and pictures him—by
contrast with those whose work is “a duil monotonous duty”—”working at his anvil, his
face ail radiant with exercise and gladness, his sleeves tumed up, his wig pushed off lis
shining forehead—the easiest, freest, happiest man in ail the world. (Magnet 57-58)
But as the economy called for a regulated labour which increased production, work ofthis kind
became scarce. As people were forced to the milis or similar places of work, their everyday lives
without question were impressed upon by the severe changes. And these changes would also
impress upon the worker’s psychology. As Herbert L Sussman writes in the Preface to his
Victorians and the Machine: The Literaiy Response to Technology, “the use of the machine to
perform certain physicai tasks created profound changes in inteilectual and emotional life.” At its
base, these changes were inextricably linked with “intellectual mechanism and industrial
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mechanization” (60). But they did flot appear simply as a result of factory life; in fact, the factory
as a whole had become “fully socialized” (Magnet 24), such that it may be seen as a symbol of
society. Sussman goes so far as to write, “In a society wholly mechanized. . . even the rotating
earth is seen as a great iron flywheel.” Perhaps for this reason, one finds in Dickens a criticism of
the system, rather than of individuals; that is, Dickens levels his criticism “flot [at] a person, but
[at] an emotional atmosphere, a state of mmd symbolized by the machine,” so if “Gradgrind [in
Hard Times] is a caricature, it is because rigid doctrines repress his emotional life” (61). These
ngid doctrines are those which socialize individuals within a society; they are also what narrates
characters within the plot of a story.
The concept of an overarching ftamework that govems the decisions and even the
motivations ofindividuals is historicized by Michel Foucault in his Discipline and Punisiz: The
Birth ofthe Prison (1977). In this book, foucault describes the movement from a corporeal
punishment to an invisible mental one. The strategies employed by the social—in the form of
written and unwntten rules, regulations, mores and values—”discipline” individuals until what
remains are what Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow refer to as “orderly individuals [who are
required to fit] into the machinery of production” (135). foucault goes as far back as 1757 to
describe the gory execution or amende honorable of a man. He then follows this description with
a time-table used for prisoners the century afier the abolishment ofthis practice. “We have, then,
a public execution and a time-table. They do not punish the same crimes or the same type of
delinquent. But they each define a certain penal style. Less than a century separates them” (7).
Thus begins Foucault’s account ofthe intemalization ofdisciplinary social structures, suggesting
that the less visible the disciplinary mechanism, the more disciplinary action is at work. The
metaphor of the time-table itself, then, may be seen as an oppressive force, compelling
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individuals to follow arbitrary regulation on the threat of authoritative retatiation. Then, the time
table, as inextricably connected with socialized work, becomes doubly meaningful.
In Dickens’s Nicholas Nickleby (1839), the social and the time-table become linked as the
goveming power of authority:
Social institutions, too, appear in the nove! largely in relation to aggression. The one time
we see policemen, for instance, they start pummeling innocent bystanders, when, at a
farcical meeting of the Metropolitan Hot Muffin Company, the impatient audience begin
to hoot and yell. The policemen, wanting “to queil the disturbance” but unwilling to fight
their way through the crowd to reach those responsible,
ImmediateÏy began to drag forth by the coat tails and coliars ail the quiet people
near the door; at the same time dealing out various smart and tingling blows with
their tmcheons, after the manner ofthat ingenious actor, Mr. Punch, whose
briîliant example, both in the fashion ofhis weapons and their use, this branch of
the executive occasionally follows. (2)
This joke has reference to a stem reality, for in the world of Nicholas Nickleby the law itself is
no more than an instrument of violence, to which, for example, Ralph Nickleby resolves to tum
as his ultimate weapon against his nephew. “The protracted and wearing anxiety and expense of
the law in its most oppressive form, its torture from hour to hour, its weary days and sleepless
nights—with these I’ll prove you,” lie growis at Nicliolas, “and break your haughty spirit, strong
as you deem it now” (45). The “torture from hour to hour” recalis the prisoner’s time-table in
foucault’s history of discipline. Interestingly, this is “the law in its most oppressive form.”
Magnet reminds us that Edmund Burke wamed against a society in which “at the end of e’’ery
vista, you see nothing but the gallows” (Reflections on the Revolution in France 91).
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Interestingly, in Nickteby, as well, “social authority appears as merely another engine of
violence; in Nickleby the heart ofthe city (in more than a geographical sense) is the gallows”
(Magnet 15). Thus, the metaphor ofj ail, or in this case, the gallows, as a reminder of the mental
and intellectual disciplinary action ofsociety, is found in literature at least as far back as the
prisoner’s time-table; that is, a century after the abolishment ofpenal executions.
At the same time, the executioner hirnselfis found in Dickens’s Barnaby Rudge, in a
portrayal that gives the reader a physical cue to the tbreat of authoritative punishment:
Dennis, the hangman, [was] far and away the worst of Barnaby’s sordid, brutal
“constitutional” officers. In Dennis—at once the embodiment of public authority and
pure, ferocious aggression—Dickens confronts us starkly with how literally “the
authority erected by society for its own preservation” is grounded on the same violence
from which it is intended to preserve us. (Magnet 162)
It is telling, as Magnet observes, that Dennis, in taking a “a truc professional relish” to his work,
“literally loves to bang people or to ‘work them off” (163; emphasis added). The suggestion
here is that the disciplines ofpenal punishment and ofwork are one and the same, for they are
predicated on the same principles. Indeed, it is telling when Dennis says, “I was formed for
society” because the statement “epitomizes [his} dizzy parody ofDickens’s political theory: the
hangman, in that he administers the state’s legitimate violence, performs, as Dickens and Dennis
would agree, an essential social function; therefore (as Dennis alone concludes) I, the hangman,
am an exceptionally sociable man” (165). Rather than represent an “idiosyncratic” point ofview,
Dennis’s beliefs swept over the entire social network, as evidenced by Dickens’s report that “it
was virtually a universally accepted principle that ‘the symbol of [the law’s] dignity,—stamped
upon every page ofthe criminal statute-book, was the gallows” (167).
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At this point, it is useful to revisit de Tocqueville’s American observations. He refers to
individuals in society as being “decent and orderly” (Democracy vol. I., pt. 2, eh. 7), even
“immaculate in conduct,” as they are socialized in a democracy. The resuit, however, is an
ordered existence in which an individual Ïacks the freedom to truly live. De Tocqueville believed
that the commercial imperative in America comprises a tyranny in which
the body is left free, and the soul is enslaved. The master no longer says, “You shah think
as I do or you shah die”; but he says, “You are ftee to think differently ftom me and to
retain your life, your property, and ail that you possess; but you are henceforth a stranger
among your people. You may retain your civil rights, but they will be useless to you, for
you will neyer be chosen by your fellow citizens if you solicit their votes; and they will
affect to scom you if you ask for their esteem. You wihl remain among men, but you will
be deprived of the rights ofmankind. Your fehlow creatures will shun you like an impure
being; and even those who behieve in your innocence will abandon you, lest they should
be shunned in their tum. Go in peace! I have given you your life, but it is an existence
worse than death.” (vol. 1, pt. 2, eh. 7)
Here, de Tocqueville anticipates Foucault’s basic themes in Discipline and Punish, and also
assumes a strikingly similar prophetic voice. That “the body is lefi ftee” while the “soul is
enslaved” is a direct prefiguring of the Foucauldian emphasis on the disciplinary strategies of
authoritative social structures on the mental, rather than physieaÏ, level. foucault himself credits
the philosopher Gabriel de Mably’s De la législation, written close to a century earlier than
Discipline and Punish:
If the penalty in its most severe forms no longer addresses itself to the body, on what
does it lay hold? The answer of the theoreticians—those who, about 1760, opened up a
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new period that is flot yet at an end—is simple, almost obvious. It seems to be contained
in the question itself: since it is no longer the body, it must be the soul. The expiation that
once rained down upon the body must be replaced by a punishment that acts in depth on
the heart, the thoughts, the will, the inclinations. Mably formulated the principle once and
for aIl: ‘Punishment, if I may so put it, should strike the soul rather than the body.’
(foucault 16).
It is interesting that Mably describes the older, corporeal forms ofpunishrnent as ‘raining down’
on the body, so that punishment is something that passes over the very surface of the skin; once
the corporeal punishment has run its course, it would seem not to leave any tracks or evidence
either of its intensity or its result. The punishment with which Mably suggests to replace this
surface sensation is one that “acts in depth on the heart, the thoughts, the wilI, the inclinations”
(emphasis added). As well, it cannot be dismissed that Mably’s description ofcorporeal
punishment as ‘raining down’ denotes something that is not only natural, but bas a cleansing
effect on the individual, and even occurs from above without any regard to mortal wishes, as if
from an omniscient power. Conversely, once the punishment shifis from its focus upon the
corporeal and moves towards the inner being, the concept of ‘punishment’ itself shifts from a
more passive experience ofbeing rained upon to an experience of wïthstanding “acts in depth”
which “strike the soul.” It is also as if the punished had once suffered nobly, in a state of
communion with the Divine. Indeed, Foucault wntes that “the shame inflicted on the victim
[tranformed] into pity or glory” (Discipline and Punish 9) when lie was on the scaffold and
subject to an executioner who was compelled to fulfiul his duties in the name of a just God. Once
the responsibility ofpunishing feu into human hands, metaphorically speaking, it degraded into
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something shameful, flot because ofthe gruesome and calculated operation but because the
lasting damage tumed to the psychological rather than the physical.
Indeed, as Foucault detaits in his Discipline and Punish, it is by animating the inner life
with fearfifi thoughts ofpunishment that the highest level ofcontroÏ may be exercised by
authority. He writes,
Punishment, then, will tend to become the most hidden part of the penal process. This lias
several consequences: it leaves the domain of more or less everyday perception and
enters that of abstract consciousness; its effectiveness is seen as resulting from its
inevitability, flot from its visible intensity; it is the certainty of being punished and not the
homfying spectacle of public punishment that must discourage crime. (Discipline and
Fun ish 9)
Thus, while the scene of the subject under authoritative control has iost its “visible intensity,” it
maintains just as much or likely more power by entering the “abstract consciousness” of the
individual in everyday life. A panoptic effect occurs in which the subjects of authority begin to
police themselves. Foucault takes the term “panopticon” from Jeremy Bentham, who identifies
the reiationship between prisoners and prison guards as being analogous to apparentiy free
citizens and the democratic state. In the modem j ail, as Bentham described it, the panopticon is a
tower that allows prison guards to observe ail inmates simultaneously. While the guards can
monitor the prisoners at any time they choose, the prisoners cannot sec the guards and, thus,
neyer lmow when they are being observed. They are forced to assume that they are being
surveiled at ah times and modify their behaviour accordingiy day and night. The “constant gaze
controls the prisoners, affecting flot oniy what they do but how they see themselves, and replaced
the use of a dungeon and dark celi to control the prisoner. This image serves as a metaphor for
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the power in and of govemmentality in the modem state” (“Panopticon”). That is, the
omniscience of the gaze became institutionalized such that the consciousness of being watched
tends to curb behaviour whether one is a prisoner in jail for committing a crime, or a citizen of
the state simply going about bis daily activities. The characteristics of the penal institution seem
to be mirrored in ail institutions; that is, being subject to the jail and its regulations is equivalent
in psychic effect as the subjectivity of the ordinary citizen to the disciplinary gaze in greater
society. Whether the material body is imprisoned or flot would seem to have remarkably littie to
do with whether it exhibits behaviour that befits imprisonment.
While in 1792 the introduction of the guillotine reduced the practice of execution to “a
visible but instantaneous event” (foucault, Discipline and Punish 12), its abolishment thereafier
was a major step towards establishing the “non-corporeal nature of the penal system” (15).
However, there had been significant indications previous to this development. foucault explains,
for example, that “the guillotine [ended] life almost without touching the body” (13), which
marked an important change in focus from the great amount of detail involved in torturing the
body previous to the use ofthis machine (manipulate which body part, for how long, in what
combination?). In fact, the “hold on the body” had begun to loosen. As a strategy of
administering punisbment, direct pain to the body had given over to the loss of wealth or rights
(15). Foucault expiains,
the punishrnent-body relation is not the same as it was in the torture dunng public
executions. The body now serves as an instrument or intermediary: if one intervenes upon
it to imprison it, or to make it work, it is in order to deprive the individual of a liberty that
is regarded both as a riglit and as property. . . . From being an art ofunbearabie sensations
punishment has become an economy of suspended rights. . . . As a resuit ofthis new
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restraint, a whoie army oftechnicians took over from the executioner, the immediate
anatornist of pain: warders, doctors, chaplains, psychiatrists, psychologists,
educationalists; by their very presence near the prisoner, they sing the praises that the law
needs: they reassure it that the body and pain are not the ultimate objects of its punitive
action. Today a doctor must watch over those condemned to death, right up to the last
moment—thus juxtaposing himself as the agent ofweifare, as the aÏleviator of pain, with
the officiai whose task it is to end life. This is worth thinking about. When the moment of
execution approaches, the patients are injected with tranquillizers. A utopia ofjudicial
reticence: take away life, but prevent the patient from feeling it; deprive the prisoner of
ail rights, but do flot inflict pain; impose penalties free of ail pain. (Disc%pÏine and Punisiz
il)
The punishment for crimes ofvarying degree ceases to consist ofphysical suffering and moves
toward something far less tangible, a non-corporeal punishment. Yet, the emphasis on ensuring a
‘painless’ punishment would preclude an unnecessarily harsh mental, psychological or emotional
suffering. In fact, the “warders, doctors, chaplains, psychiatrists, psychologists, [and]
educationalists” guarantee pain-ftee punishment through the laws and regulations agreed upon in
their respective fields. Thus, jails, hospitals, churches, law courts and schools contnbute to the
reaim of institutional government that at once constitutes the ftee subject and yet constrains him.
Forces of control and authority are readily apparent in establishments that are founded for these
purposes, sucli asjails and courts oflaw. Even the church is widely accepted as a force equal to
political govemment, in that it compels a great degree of compliance within segments of society
according to the religious tenets it upholds. Foucault referred to the authority of the church as a
“pastoral power,” one that relies on the promise of individual salvation in the next world
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(“Pastoral Power”). Schools are also a great influence on the shaping of individual minUs, as is
society in general, and both are central factors in the individual’s relation to labour. In foucault,
the process of “normalisation” in a society “encourages [an individualJ to regulate and achieve
his or lier own conformity with the established rules. . . . through governmentality” in schools
and other social institutions (“Normalisation”). An intricate mesh of various institutional powers
thereby appears to keep the individuat at a safe distance from the punitive process, yet they are
the same powers that decide upon and enforce penalties. The punisher and the protector are one
and the same.
It may also be said that the punishment and the protection are one and the same. Perhaps
there is no better institution to which this statement applies than that of labour. What other
institutional title lends itselfto slippage as easily as “labour,” which immediately denotes both
toil and worthy pursuit, something that harms and enriches? Foucault writes,
it is largely as a force of production that the body is invested with relations of power and
domination; but, on the other hand, its constitution as labour power is possible only if it is
caught up in a system of subjection (in which need is also a political instrument
meticulously prepared, calculated and used); the body becomes a useful force only if it is
both a productive body and a subjected body. (Discipline and Punish 26)
In this sort ofpolitical economy, then, the productive body is useless unless its labour may be
hamessed; likewise, the subjected body is of no use unless its constraints are able to move it into
a state ofproductivity. It is within this particular dynamic, foucault posits, that the soul is
produced
permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised
on those punished—and, in a more general way, on those one supervises, trains and
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corrects, over madmen, chiidren at home and at school, the colonized, over those who are
stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest oftheir lives. This is the historical reality
of this soul. . . [which is bom] out of methods of punisbment, supervision and constraint.
(29)
Foucault’s use ofthe term “soul” here must be differentiated from its more popular conception as
understood through traditional religion and philosophy. As he indicates, he is concemed with the
“historical reality” ofthe subjected and productive soul; accordingly, the definition of”soul” as
it is used here is understood to denote the non-corporeal substance of man ai’ the time that it was
required to rneet the needs ofthe expanding discourse oJinstitutionalpunishment. By breathing
life, as it were, into its own version ofthe human soul, the institution finalty assumes the place of
omniscient authority once reserved exclusively for the highest power of divinity. The image of
subjected and productive bodies “stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest oftheir lives” is
fitting in that it conjures a scene of incarcerated productivity that shapes one’ s actions according
to pressures from a higher authority. Specifically, it suggests that menial labour is an
institutionalized strategy meant to enforce a thoughtless compliance.
Similar views of labour were held by many novelists who were writing during the second
haif of the nineteenth century. By this time, labour had become increasingly standardized and, as
industry spread, workers had begun to fear the effect it would have on their inner selves. fiction
writers who depicted individuals within the work world tended to cali attention to the demeaning
effect of industrialization on the human spirit. Because ofthis, it is surprising that Mark Twain
wouÏd say ofhis proofreader “that he must have no opinion whatever regarding the punctuation,
that he was simply to make himselfinto a machine and follow the copy.” As Cindy Weinstein
concludes ofTwain’s remark in her book The Literature ofLabor and the Labors ofLiterature,
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“The ideal efficient worker is the mechanical one” (153). During the second halfofthe
nineteenth century, pnor to the printing press having achieved its omnipresent status, a great
number ofworkers were involved with administrative tasks which called for the copying ofnotes
and documents. It is significant to note that Twain’s
activities in the world of manufacturing, for example, demonstrate his deep commitment
to efficiency techniques that workers feit to be damaging flot only the ideals ofthe work
ethic but their minds and bodies as well. The efficiency strategies which Twain praises
throughout his letters and joumals produced a kind of flattened character in the
workplace. .. . (Weinstein 129)
Twain’s interest in efficiency naturally led to his attraction to typesetting machines, which
peaked in 1882 with his investment in the Paige compositor. The development of this machine
was the resuit of “several minds being concentrated upon the complex problem of distributing,
setting and line-justifying movable type by positive, but controÏled, mechanical action.” As
Weinstein notes, “Twain imagined the scene of writing to 5e inextricably connected to the scene
ofindustrial production” (129). But what does this say for workers whose labour is not
intellectual and does flot produce, but rather reproduces, as in the case ofTwain’s copyist? If the
copyist foÏlows the guidelines and does flot comment on Twain’s text, does he then simulate a
machine such as the Paige compositor, which does not comment on the text either? Perhaps there
is a noteworthy difference between one functionary that cannot comment and one that chooses
not to. One ofthese functionaries has the capacity for cognition and decision-making, in other
words, to think. But computers do have decision-making facilities, according to preprogrammed
protocols. And, if the remark ofTwain’s associate upon observing the machine at work—”This
is thought crystallized” (Legros and Grant 379)—is considered along with Twain’s imposing
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command on his copyist flot to think, then the issue is flot whether the individuai or the machine
has the capability to think. The issue, rather, is which will be permitted to do the thinking.
For Twain, along with other writers of the era, expanding technologies which emphasized
efficiency greatly affected the mechanics of fiction-writing, as well as the themes with which
writers grappled. The concept of one’s work needing to possess a certain kind of value developed
in significant ways, and this greatly affected the relationship of the individual to his chosen
work. The Loweli milis that both Dickens and de Tocqueville visited in the I $30s and 40s were
the subject of concem with regard to institutionalized work and its effects on its workers. As
Cindy Weinstein writes in The Literature ofLabor and the Labors ofLiterature, “the debate
about the Loweit miii operatives indicated [that work] did not necessarily guarantee spiritual or
economic enhancement but increasingly seemed to undermine individual agency and bodily
integrity. Instead of developing character in a version of the Romantic symbol, work appeared to
flatten it out in an image of Coieridgean allegory” (87). Almost a decade after Dickens’s visit to
the Loweil miils, Hernian Melville would explore a paper miii in Daiton, Massachusetts, later
including some of these observations in his story “The Paradise of Bachelors and the Tartarus of
Maids” (87). Weinstein writes that the stofy depicts “a frightening scene of production,” citing
MelviÏle’s description of the “paper machine [that] drains the rosiness ofthe girls’ cheeks until
the product takes on the quality ofnatural rosiness, leaving ‘rows ofbiank-looking girls, with
blank, white foiders in their blank hands, ail blankly folding blank paper” ($7). As in the case
with Twain’s compositor which seems almost capable ofthought, the paper machine in
Melviite’s story begins to take on the living, breathing characteristics ofits human caretakers.
This idea is more deeply explored in Melville’s Mardi (1849), which is an interesting
investigation ofthe effects of labour on the individual identity. In the nove!, the narrator gives up
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his life of work and tums to a life of leisure on the island of Mardi. “Characters in Mardi are
deflned by the fact of their relation to abor—either they work or they don’t” (Weinstcin 94). The
ones who work are employed at Hevaneva’s idol factory. Here, like the blood-sucking paper
machine in the Dalton miii and Twain’s ruminating compositor, the mechanicai process
somehow acquires characteristics oflife, while the workers recede into objectification:
Described solely in terms offunction in the assembly une, the body ofthe workers
disappears and the body ofthe product is foregrounded: “Thejoumeymen were plying
their tools —some chiseling noses; some trenching for mouths; and others, with heated
flints, boring for ears.” Instead of describing the eyes and cars ofthejoumeymen,
Hevaneva explains how the workers repair damaged idols by “touching up the eyes and
cars [and] resetting their noses.” It is as though the specialization or narrowness ofthe
joumeymen serves as the precondition for the variety ofthe comrnodity. (Weinstein 95)
Weinstein’s analysis here is on par with the widespread twentieth-century practice of self
identifying with one’s profession. Moreover, she makes the point that, for Melviile, unoriginai
work is equated with idleness or ‘idolness.’ In this way, the “effect of factory work on the
journeymen is flot a development of characterologïcal identity but rather its flattening out.
Characters become ailegorical as a consequence of either laboring too much or flot laboring at
ail” (95-6). MelviIle concludes with the founding of a utopia called Serenia, in which “religion is
based on a truc understanding of Christian principles, which significantly include[sJ the fair
distribution ofiabor: Let ‘no mân toil too hard, that thou may’st idie be” (Weinstein 98).
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iii. The Dominated and Dïsconnected Automaton
The issue ofthe effects of ‘idie’ labour on the individual identity is deait with in several
ofMelville’s works. In his Bartleby Hie Scrivener, written in 1853, the author “savagely
expose[s] the legal profession as a patemalistic institution that required its workers to engage in
labor that was a waste of time” (Weinstein 118-19). The story, published in two consecutive
issues of Putnarn ‘s Monthly Magazine, and later in 1856 in Melville’s collected stories entitled
The Piazza Tales, documents the experience of a Iawyer who has hired BartÏeby to work in his
office. The scrivener’s job, along witli two other scriveners employed by the lawyer-narrator, is
to copy documents by hand. While at first Bartleby excels at lis job so that the nanator is
compelled to push the other two copyists in their work, Bartleby suddenly and inexplicably
ceases to do any work. When questioned by the perplexed narrator, he replies only that he
“would prefer flot to.” What is more beguiling is that Bartleby refuses to be fired, as weIl.
Though he does not comply with the terms set out in lis contract, he refuses to vacate tIc
position which tIc job with the lawyer gives him. Consistency in the ways in which capitalist
society works makes us assume a degree ofpredictabllity in everyday life; these cognitive
patterns are helpful and generally a necessity for the individual to manage in a society. Most
significantly, this is seen in the workplace, largeÏy because an individual must perform a function
in an expected manner in order to fuÏfihl his job obligations. There are expectations on the part of
both employer and employee as to what functions each should satisfy. The narrator expects a
relationship with Bartleby that is ‘socialized,’ one in which lie may be able to rely on Bartleby
fulfihling certain functions and behaving in a particular way. When he does not comply, Bartleby
establishes himself as being outside of society and impervious to its laws, yet, paradoxically he
remains deeply entrenched in it, and this is what further intrudes upon the lawyer’s rationality.
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But rationality and reason are flot Iaws ofthe natural and physical world; they may be
seen, rather. as coping mechanisms for human beings living in technological societies in which
‘natural’ and ‘physical’ become iess and less pertinent. However, there is nothing physical or
natural about Bartleby. His responses are very much unnatural, and though he occupies a bodily
outline, it affects no quality that would define it as being capable ofphysicality. Our first
introduction to Bartleby
requires us to look at him as if he were a photograph. He appears without context,
possessing neither a past nor a future, but oniy a perpetual present. He is seen as if
framed by the doorway of the iawyer’s office: “a motionless young man one moming
stood upon my office threshold, the door being open, for it was summer. I can see that
figure now—pallidly neat, pitiably respectable, incurably forlom! It was Bartleby”... It
is as if anonymity engenders particuiarity. He becomes by flot being and gains identity
through featurelessness. As one man, lie stands for ail. This picture of Bartleby is both
contentless and full of content, free of interpretation and yet demanding to be interpreted.
Bartleby exists as a kind ofempty form which wilI generate the presence ofmateriaï for
the lawyer’s story. (Weiner 67)
The “anonymity” that engenders the “particularity” of Bartleby is arguably the same that marks
any ofthe allegorical characters discussed earlier. If Bartleby, like Everyman, is “representative
man,” then his ‘featurelessness” must be inclusive of ail ofhumankind, and flot differentiate
itself as being atypical. Representative man “stands for ah”; what can it mean, then, that he is, at
the same time, “contentless and full of content”? The key is that, just like Bartleby,
representative man “appears without context.” At this point, he is contentiess. But once a
particular context springs up around him, he suddenly radiates a fully historicized meaning. In
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this way, Bartleby takes over from Everyman. It is also with this view that the character of
Bartleby substantiates an important milestone in literary history.
The figure of Bartleby may more profitably be used as a source than as the derivative of
other sources: an archetypal figure on which to base comparisons, the ultimate passive
resistor who sacrificially defies the conventional limits and barriers to the annihilating
awareness oflife. (Widmer, “Metville’s Radical Resistance” 446)
It is with this understanding that this study places a great significance on the character of
Bartleby, as a precursor of the modem worker alienated in ail ways from bis own labour, his
product, lis employer and, finally, himself. Meiville strikes out against the ideas of
standardization and common expectations and, in his works, proves that, as a writer, he is “no
copyist of Maryat or Cooper, but has struck out an entirely new path for himseÏf—a path in
which none can hope to overtake him” (Review, Criterion, 74). Even into the next century,
however, writers have been influenced by Melville’s Bartleby and his dealings with a world in
which associations between men have consistently and progressively degraded into an
interaction of surfaces. “In some ways,” Nicholas Ayo writes, “Bartleby appears as forerunner of
Camus’s Stranger and Kafka’s Mr. K.” (Ayo, “Bartleby’s Lawyer” 35). He has also been
compared to Dostoyevsky’s Underground Man. Perhaps this is explained by the coupling of
one’s realization that “Melville does flot provide the reader with sufficient information to
understand the scrivener” (J. Wilson 335) with the fact that he also depicts a character that
compels the reader’s curiosity. It must be acknowledged, then, that as a writer, he has succeeded
in managing to portray the phenomena of the social hierarchy in a technological world; that is,
that members are interchangeable, regardiess oftheir places in the hierarchical network. Readers
are cognizant ofthis quasi-natural law, such that Bartleby’s refusai to be moved into action by
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the hierarchy becomes a resistance championed by members of ail strata of society, whether they
are conscious of it or flot.
The lawyer-narrator himself sways between a near solidarity with Bartleby’s resistance
and his absolute refutation ofit. This is partially due to bis oscillation between viewing Bartleby
variously as a fellow human being or as an automaton. In fact, critics oflen share the sarne sense
of confusion as to how to take Bartleby. “for some critics Bartleby is an ‘innocent,’ a ‘Christ
figure,’ and a ‘typical Melville isolato,’ while to others his behavior is categorized as
‘schizophrenia’ or as ‘perversity” (Ayo 28). The first interpretation views him as a symbol or
allegorical figure, while the second examines him through the filter ofhuman psychology,
assuming the premise ofhis indisputable individuality. The interpretation ofBartieby as
individual is seen, for some, as “an account ofMelville’s reductio aU absurdum ofthe overdone
individualism” ofThoreau and others (Ayo 27). At the other end ofthe spectrum, the approach to
BartÎeby as a flat character has been taken up by several critics who “have noted that Bartleby is
more like a marionette than an actual character,” a “sort of animated Xerox machine duplicating
the documents that reinforce and perpetuate the status quo” (Mawin Fisher qtd. in Weiner 67). In
this vein, it is especially interesting that as BartÏeby becornes more and more of a bodily fixture
in the lawyer’s office, allusions to him as being disembodied begin to appear. He is referred to
variously as an “incubus” and a “ghost.” The lawyer, in fact, daims to feel haunted by him.
Perhaps the urge on the part ofthe Iawyer and the Iandowner to disembody Bartteby stems ftom
the fact that only bodies possess rights. The authority represented by these two characters is
threatened by his body—humourless, motionless and apparently not subject to human needs or
wants. Melville refers to Bartleby’s constant consumption of ginger nuts and nothing else, as
well as his immobile disposition, both in terms ofhis personality and his actual physical
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presence. But it is his iack of engagement in activities that are human (eating, moving, desiring)
that undermines his presence as a physicai being at ail: his existence constitutes as rnuch
substance as the concrete waiis that box him in.
Related to the iack of concem for his human needs is his iack of concem for the “self’;
this is the individualistic drive indicated in de TocquevllÏe’s uniquely American “taste for well
being,” as weÏl as in the early precursors to Foucault’s “care ofthe self.” InherentÏy, this is a
“seifish” desire in that its roots lie in surviving the natural world. But if the discourse of caring
for the self had originated as a personai one, it has certainly estabiished itself more fully in the
political reaim. This is shown by the preformulated program for “success,” indicators ofwhich
are great wealth, expensive home, big cars and decadent lifestyle. Melviiie’s lawyer, then, acts in
a very logical manner when he attempts to win Bartieby’s compliance by offering him things that
mean a great deal to the narrator, especially in the arena of the American workplace:
Absolutist Bartleby, who asserts the freedom ofthe vill but denies it any specific reasons
or moral values, lacks ail selfishness. Repeatedly in the story the attorney triumphantÏy
resorts to interest, to offers ofmoney, better employment, letters ofrecommendation,
travel, a home, friendship—any selfish desire with which the enlightened human might
be manipulated—but Bartleby remains unamenable to the calculus of selfislmess. Here
the attorney cannot discover, and exploit, the useful seifishness, as he does with lis other
scriveners. (Widmer 454)
Bartleby’s refusai ofthese key acquisitions is felt by the narrator as an incomprehensible act of
anti-social behaviour—”anti-social” because lie refuses to care for bis self in the specific ways
that are outlined by society as being in the best interests of each individual. These conventions
are given by the narratives ofprogress, upward social mobility, and the American Dream. By
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failing to embrace these major aims in life and, thus, eschewing “success” as a motivating factor
in life, one effectively rejects the values and ethics of society. Though the nanator does flot fully
grasp the degree of damage Bartleby’s rejection effects on the cognitive paradigrns through
which he understands his world, it is certainly feit as a severe violence. This is evidenced by the
force in the narrator’s responses to the sèrivener’s behaviour; first, he is curious, then his
authoritativeness is evoked, then charity, then wrath, then benevolence, and then sentiment.
The narrator’s responses, however, are conditioned by a rationalizing tendency that has
no currency in Bartleby’s world and, thus, are precluded in moving the scrivener towards
behaviour more suited to his social role. The discrepancy between the two men widens
irrevocably because, as Widmer writes, the narrator “remains the defender of American utility
and optïmism” (457). He believes the other scriveners in the office think too much of
themselves; considering their professions, Nippers suffers from “diseased ambition” (Melville,
Bartleby 7), and Turkey is “insolent,” a “man whom prosperity harmed” (8). As an employer,
understandably, he requires a specific use of each man he hires. But when conftonted with the
problem of their humanity, he aiways resorts to a utilitarian view ofhumankind in order to best
settie the issue. For example, when Bartleby seems to develop eye strain, when Ginger Nut’s
work begins to affects his health, or when Turkey complains ofovenvork, the narrator handles
the complaints with an assembly-line manager’s smoothness rather than with a view to resolving
them. This is due to his assumption of the absolute truth of “a business-is-business ethic” (Ayo
30). He does, however, seem to lapse into compassion: “The bond ofa common humanity now
drew me irresistibly to gloom,” he thinks. “A fratemal melancholy! For both I and Bartleby were
sons ofAdam” (Melville, Bartleby 20). But because these thoughts are countered by his own
function of upholding the ethics of a self-serving society, these thoughts are not enough to effect
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any real change in either of their lives. As well, pathos, in whatever form, means that the
individual experiencing the emotion acknowledges and maintains the separation between himself
and the person whom he empathizes with. Rather than feeling humanity deeply or as if the
deplorable circumstances were his own, the person imagines, from afar, a surface relation to the
unfortunate individual and, in this way, reinforces the unnatural business relationship over the
more natural human relationship. This loss ofrelationship is the loss of association that de
Tocqueville wamed against when lie wrote, “Between worker and master, relations are frequent,
but there is no genuine association” (vol. 2, pt. 2, cli. 20). Thus, when the lawyer sighs, “Ah,
Bartleby! Ah, humanity!” his “words are ironic in that he cannot respond to Bartleby as a living
human being, but only as an abstraction—an abstract concept ofhumanity” (J. Wllson 344). The
lawyer denies any sense of obligation to Bartleby, especially when lie vacates his office. He
leaves Bartleby behind and when the landiord requests that he remove his fonner employee, he
insists, over and over again, “the man you allude to is nothing to me” (34). The truth is that
Bartleby and the lawyer are nothing to cadi other; the employee-employer relationship has
clieapened associations between men. The ‘bond’ exists only inasmuch as each individual
receives something from the other. In Bartleby, tus system is highuighted by the reproduction of
documents that represents authoritarian law. Turkey, Ginger Nut and Bartleby (until lie refuses to
continue working) each contribute to tic ordering of society according to a hierarchy that
accords to one’s function in society rather than one’s humanity. As Weiner writes, “There is a
hierarchy of imitation within tic law office. . . . As tie copyists imitate the lawyer, so tic lawyer
reproduces the codes that reguÏate the entire system” (71). This imitation benefits only the
authoritarian system, as “associations” between men are reduced to mere “relations.” When
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compared to earlier societies in which, say, a landowner cared for the lives ofpeople who
depended upon him for survival, this reduction of association does flot bode well for humankind.
As social relations further thin out, so character as depicted in literature begins to flatten.
As well, although the lawyer presumes to hold a certain prestige within the hierarchy ofpower,
even lie consciously admits the arbitrary nature of his power. At first, he daims to feel “safe”
doing a “snug business” (Melville, Bartleby 4). 11e “is a man who, from youth upwards, bas been
fihled with a profound conviction that the easiest way of life is the best” (3). But, as per
MelvilIe’s concept of ‘idie’ labour which was discussed earlier, the resuit ofthis kind ofwork is
that the individual founders when the circumstances ofthe position are removed. In the lawyer’s
case, the position he had assumed to be a “life-lease” was taken away without any explanation or
compensation, illustrating lis complete lack of control and power over lis own job, as well as
the copyists he commands. The revelation ofhis absolute interchangeability, and thus, lack of
individuality, occurs when he fearfully wonders whether Bartleby will take over his office
because he has occupied it for so long and refuses to leave it. As Weiner writes,
[The Iawyer} had been content and even eager to operate as a cog in the legal machinery
of the Wall Street world by contributing to its rigidity. . . . By repetitiously writing the
documents that encoded the laws of ownership or origin, the lawyer becomes a key
element in maintaining the structure of the entire legal ftamework. (70)
However, the fact tlat “The lawyer automatically carnes out this function mudh as his copyists
carry out theirs” (70) indicates that he no more possesses any control over his job and, thus,
position in society than do Bartleby, Turkey or Ginger Nut. This revelation—the only ‘truth’ that
may be considered ‘absolute’ in this hierarchy of socioeconomic status—strikes fear and dread
into the heart of any person in an apparent power position. This is because, while he may
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conform to the delineation of his circumstance, there is some degree of acquiescence, conscious
or unconscious, that his identity is no more stable or substantial than the thin outiine of the
position conferred upon him. In short, people are interchangeable within the hierarchical
socioeconomic framework.
For many, this concept constitutes a veritable threat to a way of living, and it is especially
intimidating for those who occupy power positions. This is why the lawyer responds with such
emotion to Bartleby’s refusai to work, but it also expiains his generai obsessive curiosity about
the scrivener. Both are responses to the same lurking danger that an act of non-compliance
represents to the status quo. And responses to both may be just as violent in thought as in
behaviour. Because ofhis refusai to go along with the system requirements, “the machinery of
that society is mobilized to destroy him” (Weiner 71). Yet, as supported by the anger ofthe
lawyer, the breakdown of productivity occurs as well because the other scriveners begin thinking
about their own positions relative to the hierarchy. For exampie, once Bartleby refuses to work,
the other two begin entertaining thoughts of “prefen-ing” flot to, as weii. Once the concept of not
following orders enters the scriveners’ minds, the office is on its way to becoming ineffective.
Whiie this resuits in the iawyer’s feeling ofbeing chailenged, it also makes him feel less human,
as if his superiority as given by his position in the hierarchy is relevant to lis membership in
mankind. He feels “strangely goaded” (Meiville, Bartteby 15) by Bartleby and “bum[s] to be
rebelied against” (16) or “to elicit some angry spark from him” (15). But Bartleby’s manner “not
only disarmed me, but unmanned me, as it were. For I consider that one, for the time, is a sort of
unmanned when he tranquilly permits his hired cierk to dictate to him, and order him away from
his own premises” (19). Responding to the strong feelings evoked by what is, in effect, a
provocation on the part ofBartieby, the lawyer says he should have “flown outright into a
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dreadful passion, scomed ail further words, and tbrust him ignominiously from my presence”
(13). Though he daims that Bartieby’s “desk is mine, and its contents too” (21), his search ofhis
empioyee’s desk is an inappropriate use ofhis assumed power. This is evidenced by the fact that
such an act would be illegal today. This abuse of power constitutes an act of violence upon the
rights of the individual worker.
Moreover, the subtitie ofthe short novel, “A Story ofWall Street,” brings to light the
preponderance ofwalls in Bartieby’s and the lawyer’s iives. The lawyer begins the story by
placing Bartieby’s desk some distance away from his own, facing a window whose only view
consists of bricks. Eventually, he adds to this arrangement by putting up a folding screen around
Bartleby to create kind of cloister, yet which allows in the ali-commanding voice of the lawyer.
The effect is akin to that of the Wizard in The Wizard ofOz, who assumes an air of grandiosity
and bombastic pretense aithough he is only a very ordinary man. It is easy to recognize the walis
erected around Bartleby as those which constitute the modem-day cubicie. Thus, when J. Wilson
writes that “the walls reflect the division ofthis particular society into two distinct classes: the
property owners and the propertyless workers” (337), his analysis remains startiingly applicable.
Critics, including Wiison, equate the walls ofWall Street to those ofthejail and, eventualiy, the
Tombs, where Bartleby ends his life. The suggestion is that working in this environment is
equivalent to being dead, and this is indicated by the afterthoughts of the iawyer, who reveals
that Bartleby had once worked in the Dead Letter office. Though attempts to communicate are
made, dead letters symbolize the absence of truc interaction in a society in which
“communication” is based on terms which are strictly business and less and iess “authenticaliy
human” (Widmer 450).
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The walls ofthe Tombs also refer to those ofthe tombs of ancient Egypt, “equat[ing]
Bartleby’s plight with the plight of the oppressed masses” (J. Wilson 343). The lawyer attempts
to uphold the façade that this pyramid-like hierarchy does flot exist by claiming “there is the sky,
and here is the grass,” as if to say that no boundaries keep him in his place. But regardless of
whether Bartleby is apparently free in the natural world, or encased in a tomb-like cubicle, his
reply is stili “I know where I am” (Melville, Bartleby 39). This is because, as the character of
Bartleby indicates, the forces that keep him in his place are not only physical. Because lis nature
does flot change as his outward circumstances undergo drastic upheavals, it is apparent that the
affliction he suffers from is, as the lawyer finds, an “innate and incurable disorder. I might give
alms to his body; but his body did not pain him; ït was his soul that suffered, and lis soul I could
not reach” (22). Yet, while the narrator has been cited for irresponsibility, for inaction when
faced with the sympathetic plight of another human being, it is preciseÏy Bartleby’s soul that the
lawyer—or those authoritarians in Bartleby’s past whose disciplinary role the lawyer had merely
taken over for—had reached, and afflicted. If Bartleby’s sou! is so diseased, has it become so as
a resuit of some punishment? It would follow, then, that the lawyer would be so full of pity and
compassion for Bartleby because he re-enacts the proper Foucauldian response, as a member of
society who is able to sympathize while acknowledging the need for swift but painful
disciplinary action. Prison walls are evident in the story, but rather than simply symbolizing the
prison, they are meant to suggest the imprisoning tfestyte. Perhaps they function just as the
stamp of the gallows which, as Dickens reports, was “stamped on every page of the criminal
statute-book” and universally known. As discussed earlier, when methods of disciplinary action
changed throughout the I 9th century, the gallows and the jail began to represent punishment to
the sou!, rather than to the body. If “at the end of every vista, you see nothing but the gallows”
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(Burke 16), then it follows that the individual cannot help but see everywhere in society and its
institutions indications of bis own mental and emotional discipline. Bartleby’s “incurable
disorder” (22) of the soul is a direct resuit of the disciplinary action of social institutions. By
actively fortifying the social codes and mores that keep Bartleby in his folding-screen cubicle on
a steady progress towards self-annihilation and death, the lawyer insidiously extinguishes the life
of the scrivener while maintaining an attitude of charity and sympathy. In essence, this “idte”
work is what keeps the social machinery pristine and functioning at its peak. Indeed, this
machine produces functionary man before he is even bom, according to the standards and
boundaries of conduct that are aiways already in effect. This explains how the lawyer is able to
introduce us to Bartleby before he is even named: as J. Wilson points out, the lawyer seems to
recognize Bartleby in the doorway ofhis office by virtue ofhis anonymity; it is precisely his
initial accordance with the rules that extinguishes bis interiority and achieves this ‘absent’
quality. The lawyer, too, while facing the threat ofhis own irrelevancy because bis job is in
jeopardy, continues his ‘idle’ work by following the law to the letter, as it were; in doing so, he
contributes to the maintenance of an immaculate and orderly society. By the mid-nineteenth
century, when Melville sat down to write Bartleby: A Stoiy of Wall Street, it was beginning to be
much clearer, and flot only to the thinkers and artists ofthe time, that the morphology ofman
suggested he was losing agency—quickly. Paradoxically, representative man changed from
Blake’s Nobodaddy to Nobody, and then from Everyman to.. . Somebody. Everyone in
capitalist society suddenly wanted to be a somebody, as ifchangingjob titles would have any
effect on the intrinsic structure that extinguished the life of Bartleby. Yet, this inflated lifestyle of
artificial power and prestige was only a variation on that of the lawyer-narrator; in fact, it was his
very lifestyle pressed to the extreme.
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By the end of the nineteenth century, as the average lifestyle became more and more
devoted to the appearance of affluence, new developments in human psychoiogy and social
behaviour arose, adding to the discourse of the individuai. At the same time, increasing
technology further affected the ways human beings worked, so that the positive impact of these
drastic changes often countered any headway made by those who cited the machines for
undercutting the individuality ofhuman character and, therefore, individuai agency. In fact, for
many, the effects of technological progress on the economy as weli as on the human being were
very promising and suggested only greater prosperity and well-being for ail. While the
“developing market economy in antebellum” had become one of “the nineteenth century’s most
powerful technologies of producing personhood,” whether this power was ultïmateiy a positive
or negative one was stiil a hotly debated issue. In particuiar, as Weinstein continues in The
Literature ofLabor, “new forms of labor produce new forms of personhood” (104; emphasis
added). And as the language ofbirth and production became indistinguishable, so did the clarity
of the une separating human from machine. “To most Victorian writers, however, it seemed that
the inner life could stiil remain untouched by the machine” ($ussman 184), and this assumption
constituted a blind spot for late nineteenth-century society because it threatened to broach the
essentializing of human intenonty. It also led to the expectation that the human spirit couid flot
be intruded upon by what contained it, that is, its socioeconomic circumstance. As the I 900s
came to a close, however, it became clear that “the twentieth-century fear [would be] that the
machine will invade even this sanctuary” of limer life (Sussman 184).
Anxiety as to the possibility of this conclusion coming to fruition certainly was flot
reserved for writers of fiction. In fact, writers would find many points of comparison between
their thoughts on how technology wouid affect the human being in the new millennium, and
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those ofwriters in areas such as politics, social theoiy and, particularly, psychology. Wri
ting
during this time period was William Morris, whose startiing observations about the effe
cts of
mechanical work on the individual in society were as important in their own right as freud’
s
work on the psyche. In his article “Art and Socialism,” Morris begins with a distinction be
tween
the work to which man applies himself such that it provides a “natural solace” and the work
that
is “without meaning” which invariably becomes a “repulsive burden” (Morris, PoÏiticat Writings
110). It is real, genuine labour that Morris cites as creatïng true “pleasure—or in other words,
added life” (110). But the type of labour that was gaining popularity with manufacturers also
vigorously attacked man’s role as a craftsman. The artist’s responsibility of invigorating and
sustaining human spirituality was overcome with the fiinctional, societal foie of tending to
the
needs of machines in production.
Morris famously “blended” Art and Labour, arguably raising both to higher levels of
purpose and dignity. He made a daim that ail members of society should neyer be wi
thout work
and that there were three principles that stipulated the kind of work it should be: F
irst, that it be
“work worth doing”; second, that it be work that is “pleasant to do”; and third, that
the work be
“done under conditions as wouid make it neither over-wearisome nor over-anxiou
s” (“Art and
$ocialism” 127). Furthermore, Morris hoped to “win back Art again to our daily labour” (121).
Art was “the pleasure of life” (129) and “the happiness oflife” (123), and this was what he
hoped would infuse labour with a life-giving, rather than life-taking, toil.
Morris condemned
what lie saw as the deterioration ofmankind through the deterioration o
fits work.
Standardization in production facilities was increasing everywhere as the
demand for consumer
goods amplified. Labour, which had once been a natural solace, had now
become a horrible
burden. And, though Morris believed that this sorry state of labour ha
d corne about directly
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through the application of new mechanical technologies, he remained firm in the knowledge that
these sarne machines might have been used to ameliorate everyday life for the average person. In
fact, in his view, machines did flot automaticalÏy preclude human sensibility from open
expansion and growth. As proven through “his essays and his commercial practice, Morris saw
no necessary conflict between the machine and the sensually liberated life. Like Carlyle,
Dickens, and even Ruskin, he shared the Victorian delight in technologicat achievement”
(Sussman 132). Instead, however, technology that might have been applied towards labour
saving strategies leU to the breakdown of relations between peopie, as well as the threatening of
the integrity of individual self-identification. The hand of the crafisman ceased in the creation of
useful or artfui objects, and took up with puliing levers and responding to the ever-increasing
frequency ofthe assembly une. Thus, the meaning the crafisman once gleaned ftom a more
traditional work dissipated—whether that meaning was generated from a leamed understanding
or a ‘natural’ intuition of what type ofwork is worthy ofa particulariy deeper significance (say,
work that creates artfui or useful objects, rather than objects that are neither artful nor useful. but
simpÏy impress upon the mmd with a perfected redundancy). Morris writes,
The wonderful machines which in the hands ofjust and foreseeing men would have been
used to minimize repulsive labour and to give pleasure—or in other words added life—to
the human race, have been so used on the contrary that they have driven ail men into
mere frantic haste and hurry, thereby destroying pleasure, that is life, on ail hands: they
have instead of lightening the labour of the workmen, intensified it, and thereby added
more weariness yet to the burden which the poor have to carry. (“Art and Socialism” 110-
11)
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On top of this, the new types of labour that were being created were what Morris referred to as
“useless toil.” In lis article “Useful Work versus Useless Toil” (1885), he points out the sorry
state of society in which any kind ofwork is praised, even if it is work of a useless variety. He
suggests that there is a kind of work that, since it employs man on a very basic level of
consciousness and intelligence, is beneath humankind. This is the type of work that man should
do without.
Since socÏety has been incuicated with the Puntan work ethic, however, it lias corne to
tacitly accept the premise that any work is a worthwhile pursuit. In this respect, Morris’s
conception of a labour that must be truly worthwhile extends rnuch further; in fact, lis may very
well be the labour glonfied in the early georgics. In “Usefut Work Versus Useless Toil” he
writes, “the creed of modem morality that ail labour is good in itself [is] a convenient belief to
those who live on the labour ofothers” (117). He differentiates between the state ofcreating, or
truly producing, and the mere state ofbeing “employed.” This higher purpose, to attain and
maintain any kind of employment (regardless of its suitability with respect to the nature of the
employee) requires the ultimate sacrifice of one’s tirne and initiative. Morris calis into question a
work ethic that requires one to push away one’s true calling rnerely to make money and build
commercial networks. His work ethic, on the other hand, requires the sacrifice of commerce in
order to build upon individual initiative. In making this distinction, Morris infuses dignity and
honour into true labour. He opposes the art ofcraftsmanship—oftrue creation—to mechanïstic
production. As mentioned earlier, it was flot necessarily the mechanisms of technological
innovation that Morris disparaged. In fact, what he cautioned against were the detrirnentaÏ effects
of mechanization on human consciousness along with “the eagemess of competitive Commerce
to make the most of the huge crowd of workrnen whorn it breeds as unregarded instruments for
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what is called the making ofmoney” (“Art and Socialism” 114). Here, Morris’s conception of
Commerce is very much in une with that of de Tocqueville. Morris goes on to write, “the
Commerce they are so proud of has become their master” and they “are cornpelled to admit not
that Commerce was made for man, but that man was made for Commerce” (116). That man “was
made for Commerce” indicates that he contains himself in order to fit the form of Commerce
(rather than, on the other hand, expressing himselfto fully realize his organic and human
qualities). This brings to fruition de Tocqueville’s prescient words, “The art advances, the artisan
recedes,” or, as the worker is “perfect[ed],” “the man in him is degraded in proportion”
(Democracy in America vol. 2, pt. 2, cli. 20). It is important to note that, in these excerpts from
de Tocqueville, the “art” ofthe “workman” is that oftechnological production, rather than that of
the true “art” ofwhich Morris speaks. This shifi in meaning cornes about because ofthe shifi in
meanings ofwork. In the past, work was predicated on a sense ofpride in one’s individual
production; eventually, it transmogrifled into a sense ofpride in one’s conquests. This, Moi-ris
writes, is -
the present system of labour in civilized countries. That system, which I have called
competitive Commerce, is distinctly a system of war; that is of waste and destruction: or
- you may eau it gambling if you will, the point of it being that under it whatever a man
gains he gains at the expense of some other man’s loss. (“Art and Socialism” 123)
Here, Morris responds to the growing sense that one’s labour constituted a waste oftime, energy
and monetary ïncome if one worked for the community, rather than for oneseif. The complex
motivations and desires accompanying the growing system of Commerce had, indeed, altered the
individual moral code. Instead of”production” connoting the concept ofputting one’s efforts out
into the community and sharing the benefits ofthat work, “producing” became synonymous with
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accumulating, or ‘bringing in’ money ftom the community. One of the main draws of the new
consumerism was acquiring objects that one’s neighbours and friends did flot have; thus, it only
follows that whatever concems were attached to community were easily abandoned for the hard
work of fulfihling one’s individual needs and desires.
These manufactured ‘wants’ were so powerful that Morris refers to them as creating a
state of”war,” one in which competitiveness engenders “gambling” and “destruction” as part of
everyday life. In “How we Live and How we Might Live” (1884) he bluntly states that a shorter
name for competition is war; in fact, he daims “our present system of Society is based on a state
ofperpetual war” in which one must “pursu[e] your own advantage at the cost of some one else’s
loss, and in the process of it you must not be sparing of destruction even of your own
possessions, or you will certainly come by the worse in the struggie. You understand that
perfectly as to the kind of war in which people go out to kiil and be killed” (136-37). Overail,
however, it is a “waste of labour, skill, cunning, waste of life in short” (139) because the product
itselfis cheapened; due to society’s fickleness, demand is also cheapened; and finally, the worker
is cheapened by a demotion from a creator to a veritable waste of life. Rather than stimulate the
economy, Mon-is posits, this kind of production creates a damaging glut in society. It can hardly
be estimated when society will choose to overindulge. Thus, the rule of supply and demand,
when applied to the perpetual shiffing of American fashions and desires, provides a shaky base
from which to derive subsistence. This instability, added to the ubiquitous propaganda
encouraging a ‘healthy competitiveness’ among men, pits the individual against ail others.
Rather than contributing towards the health of society, the individual only works in order to take
away payment for work done; adding to society is hardly a consideration. The alienation ofthe
individuai began once lie feit no shame in admitting that the “I” had become more important than
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the community, once he realized, undoubtedly, that in order to succeed, he must take from—
deprive—someone else.
Consumerism, then, established an individualist desire in Americans that meant the needs
ofcommunity were being pushed farther and farther away from the individual’s major priorities.
This “individualism” proved a direct contrast to that which the country had previously known;
for example, while Whitman writes about individualism only a few decades earlier, it is aiways
with the resuit of increased fratemity and the betterment of society in mmd. On the other hand,
individualism conjoined with the new consumerism effected a selfishness that posited much
more than a sense of seif-preservation and well-being as its end. At some point, a personal
evaluation ofwell-being——how one is progressing with regard to one’s short- and long-term
goals—was no longer valid unless it contained a comparative estimation ofhow eveiyone etse
was progressing. This competition drove many Americans to eschew the sense ofpurpose that
came with striving towards a higher calling. In the same movement, they also tossed aside the
determination necessary to focus one’s abilities and energies on work that would sustain a person
over a lifetime. Indeed, a vocation is defined as a “regular occupation, especially one for which a
person is particularly suited or qualified” (“Vocation,” American Heritage Dictionaîy; emphasis
added). What is important to note here is that an individual could depend on finding work that
interested him, and for which he was suited, and also, basically, that this mode of work would be
available for a person over the span of his life. Both of these elements become conspicuously
absent as consumerism’s influence on American society increases. In addition, pnor to
consumerism taking hold en masse, people had ofien felt that work was a vocation, or, a
“response to a summons. . . or calling” (“Vocation”). To describe one’s work as a response or
reply suggests that a sort of communication is taking place. Indeed, traditional conceptions of
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“work” may include interaction between two individuals. It may also be indicative of one
individual responding to the needs of a group, or a community. By choosing, as one’ s vocation,
to focus on responding to someone or something else, one relegates the concept of selfishness to
a place ofvery littie importance. To be sure, the word “vocation” suggests a higher calling; it is
rooted in the Middle English vocacioun which is defined as “a divine cail to a religious life.” But
vocation soon becomes “occupation”: “An activity engaged in especially as a means ofpassing
time” (“Occupation”). Thus, a working person, once responsibie flot only to the public but to a
divine power, is downgraded to a holder of a position which offers mereiy the passing of time.
Moreover, occupation is aiternately defined as the “act or process of holding orpossessing a
place” (emphasis added), a meaning that holds great significance later in this study when
character is discussed as a functionary of narrative.
The terni that cornes into popular usage afier “vocation” is ‘job.” The transition from one
word to the other marks the movement ftom the common notion of work as answering a life
cailing (vocation) to work that holds as its major concem the possibility ofbeing fiscally short
changed (job). In fact, ‘job” is inextricably linked to the idea ofpayment as “vocation” definitely
was not: The American Heritage Dictionary defines ajob as a “specific piece of work to be done
for a set fee” (“Job”). It is interesting, as well, to note that ‘job” has irrefutabiy shady
delineations: as a verb, it also rneans “To transact (officiai business) dishonestly for private
profit.” It again denotes negatively by its infonnal meaning: “A criminal act, especially robbery.”
furthermore, it must be considered that another informai meaning of ‘job” is “An example of a
specified type, especially of something made or constructecf’ (emphasis added). for instance, as
put forth in The American Heritage Dictïonaiy, a new building might be described as ‘just
another glass and steel job.” In this case, the concept of a job as an empty, pre-existing form that
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may be possessed is clear; it has withstood time to remain in use in the phrase “having a job or a
position tofiht.” More importantly, the prevalence ofthis conception of thejob opens the way for
the popular understanding of peopie as flattened-out types that must conforrn to the roles meted
out to them by the increasingly competitive structures ofthe socioeconorny. “Man is,” as Morris
writes, “made for Commerce” (emphasis added).
It should be noted, as weii, that the word ‘job” may also derive from “the obsoÏetejobbe,
piece, alteration of Middie English gobbe, lump” (“Job”). By the seventeen hundreds, the phrase
“jobbe ofworke” meant apiece ofwork (contrasted with the continuous, life-long labour of
“vocation”). It is interesting to note that “gobbe” or “gob” is ofien used in the American idiom
“gobs ofrnoney.” It then becomes apparent that ‘job” signifies a potential for making (or taking)
money, rather than a potential to fulfili a higher cailing by creating (or adding) to the world (as is
suggested by “vocation”). By the tum of the twentieth century, “to gob” meant “to swalÏow
greedily and without tasting” ( Webster 1913 Dictionaiy), a description very near to what de
Tocqueville had obsewed but much more fitting for the desire-for-desire consumer world. A
‘job,” then, had corne to rnean a short-terrn stint that reimbursed time and effort with money; a
‘job” had clearly dispossessed itself ofthe onus to provide any real sustenance, such as a greater
purpose or a meaning other than the literai task at hand. (Indeed, by the late twentieth century, a
‘job” cornes to be defined as a “Normal term for a complete item of work performed by a
computer system” [Dictionary ofScience and Technology]). In fact, a ‘job” had become siang
for “specimen, thing, person” (“Job,” American Heritage Dictionary; emphasis added). That the
word ‘job” could be another name for a person clearly indicated that, by the early twentieth
century, the average American was aware ofthe life-shaping effect that ajob had on the
individual in society. Far from its origins as a vocation that brought out qualities ofthe divine in
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a person, work had merely become a ‘job,” a showcase ofhumanity’s flawed, albeit mortal,
seifishness. Further, the characteristic qualities ofthejob—the set role, way ofthinking, and
protocol that it provided—assimilated the individual such that he expressed only those qualities
and characteristics possessed by the job or position itself. Since responding to and looking at the
world from only one point ofview effects a ‘flattening’ ofthe human personality, this
assimilation led to a further dehumanized individuai. Depending on the homogeneity of only one
worid-view became easier than maintaining different facets of one ‘rounded’ personality.
What also became easy was giving in to the seduction ofthis new kind ofwork, much of
which required only a fraction of the physical or intellectual dedication and intensity than had
been required by traditionai work. The new work most ofien had something to do with the
creation or maintenance ofwhat Morris calied the “labour-saving’ machines.” However, rather
than prove an unquestionable benefit to humankind, the machines had alarming effects on
society, as Morris asserts:
What [machines] really do is to reduce the skilled labourer to the ranks of the unskilled,
to increase the number of the “reserve army oflabour”—that is, to increase the
precariousness of life among the workers and to intensify the labour of those who serve
the machines (as slaves their masters). Ah this they do by the way, while they pile up the
profits of the employers of labour, or force them to expend those profits in bitter
commercial war with each other. In a true society these miracles of ingenuity would be
for the first time used for minimizing the amount of time spent in unattractive labour,
which by their means might be so reduced as to be but a very light burden on each
individuai. Ail the more as these machines would most certainly be very much improved
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when it was no longer a question as to whether their improvement would “pay” the
individual, but rather whether it would benefit the community. (“Useful Work” 133-34)
Thus, Morris viewed an individualistic society as a society at war. When a person does not
improve the condition of the community in which he lives, he is leading himself and his family
towards a bleak future. As he writes later in “At a Picture Show,” “The workman must leam to
understand tliat lie must have no master, no employer save himself—himself collectively, that is
to say, the commonweal” (par. 19). But if the worker does flot join together with the
commonweal, lie is at the mercy ofthe “gambling-market” (par. 19) and is effectively a slave, no
matter how much he is financially compensated by his master. On the one hand, he lias the
option to create ami add to the social good; on the other, lie adds only to the gambling-market, or
commercial world, which in tum entrenches divisive forces amongst the bonds ofwhat de
Tocqueville refers to as “human affection” or, altemately, what tlie lawyer in Bartleby cails
“common liumanity.”
Although Bartleby’s employer has been charged by some critics with being consurned by
tlie niggiing feeling tliat lie sliares a “common humanity” with tlie scrivener, it cannot be said
tliat lis littie actions are enougli to betray these feelings. In otlier words, consciously or not, he
feels justified to a sufficient degree that as soon as lie may rid himself of the physical form of
Bartleby, business will settle into its usual pattem. As hierarchies seemingly toppled under the
‘open and fair’ competition of American Capitalism, De Tocqueville on the other hand
bemoaned this degraded relationship between men. Responsibility towards those who were less
fortunate slowly lifled and detaclied itself ftom those who enjoyed comparable economic
stability. The meager relation that remained was a poor substitute for De Tocqueville’s
“association” or Whitman’s “adhesiveness.” By the end ofthe century, Moms cails for the
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workforce to “put Association instead of Competition, Social order instead of Individualist
anarchy” (“Art and Socialism” 111). Otherwise, he wams presciently, “men will become
unequally developed, and there will stiil be a rotten place in Society” (12$).
The sense of social structures which inextricably bound the individual was further
ensconced by increasing mechanization and, ultimately, the introduction and propagation of
Fordism and Taylorism into many workplaces. In 1911,
Frederick Winslow Taylor, the father of scientific management, boldly declared: “What
we are looking for. . . is the ready-made, competent man. . .in the past the man has been
first, in the future the system must be first.” According to Taylor, managers should “talk
to and deal with only one man at a time, since each workman has his own special abilities
and limitations, and since we are not dealing with men in masses, but are trying to
develop each individual man to his highest state ofefficiency and prosperity.” Taylor’s
system continually makes such appeals to the individual, when the very basis ofthat
system is the denial of the individual and the construction of the generic worker. Haber
characterizes Taylor’s program as one in which “methods were primary, flot particular
men.” The particularities ofindividuals disappear even though Taylor denies “dealing
with men in masses.” (Weinstein 164)
And one did flot need to work for an assembly-line production to comprehend that the
assembly-line had become a major symbol in popular culture. The image of the assembly-line
was not simply widespread but, also, crucially meaningfut. It was received and understood by the
general public as a system that could very well swallow the individual whole. The production
line becomes such a prevalent image in society that it is celebrated years later by the clockwork
machinery that ingests Charlie Chaplin in his film Modem Times (1936). If, as Morris daims, it
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was “the aim of the masters or profit-makers to decrease the market value of this human part of
the machinery,” then the masters seemed to have won. They had, to be sure, succeeded in
reducing man to “a part of the machinery for the production of profit” (“How We Live” 143).
But in the literature at the end of the nineteenth century, this apparent loss of humanity coupled
with the acquisition ofa machine-like quality to create a sense ofhumanity’s devolution.
Although Taylor claimed “The old fashioned dictator does not exist under Scientific
Management” (Taylor 9), the only truth in this statement was that rules were flot enforced by one
man; rather, they came to be enforced by a generalized, omniscient power that held the stop
watch. The irony is that the new ‘democratizing’ or equalizing power of the assembly-line
- merely moyeU the power of the ruling class from a visible embodiment to an abstraction. The
fact is that society was stili heavily govemed by a hierarchy of power and the change in the
factory did nothing to change that.
Around this time, Thorstein Veblen wrote his well-known critiquee of society entitled
Theoîy ofthe Leisure Class (1899); in this work, Veblen writes a scathing review of that
segment of society that glorifies a lifestyle of excess. In his writing, “we find the idea that life in
a modem industrial community is the resuit of a polar conflict between ‘pecuniary employments’
and ‘industrial employments’, between ‘business enterprise’ and ‘the machine process’, between
‘vendibility’ and ‘serviceability’—in short, between making money and making goods. There is
a class stmggle under capitalism, not between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, but between
businessmen and engineers” (Blaug “Veblen,” Great Economïsts Before Keynes).
The emphasis on the conflict between making goods and making money is an interesting
one. It highlights the tension between vocation and business, something one is ‘naturally’ suited
for and something to which one applies oneseif (the assumption is that selling is not a truly
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honest lifestyle). From this distinction cornes the relatively new problematic of distinguishing
between an individual and his role in society; before this, there was no need to look at these as
being distinguished from the other. But the dawn ofthe twentieth century gave the individual
new ways of looking out at the world. CertainÏy, his world was changing: society was adjusting
to the impact of newly acquired wealth ftom the Gold Rushes from the early 1 $OOs up to just
before the tum ofthe century. In part because of this new experience, artists began imagining
new ways to situate the individual, along with his new situation, within the Ïiterary work. One of
the issues that consumed many writers was the conflict inherent in the increasing emphasis on
individualism, specifically, American individualisrn, and the growing exoskeleton ofthe social
hierarchy. While seemingly America was becoming more outwardly dernocratic—exemplified
by the growing number of individuals who were able to exercise the new social mobility—
something like the superego ofthe social reared its ugly head. This backlash may be seen in the
cultural production of the time. Attempting to disregard the demarcations of hierarchy not only
robs one of “civilization” but also ofhumanity. Ignoring the unes of social class makes an
individual, with ail rights and privileges, into a grotesque. For example, the respected doctor in
R. L. Stevenson’s Jekyti & Hyde (1886) creates an alter-ego in an attempt to escape the confines
ofhis social role: the murderous and fearsome Mr. Hyde. With the concept ofupward (and
downward) social mobility gaining popularity, people began to understand and accept the idea
that one’s social mie could somehow be different from, even quite opposite to, the nature of
one’s inner self. It is important that Freudian theory was just becoming known with the English
language publication of Inteipretation ofDreams (1909); as well, Darwin’s controversial Origin
ofthe Species (1859) was gaining a greater acceptance. Both would find wider audiences as the
first decades ofthe twentieth century would unfold.
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The idea that there was a ‘natural’ status ofman in society that was somehow divinely
ordained continued to lose currency as stories of the self-made man and the edification of the
American Dream gained popularity. In his book, Made in America (1992), Jeffrey Louis Decker
discusses the term, “American Dream”:
[T]he term was flot put into print until 1931, when middle-brow historian lames Truslow
Adams coined and used it throughout the pages of a book titled The Epic ofAmerica.
The American Dream is to be understood as an ethical doctrine that is symptomatic of a
crisis in national identity during the thirties. The newly invented dream calis out for a
supplement to the outmoded narrative of individual uplifi, which had lost its moral
capacity to guide the nation during the Depression. (92)
0f course, while the term only came into vogue at the time of the Depression, it cannot be said
the story, the “dream” itself, was something new. The plot of the social outsider who makes it
big is found in numerous popular novels. These plots, however, necessitated their own qualifiers;
there was a danger that readers would view their social-climbing heroes, or antiheroes, with
admiration, rather than categorical pity and perhaps contempt for challenging tradition. At the
least, moral endnotes were required to tip the scales unambiguously for readers. The balance,
however, swayed precariously.
for example, these changing values in American society at the tum of the century are
highlighted in Edith Wharton’s Custom ofthe Country (1913). The “hero” ofthe story, Undine
Spragg, is a social-climbing woman of low moral character; she is also a bad mother and wife
and a woman with a questionable past. She does a magnificent job ofmaintaining an upward
movement through the echelons of society and, by the end of the nove!, she is on her way
towards making a move to become a respected politician’s wife. However, she is meant to be
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disliked; even her name is “unattractive.” The inherent warning certainly is to avoid women like
this, and to watch out for fakery and deception. Theodore Dreiser’s An American Tragedy (1925)
ends with a much stronger note: Clyde Griffiths, a “nobody” who panics at the thought of losing
his entrance into high society when his poor girifriend becomes pregnant and threatens to ruin
his shiny future, ends up in jail, the object of a great scandai, and finally, executed. But in novels
such as Dreiser’s Sister Carne (1900) and The Great Gatsby (1925), the empathy of the reader
for Carne and Gatsby is too great to overcome the distaste for the social-climbing that could be
expected from readers at the end of the nineteenth century. These characters are flot led—as
much—by the ruthlessness that ieads Undine Spragg and Ciyde Griffiths; certainiy, more than
anything eise, the murder ofhis pregnant girifriend distances the reader from Clyde. Instead,
these characters are leU by a sympathetic need for acceptance and love; this is reason enough for
readers to overlook the more aiarming idea that peopie could literally make themselves what they
wished simply by acting the part. It was stili a threat to most of society that one might choose
to—and succeed at—presenting an outer persona that was quite opposite from what they
“naturally” were.
In his turn-of-the-century nove!, Sister Carne, Dreiser captures the spirit of the American
Dream. In his Introduction to New Essays on Sister Carne, Dona!d Pizer writes that Dreiser “had
a!so known. . . the core ofhope and expectation—usually thwarted but occasionaliy fulfi!ied—
seemingly inherent in the American expenience” (Pizer 2). Carne moves from the provinces to
the big city of Chicago to make a “success” ofherse!f. Though she is read by many as
prostituting herse!f—she immediate!y moves in with a married man who financialiy supports
her—she eventually makes her own money by becoming an actress. That she is seen as a cntica!
success by Chicagoan society is a good move, on Dreiser’s part, for it smoothes over the fact that
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Carne might be a good liar and user of people. In Sister Carde Dreiser approaches the “late
nineteenth-century cultural myths of the seduction of the young girl in the city and of the
prosperous origins ofthe Bowery bum” (Pizer 7); of course, the American Dream is another
myth he embarks upon; Carne ends up a great success as an actor, but compÏetely alone, rocking
in her chair in a picture that bespeaks a lack ofnurturance, past and present. Although Dreiser’s
narration is sometimes too fond, the novel was initially rejected by Harper’s because ofits
“realism” (9). While many ofhis contemporaries supported Dreiser and fourni him a great voice
for this new “realism” or “naturalism” in American fiction-writing, others found him “an agent
ofregression in his dramatization of the triumph of man’s ‘animal’ nature over his capacity for
reason and moral choice” (14); in other words, the thirst to overcome, or simply disregard, the
social hierarchy was seen as an animalistic trait in his characters. Therefore, while Dreiser’s
fiction certainly depicts the tnumph of the individual, the individual is no longer that great
example ofhumankind that readers could aspire to become. Instead, Dreiser was accused by
Lionel Tnilling and the New Criticism of “fail[ing] to take cognizance of the role of the mental or
spiritual in human affairs,” or failing to “render the complexities oflife in a complex manner”
(15). Indeed, Came acts on instinct, without thought—automatically. She is “too often depicted
as a dupe of ‘consumerism’ and ‘commodification” (1$). Yet, in this, Carne finds herself,
together with much of the reading public, experiencing life in the American city at the tum of the
century.
Another reason some cnitics despised Dreiser’s work was that Carne is not a “solid”
individual that readers would have been trained to appreciate: she “is a character whose destiny
is unclear because her identity, ftom beginning to end, is only in the process ofbeing formed”
(Riggio 24). This is an astute observation of a character wntten for a public that was accustomed
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to looking down upon this kind of ‘shape-shiffing’ personality. A personality that was as yet
“unformed,” especially by the end ofthe novel, was a personality that was deficient, unsure ofits
own moraÏity and, thus, a threat to those whose morality was accepted without further thought.
This was a new occurrence in literature and one that heralded a definite change in society.
However, for a country that prided itself on fteedom of individuality, the idea that the American
personality was something that merely soaked up the social context, rather than imposed itself in
a larger-than-life form, was unpopular, at best. While some critics see Dreiser as a psychological
realist, it is the “certain lack of individualization” (26) that is cause for concern; lie “deliberately”
leaves out details ftom Carrie’s past that would, in fact, create a more “roun-ded” character. As it
is, she is “shown as a victim of external events” and “appears to be dominated ‘by conditions
over which [she] had no control” (26). As well, Dreiser describes a strange, unfulfihling
relationship between Carne and her family back home; in fact, there is barely a mention of her
family beyond a paragrapli in which it is mentioned that Carne has lefi them behind. Later,
Dreiser descnibes Hurstwood’s home life as “lack[ing] a ‘lovely home atmosphere’ which makes
‘strong and just the natures cradled and nurtured within it.” Then, using
language that echoes the imagery used to explain Carnie’s relation to her family, Dreiser
concludes that those who miss this nurturing neyer know the “mystic cords which bind
and thrill the heart.” Those, like Canne, for whom the cords don’t bind very strongly,
have been denied the family’s “tolerance and love” and as a resuit “The song and the
literature of the home are dulled.” The language is full ofthe sentimental clichés ofthe
day, but it points to the hidden drama behind Carne’ s first “perfunctory embrace” of [her
sister] Minnie on the train platform. (Riggio 29)
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Because Dreiser so oflen employs fond language to describe Carne or Carrie’s reÏationships, the
use ofempty language and ovenised metaphors corne to signify something in themselves: it is as
if on some level Dreiser already recognizes the emptiness ofthe new American individual,
“cradle[d] and nurtured” not by the family home but by the utter arbitrariness of the situations of
everyday life in the city. It is flot even necessarily her own situation that rnolds her: when she
plays Laura in Augustus Daly’s Under the Gastight, it is the poor girl’s situation that makes her
better feel her own. Only then does Carne suddenly feel “the bittemess of [Laura’s] situation.
The feelings ofthe outcast descended upon her” (Riggio 35). Perhaps Carrie’s story simply has
no need for a stronger individual identity since, as Ellen Moers wnites in Two Dreisers, hers is
“an old, old story: the restless country girl who cornes to try her luck in the big city and neyer
goes home again” (qtd. in Riggio 30). The story is so old that the American reader doesn’t need
the detail; the story unfolds itselfwith case, fihling in its own details as needed. In fact, Sister
Carne merely replays “the young man from the provinces subgenre [whichJ involves a
predictable sequence of events” upon which Dreiser bases his narrative (Lehan 69). In any case,
to portray Came in this way suggests unambiguously that Dreiser sees socioeconomic forces as
holding more sway over the individual—this type ofindividual—than psychological makeup, or
history, or fact ofbirth: this presents a serious controversy for a societyjust emerging from the
traditional Victorian age, a society bred on the Romantic ideal of Individualisrn.
Though Carne does attempt to disregard these traditions, she stili holds them in high
regard, as would the early twentieth-century reader of Sister Carne. for example, she holds
Hurstwood in high regard because ofhis status in society. He “affect[s] her as much as the
magnificence ofGod affects the mmd ofthe Christian” (Dreiser 129). But her obsession with life
in the big city, matenial and rnonetary desires, and her “inability to be bound to anyone” (Riggio
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33), make for an individual that is complete!y alienated from the rest ofsociety. 0f course, the
“tbreads which bound lier so Iightly to girlhood and home were irretrievably broken,” but she
leaves Hurstwood (and her sister) “like a criminal,” as welI. At the beginning of the nove!, she is,
as Dreiser writes, “a lone figure in a tossing, thoughtless sea” (qtd. in Riggio 29). By the end, she
lias flot noticeab!y changed: “Ames recommends {Thomas] Rardy’s nove!s to Came because he
says, ‘I should judge you were rather lone!y in your disposition” (qtd. in Riggio 25). The
baffling question is the nature of Carne’ s inner life; it would seem that the only distinguishing
characteristics ofDreiser’s hero are a!ienation and an attempt to comfort herseif with material
things. In fact, she may be described as a mere “medium’ for what Robert Ames later calis ‘the
[world’sj sorrows and longing” (Hochman 45). The concept of an empty conduit, or cipher, is
one which finds itse!f in works of a more self-conscious variety, written nearly a century later.
for now, the baffling question is, if Carrie’s irmer life seems to remain the same from the
beginning to the end ofthe novel although she has expenienced relationships with Hurstwood and
Drouet as we!! as the meteonic ascent of her situation and her re!ationships, then, as the destitute
Hurstwood reflects at the end ofthe novel, “What’s the use?” (Sister Carne 656).
One might ask, what is the use, when flot on!y is the character of Carne acting in an “old
story,” but as Richard Lehan wnites, “a!most ai! relationships she meurs are involved with
money,” “almost everything is quantified,” and her very life runs according to the “desiring
machine” (69)? In fact, Lehan refers to life in Dreisen’s narrative as “Spencenian matter in
motion,” that is, “pure mechanistic process.” Cari-je, as might be said about Mr. Hyde in Jekytt
and Hyde, has “no moral center”: she “is no longer the pure product of animai intuition, but [she]
also [does] flot have anything like fully deve!oped reason” (69). What is useful, then, is to
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attempt to decipher how the proper “young man [or woman] from the provinces” ends up with a
moral turpitude that can be compared to that of Mr. Hyde.
$ister Carne marks an important shifi in the representation of the individual within
society, the effects of which are stili to be found in contemporary literature. First, of course, there
is the nature of the content: as Alan Trachtenberg states, it is the “aggressively offensive
content—the absence, as Randolph Boume put it, ofany hint of moral redemption (or
punishment) in a story of a ‘fallen woman’ who trades her virginity for material comforts, and
yet stili holds our sympathy at the end, more than comfortable in her flat at the Waldorf, reading
Père Goriot and stili somehow dissatisfied” (A. Trachtenberg, “Who Narrates?” 120). But the
fallen woman that stili gamers the reader’s sympathy is not a new story. Second, there are the
many intrusions on the part of the author; these are necessary, Trachtenberg argues, because
Dreiser’s “own characters lack the capacity to think critically about their lives; they are
‘inarticulate.’ The depth and scope of the choices they make, seemingly made without much
reflection, required Dreiser’s input, his pity and insight, so as to make the possible impact ofthat
choice hit upon the reader” (120). This is, in fact, a very interesting development: for the author
to feel that he needs to teli the reader what to think about his characters would seem that he has
failed to properly inject the nght tone, characterization, or progress in the narrative. But, when
one considers the new kind of individual being portrayed by the narrative, this is a very
significant point. Alan Trachtenberg writes, “Complete self-awareness is indeed a high standard
for the modem audience itself, thus, characters in fiction who are consistently aware of—and
able to articulate—the larger impact of their every action, or inaction, smack of a kind of
authonal dishonesty.” In other words, although the modem reader requires more to be convinced
ofthe “viability” ofhis character than the Victorian reader, in some ways, he requires Iess:
$8
Dreiser certainly departed from the 19th century conceptions of characterization.
Viable characters are able to understand and then articulate their experience, to express
their desires and fears or, at least, make the attempt to do so, intelligent or not. “We care
and sympathize comparativeïy less for the stupid, the coarse and the blind,” states
[Henry] James. . . . “{C]haracters are oniy as interesting in proportion to how theyfeel
their respective situations.”. . . While [Carne] may flot be the “really sentient” character
that James valonizes, the reader is carried along with her through her experiences, not
because of any critical seif-analysis or sudden epiphanies experienced by herseif, but
because greatfteling certainly is evoked—if not within Carne, certainly without. (A.
Trachtenberg, Narrates?” 93)
In fact, this has an even greater significance when contemporary authors are discussed later in
this work. Late twentieth-century characters certainly evoke feeling, but it is also without, rather
than within thernselves. As well, this kind ofindividual needs the exposition ofthe author, or at
the very least, a very specific kind of positioning within the narrative so as to put the character
into the light best suited to reflect upon the author’s intended meaning.
Came is a character whose emotions are her finest selling point because they are what
carry the reader along the narrative. However, there is a difference between this and the old
standard of storyteÏling that requires the characters to evoke the reader’s empathy. The differencc
is that the moments of great emotion in Sister Carne occur only when the situation is presented,
or recounted, as a dramatic or literary episode. Thus, Came’s pitiful situation tnily only grabs the
reader (and Carne herseif) when she plays her literary counterpart in the Augustus Daly play.
She onlyfeels her situation when eyes are upon her. In fact, she is only able to act in the play
when, knowing that Hurstwood has joined the audience, she imagines herseif acting through his
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eyes. Carne literally ‘want[s] to be in pictures,’ as the old ditty goes: it is flot so much the need to
see herselfonscreen and on biilboards, but a kind of modem reflexive need that requires she
process her everyday experience in her mmd first, as if watching a film, or as if she were
omnisciently watching herseif from above—it is as if she needs to leave the space of her self to
better understand her situation. Only then does she achieve an understanding as to her status or
the success ofher endeavour; for Carne, this is the only thing that begins to approach
satisfaction.
Awareness ofone’s situation in society—ofone’s level of success—became difficuit to
ascertain as the twentieth century opened. The appearance of success often stood in for the sense
of satisfaction that came from a job well done. Increasing prosperity and the changing role of
women brought new kinds of desires into the lives of average women and men. Values that had
been taken for granted for centuries were being questioned as women gained some
independence. People began to critically examine their own sets ofmorals, as well as their
acceptance ofthe Church and State; this, of course, was flot confined to the United States. A
parallel to this development in North Amenca is French writer André Gide’s Les Caves du
Vatican, which was translated into Lafcadio Adventures in 1914. In this work, the theme of
fakeness, disguises, and “playing a part” is very important. Characters are tmly empty; whereas
even sensate expenience could once kept characters ‘anchored’ to plot and context, it now
becomes merely a fleeting sensation that floats away, neyer to be truly experienced or
amalgamated into a Self. In the same way, characters are also detached from true emotional
investments. for example, at the end of the book, Lafcadio’s interest in ‘the beloved’ wanes;
also, when Arnica cannot distinguish between the two boys that love her, and simply chooses
Amedee over Blafafas because he says her name “in a way that seemed to her Italian,” even
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though he himself had said lier name “without reflection” (Gide 105). When the academic Julius
is awarded a long-awaited membership to the French Academy, it is not because he had been
building towards this goal on his own ment, but because the Academy simply chooses to let him
in. In response to his wife’s conment that “One has nothing to do in this world but to wait,”
Julius adds, “And not to change” (226). The most important character, Lafcadio, is “set up” as a
Hero figure at the fire, but then he simply abandons this role and tums to Murderer. These kinds
ofcharacters reflect Gide’s observation of society and, likely, what he saw was a growing
tendency for character to be formed in response to the immediacy (and arbitrariness) of a given
situation: in fact, in the intriguing words of Julius, Lafcadio is “at the mercy of the first
oppontunity” (Guerard 132). Gide’s waning interest in psychology led him to write this novel
about the “unmotivated crime,” which may be defined as an action that cannot be thoroughly
comprehended if approached from a traditionally analytic viewpoint. Lafcadio is at the mercy of
the first opportunity because he is flot regulated by that which regulates the traditional character:
the overarching grand narrative that provides dues, motivations, and explanations of each
character’s actions and thoughts, however minor and major. Lafcadio, Julius says, is ftee of a
“calculat[ing]” system (222) that assigns every thought and motivation. This is the logical system
that Gide himself had become disenchanted with when he spoke of an ‘over-ali structure.’ This
structure is a background matrix upon which the individual generally falis in order to prove a
revelation of character according to symbolic detail and gesture. In other words, Gide allowed
lis characters to exist without much pinning down, literally or psychologically. The reader does
flot really know any of the characters because there is flot enough matenal to build towards
proving any of the characters’ natures. What a character may do from one situation to the next
becomes arbitrary, as a set pattem ofresponses cannot be established; therefore, the reader
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cannot expect the character to act one way or another based on previous actions. Lafcadio’s
beloved, Genevieve, protests against this ‘slipperiness.’ When faced with his murderous
behaviour, she says, “[You are) a criminal. Lafcadio! How many times have I sighed your narne
since the first day when you appeared to me like a hero” (239). Genevieve’s complaint is the
same as that of the conventional reader: how can the reader “know” characters if their “inner
selves” refuse to be indicated by the morality oftheir actions, or if the resultant degree of
morality is not conclusive? Traditional literary analysis renders these types of characters
ineffective and imrnobilized. If evidence of symbolism, action and description are flot given by
the narrative, the resuit appears to be a “sketchy” character, one that is not capable of standing
alone at a time when characters must be true-to-life, real, and activated by the reader’s
identification with them. Indeed, when one character in Lafcadio Adventures “perishe[s]
because lie penetrated behind the scenes” (Bree 187), the indication is of an ail-powerful
narrative that eliminates ail literary material that does not settie into accepted roles naturally.
The threat of elimination for that whicli does flot fit into the natural role is also a focus in
Sinclair Lewis’s Main Street (1920). Carol Kennicott, like Dreiser’s Carne, is dissatisfied with
what her social position requires of lier. But rather than attempt to change her social role,
interestingly, Caroi changes lierseif, or at least, lier viewpoint, to better fit others’ expectations of
her. On the very first page of the nove!, Carol is introduced to us as exhibiting a “suspended
freedom” (Lewis 1). The lone observer that notices Carol on the hilltops, “drinking the air as slie
longed to drink life” (1). The “suspended freedom” alludes to Carol’s potential as a free thinker,
which is held in abeyance because ofher respectable position in society as a doctor’s wife in a
small, conventional town. It is an ominous scene, especiaÏly as the meclianisms of social power,
as manifested by the gossipy townspeople of Gopher Prairie, becorne more apparent to the
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reader. When, at first, she strives to bring “culture” (or, dfférance) into her parochial
community, she is met face to face with forces that wam she should maintain the status quo. The
observer at the beginning ofthe novel cornes back in many different forms, flot the least ofwhich
are sets of eyes watching her from behind closed living-room drapes. The intemalization of
Bentham’s panopticon, as discussed by Foucault, becomes evident in this picture of a srnall
town, in which the collective acts upon the individual frorn without (rather than the superego
imposing itself upon the individual from within). Carol complains of feeling “trapped,” and even
that she “has been kidnapped by the town” (246). “Its philosophy and its feuds,” Lewis writes,
“dominated lier” (246). Yet, she realizes that fitting into this society would provide her only with
“the contentment of the quiet dead” (265). Later, her ffiend Guy Pollack affirms that their society
has made him into a “a living dead man” (157).
Whereas Richard Lehan describes Dreiser’s characters as participating in a “$pencerian
matter in motion” or “pure mechanistic process” (72), it is interesting that Carol in Gopher
Prairie is, at first, described as exhibiting a “suspended freedom” (Lewis 1). Clearly, both
descriptions refer to “Brownian Motion,” the apparently “random movement of microscopic
particles suspended in liquids or gases resulting frorn the impact of molecules of the fluid
surrounding the particles” (Merriam- Webster Dictionaiy). 11e themes of natural selection and
survival ofthe fittest have been applied to these novels by critics writing in the early days ofthe
twentieth century, as well as critics who approach these works from a late twentieth-century
viewpoint. The fact that these concepts had just been introduced to the public with the release of
Darwin’s Origin ofthe Species in 1909-14 makes the stories that much more accessible to a
reading that valorizes the individual ‘s successful usurping of social roles to her own benefit.
However, the emphasis on the random motion ofparticles in a liquid or gas as a metaphor for the
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equally random motion of individuals in society does flot obtain in ail aspects. The comparison
assumes an equaiity ofparticles, or individuals, which does flot prove true in everyday life. The
effects ofthe collisions, then, are actually flot as random: movements ofthe particles depend
upon the particle’s own mass, as opposed to the particle that collides with it, thus, Lehan’s
qualifier of “Spencerian” (which assumes a sense of motility that “random motion” does not).
for example, in Main Street, fem, a young woman having an affair with Cy Bogart, is made into
a villain, although ail the townspeople know that Cy Bogart is the one disposed to wrongdoing.
But because his mother holds a position of relative power in society, and does flot acknowledge
his true character, the rest ofthe town are forced to ignore his actions whule Fem is mn out of
town. Similarly, Carol realizes that the oniy thing that saves her from Fem’s fate, is the class to
which she belongs. Her husband’s stature in Gopher Prairie, which becomes her own, is what
“saves” her, keeping her locked firmly in place.
While Dreiser’s Carne has been described as being pure emotion, Carol can be described
as pure vision. Since both emotion and vision are qualities that lack delineation, the resuit is the
implication that they have the potential to overcome social barriers or, at least, give the
appearance of overcoming these barriers. However, in Sister Carne, we leave Carne at the end
ofthe novel quite dissatisfied; moreover, at the end of Main Street, Carol realizes that the
townspeople of Gopher Prairie have taken her “poise” from her. She no longer moves through
the city confidently; now, she tries flot to feel “self-conscious about the people who looked at her
in the street” (382). If we take “poise” to mean balance or equilibrium, then it follows that the
state of”suspended freedom” that Carol enjoys at the beginning ofthe novel has been lmocked
askew. But when her husband attempts to convince her to come back to him, ail he has to do is to
show her the photographs ofGopher Prairie and she is lost in her visions ofbnnging “culture” to
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the quaint littie town. Because this is exactly what he did to first attract her to the town, it
becomes clear that she has not really changed. While Carne sympathizes with her ‘type’ of
character whule acting in Under the Gaslight or reading Père Goriot, she does flot understand the
resonances these characters have with her own life. As well, Carol does not comprehend her own
circumstance; rather than go to some literary source for identification, however, she consciously
imagines herseif in a story that she composes, instead, in her own head. The photographs have a
narcotic effect; like Carrie’s play and Père Goriot, they help her imagine the story of her life
rather than participate in it as it happens. Carol wants to see herseif in pictures, literally. She
appreciates being able to superimpose herseif onto an imaginary scene, rather than live in the
reality ofher everyday life. She tbrows theme parties which also express her need for romance
and the exotic in order to bear the daily grind. Carol seems to represent the first strains of
consumer culture; she succumbs to a view of everyday life that has been repackaged as
something exotic and commercial, and then buys wholly into it. Like Carne, Carol seems to act
out lier daily life, rather than live in it; she secs her life from the outside, and lives as though
being watched (as she, in fact, is—the townsfolk of Gopher Prairie constitute the Big Brother of
the provinces). What Carol is buying into is a scene of herseif saving the small town, improving
it, becoming its hero and benefactor. On the other hand, many of the people in town sec her as a
fool for not submitting to the reality of lier situation; literary cntics such as Martin Light consider
her character as groundless and disengaged from the reality of her life as Don Quixote. But both
characters seem to apply a kind of method to their behaviours: each acts out their chosen roles.
Carol plays at being the doctor’s wife, the new bride, the housewife, the entertainer and the
benefactor, as well as apparently transforming from the “girl Carol to Mrs. Kennicott.” Yet, she
approaches each of these roles with a heavy self-consciousness that precludes lier engagement
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with the roles. Engaging with one ofthese roles would mean that she would be able to perceive
sorne sense ofthe truth ofher own situation, and since the novel ends with her arriving back at
the beginning (being “duped” into retuming to Gopher Prairie by believing she can, again, save
the town by bringing culture to it), she shows that she does flot corne close to perceiving the truth
ofher situation. Thus, when Vida asks Carol, “WilI you be impersonal? I’m paying you the
compliment of supposing that you can be” (Lewis, Main Street 94), she paradoxically, and
unknowingly, hits upon Carol’s sheer incapacity for being personal. Carol’s response,
therefore—”I’ll be as impersonal as cold boiled potatoes” (94)—is highly cornical. Carol
exchanges personae as easily as a player on the stage. The practice of distancing oneseif from the
processing and cognition ofone’s own everyday experience occurs even more in contemporary
literature. As the media saturation of everyday life becomes complete, individuals in society
today requÏre the media Yens to better “see” their own situations. In other words, because focus is
completely outward, making sense ofthe world—and ofoursetves—naturally begins with
focusing on the extemal. Though this tendency is criticized by some critics ofliterature, as weYl
as critics of society, it is one that is produced by the cognitive paradigms that are solidly
entrenched within the contemporary mmd.
If the subjectivities of artists in the 1980s and 1990s seern to be acting out, it seems that
artists of the early twentieth century took as their heroes characters who were literally acting in.
Figures such as Sister Carne and Carol Kennicott make the reader unsure as to whether they
retreat to their individual imaginaries as a resuit of feeling ‘boxed in’ by their communities, or
whether they are boxed in by their communities because oftheir vision. It seems an inextricable
relation that makes it impossible not to take the character as both subject and object. Society
presurnes to uphold individuality as a cherished trait of “Americanness,” but must, nevertheless,
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Section II
Commodity Fiction:
Overloading the Assembly Line
While the ïndividual in American literature ofthe early twentieth century appears to
distinguish (read: characterize) herseif against the inner-outer problematic, fictional narratives in
general fare a littie differently. The distinction between “genre fiction” and “literature” stands as
solidly in the twentieth century as it ever has. But if the high art of creating literature is merely a
mask that covers the imitation of classic models and conventions, then how truÏy different is it
from genre fiction? Just as a character imparts details to the reader which are then swept up into
an analysis ofhis “character,” so fiction is detalled and packaged in order present a certain
“type” of narrative. On any given day, there will be a book that satisfies the preconditions and
desires of the book-buyer at the moment that the buyer’s eyes land on the cover and the buyer
takes in the presentation and the marketing buzz surrounding it. Perhaps people who find
themselves in an increasingly complex and disorienting world look for the stability of familiar
plotiines in which to situate themselves, as Deirdre Shauna Lynch finds in her 199$ book The
Economy ofCharacter: Novels, Market Culture, and the Business ofInner Meaning. The
reader’s expectations, however disjointed from the realities of everyday life, are constantly
engaged and thus validated.
Perhaps a link between the classic novel and genre fiction is the kind ofbook which may
be grouped under the label of “formula” or “commodity fiction.” The term brings to mmd much
publicized author appearances at chain bookstores, a dependence upon product placement, and
an endorsement ftom Oprah Winfrey to gamer inevitable bestseller status. It may require being
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ostracize that individualism or vision, and push it to the outskirts ofthe community; this serves
as a basis for the theme of illusion versus reality, one of the most prevalent concems of artists
and writers of twentieth-century North America.
97
on the Amazon.com recommendation iist, or it may simpiy mean that the book has a highiy
processed presentation: fluorescent colours, a photograph from a concurrent filmic adaptation, or
a free CD-ROM shrink-wrapped to its back cover. It is accepted that current rnethods to promote
new novels tend towards saturation ofthe market. Whiie it may be argued that reliance on
“word-of-mouth,” as in earlier times, is itselfa form of marketing and promotion, there is no
refuting the hypermarketing tendency oftoday’s booksellers. One reason for this is the decline in
reading for entertainment and news-gathering purposes; this has been displaced for the most part
by television news and the internet.
i. Formula Fiction in the Nineteenth Century
The advent of formula fiction is flot specific to the age ofmaterialism and fetishism circa
the 1 980s and 90s; indeed, it has been around in the form of stories that have been presented for
public consumption decades, even over a century, earlier. Formula fiction, as Deirdre Shauna
Lynch proposes, provided an important structure to which readers applied themselves in order to
better understand their places in the nineteenth century’s changing socioeconomy. By the middle
of the century, Walt Whitman feit the need to appeal for stories that were flot the same old
fantasies; in other words, he wanted stories that were anchored in the real and the unsentimental,
stories that were, above ail, not simply exercises in foiiowing format. In the Preface to the I 855
edition ofhis Leaves ofGrass, Whitman writes, “Great genius and the people ofthese states
must neyer be demeaned to romances. As soon as histories are properiy toid there is no more
need of romances” (Whitman, “Preface” 1969). In this sense, a “romance” is a story that faiis
back on received tradition and expectation, such that the reader recognizes the plot and the
characters, and accommodates the revelation of information until the narrative’s conclusion. For
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example, in the “family romance,” the traditional family structure, characterized by the comfort
and stability that is “naturally” inherent in the mother-father-child unit, is upheld at the end of
the narrative; this is usually symbolically reinforced with a union (typicaliy, a marnage) or a
reunion. It was, afier ail, Aristotie who claimed that the skilful poet must flot “destroy the
framework ofthe received legends” (Aristotie XII). One way to understand this ftamework is to
view it as the matnix of authorial technique used to signal the plot-points and character-types
which further the story; these consist in what Raymond Williams refers to as “convention.” He
wntes that literary conventions were originaiiy agreed upon by the majonity and, later, passed
down as “tacit agreements.” Eventuaily, these conventions became a kind ofreceived
knowledge, or “custom,” which would be unquestioned for generations. Ultimately, however,
An adverse sense developed, in which a convention was seen as no more than an old rule,
or somebody else’s mie, which it was proper and often necessary to disregard. The
meaning of”convention” in art and literature is stili radically affected by this varying
history of the word. (Williams, “Conventions” 185)
Rather than rebel against these received forms in a kind of reaction that merely reinforces the
custom, some writers are able to “radically affect” the production of narrative in differing ways.
Williams continues,
In certain periods of relative stability the conventions are themseives stable and may be
seen as no more than formai, the ‘mies’ of a particular art. In other peniods, the variation
and indeed uncertainty of conventions have to be related to changes, divisions, and
conflicts in the society, ail normally going deeper (beyond what are still, in certain
privileged areas, taken as ‘mies’ or as neutraliy variable aesthetic methods) than can be
seen without analysis. . . . The modem controversy about conventions, or the cases of
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deliberate exposure or reversai of older or inherent conventions in an attempt to create
new relations with audiences, thus relate directiy to the whole social process, in its living
flux and contestation. (190)
That the current postmodem era is itself characterized by “changes, divisions, and conflicts in the
society” is already established; certainly the postmodem era has produced fiction that “attempt[sJ
to create new relations with audiences.” The question of “how” often is answered unclearly: the
appearance ofdifference is sometimes mistaken for the real thing. On the other hand, the
appearance of similarity is cornmonly understood as convention. For example, in the foliowing
excerpt from The Literature ofLabor and the Labors ofLiterature, Cindy Weinstein describes
how Mark Twain’s flowery language is accepted as an ovenise of literary convention, rather than
a possible “piay” on it:
When the narrator of Life on the liississippi first leams to pilot the river, much ofhis
excitement cornes from surprises in the river’s geography, such as changes in the shape
of the shoreline and rocks in the river bottom, which threaten to wreak havoc upon the
steamboat at any moment. In an often quoted passage, the narrator describes his
experience of a Mississippi sunset before he “had mastered the language of this water and
had corne to know every tnfling feature that bordered the great river”:
A broad expanse ofthe river was tumed to biood; in the middle distance the red
hue brightened into gold, through which a solitary log came floating, black and
conspicuous; in one place a long, sianting mark lay sparkling upon the water; in
another the surface was broken by boiling, tumbiing rings, that were as many
tinted as an opal; where the ruddy flush was faintest, was a smooth spot that was
covered with gracefiil circies and radiating unes, ever so delicately traced; the
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shore on our lefi was densely wooded, and the somber shadow that feu from this
forest was broken in one place by a long, ruffled trail that shone like silver.
Leo Marx argues that the conventional language of this passage illustrates Twain’s
inability to “affirm the landscape’s beauty in its actuality.” Similarly, Henry Nash Smith
daims that Twain’s highly artificial discourse “implies that the rhetoric is false, the
prosaic reality true.” As both critics point out, the “language ofthis water” is anything
but “natural.” The artificiality ofthis passage is especially important to note because,
precisely when the narrator attempts to descnbe the “natural” river, his language becomes
conventionalized through simile (“rings, that were as many-tinted as an opal”) and
metaphor (“the river was turned to blood”). The presence ofsuch obviously literary
language suggests that the romantic view ofthe river is no less contrived and no more
natural than the technological perspective ofthe West Point engineers offered later on in
thetext. (132)
Whule some critics accuse Twain of creating inauthentic, or simply unsuccessftil, literary
renderings, his writing may be seen to possess a “mastery ofauthonal artifice” (132), according
to Weinstein. It brings the description to the level of exchange between writer and reader: the
writer hopes to “seli” his story and, in doing so, utilizes the conventions oflanguage to ensure
that his reader is more susceptible to accepting the story without question. Whether the reader
finds truth in the story itself or in the artifice which must consist in a story depends upon what
the reader is taught to look for. In the words of David Punter, with respect to the poetry of
William Blake,
inauthenticity does flot render a work less valuable but more so, for it means that it can
represent, not a tmth appropnate to the given world, but an imaginative vision in which
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that truth is set off against a higher kind of comprehension. Poetry does flot for Blake
merely give the fullest access to “that which is”; it deals uniqueiy in the relation between
that which is and that which could be, and beside it, ail other kinds ofknowledge appear
positivistic. (245)
Thus, “authenticity” is flot mereiy a factual truth, but something which refiects the truth.
ii. Formula Becomes Commodity
Narrative and storytelling are aiways, at some level, acknowledged by consumers as
“product,” leaving littie room for exchange beyond the economic. The focus is on a formula that
has sold before, and will, presumably, seli again. Even de Tocqueville acknowledged that the
“ever increasing crowd ofreaders and their continuai craving for something new ensure the sale
ofbooks that nobody much esteems.” In fact, he wrote, “Democratic literature is aiways infested
with a tribe of writers who look upon ietters as a mere trade” (Democracy in Arnerica, Chapter
XIV). The creation ofa work has famously fallen into the assembiy-iine of production and, then,
consumption. The author, or “creator,” is dead. In its stead rises the fiction merchant. And thus,
fiction becomes commodity.
The label of “commodity fiction” is a burden to bear for popuiar writers, mostÏy because
it is assumed by most critics that commodity wnting aims at the popular mind-set, foregoing the
aim of “serious” writers whose works do not expect to impress upon the mainstream. It is
thought that commodity writers do flot offer enough, intellectualiy, to the reader in exchange for
the act of reading. It may be surpnsing to realize, however, that “traditional” and well-respected
authors share in some of the concems ofcommodity fiction writers. For exampie, Melville’s
Pierre is acknowledged to expose some ofthe difficulties invoived in pubiishng a novei that
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usurps popuïar expectations. Susan Weiner discusses this dilemma:
In addition to the difficulties inherent in the creative project, the author must also face the
response of a contemporary audience that rejects grandeur and eamestness, those
qualities Pierre had tned to pour into his story. Pierre’s seriousness copies MeIviIle’s own
attempts to dive beneath surfaces in the nove! Pierre. But he, like his character, met with
fai!ure, and perhaps for similar reasons. Not only had both encountered critical
disapprova!, but another factor may have p!ayed its part—”the ever multiplying freshets
ofnew books, seems inevitably to point to a coming time, when the mass ofhumanity
reduced to one !eve! of dotage, authors shah be scarce as a!chymists are to-day, and the
printing-press be reckoned a small invention. . .“ Paradoxical!y, the age of serious
authors was passing as pnnted matter prohiferated. (Weiner 65)
Pierre was an important work for Me!vi!!e because it consisted of his great effort to “dive
beneath surfaces,” and his “fai!ure” at this, which was due, in !arge part, to an audience that did
not expect, or want, this kind of nove!. What the majority of the audience wants are stories based
on received notions of the nove! and of character, stories in which narrative elements fa!!
automatica!!y into their expected categories, and then, are easi!y absorbed by the reader.
Melvi!!e, however, fe!t differently:
In Pierre, Melville had suggested a theory of artistic creation that is put to the test by
both the author/hero of the nove! and the nove! itse!f. The theory deals with the concept
of originality. .. . Simi!arhy, a man who aspires to be an author, whi!e he must assimilate
the works of his literary predecessors, must a!so e!ude and differ from them. (Weiner 65)
Melvi!!e became miserable as a resu!t of his fai!ure; persona!!y, he was extremely disappointed
but, in addition, his nove! was a!so misunderstood and disparaged by critics. It is likely that, for
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him, the question remained: if the reader wili oniy accept received forms of narrative, how does
one wnte a story which the reader will accept without oneseif fully succumbing to the old forrns?
That is, how can one write a story that is popuiariy accepted (adheres to the oid forms) but stili
sufficiently effective (departs from the old forms)?
As Susan Weiner relates, Meiville began writing for magazines; likeiy, the freedom to do
what lie wished would be more acceptable because the final resuit would be countered by the
other items in the issue. However, the problematic inherent in writing—that it must aiways be
marketed—was stiil a factor that greatly unsettied him. Eventuaily, he
expressed disdain for [magazine writingj in a tone not far removed from Bartleby’s
famous refusai to copy. In a letter to Evert Duyckinck of February 12, 1851, Melville
rejected a request to submit some writing and a daguerreotype of himself to Holden s’
Dollar Magazine:
How shah a man go about refttsing a man7 I cannot wnte the thing you want.
I am not in the humor to wnte the kind ofthing you need—and I am flot in the
humor to write for Holden ‘s Magazine. . . . You must be content to believe that I
have reasons, or else I would not refuse so small a thing—As for the
Daguerreotype..
. that’s what I can flot send you because I have none. And if I
had, I would not send it for such a purpose, even to you.
Melville seems to be objecting on severai different but interrelated grounds. First, he does
not want to wnte “the kind ofthing” suitable for a mass market publication. He prefers
not to cater to popular taste. Second, he objects to the daguerreotype because it
reproduces a man. By implication this is a function formerly attributed to God or nature.
Industry has usurped the spiritual and the biological. By being reproduced, a man
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becomes “oblivionated” by losing bis own particularity. “With the daguerreotype,
everyone will be able to have their portrait taken—formerly it was only the prominent;
and at the same time everything is being done to make us ail look exactly the same—so
that we shall only need one portrait.” Third, the daguerreotype is requested as a kind of
advertisement, presumably to promote the story with which it will appear. The picture
becomes a way of circulating the author, making him current by tuming him into a form
of currency. Just as Pierre had refused to supply a fancy title page, Melville refuses to put
the daguerreotype on the page, which becomes an “unwindowed waii” that represents the
economic constraints surrounding the writer. (Weiner 65)
Bartleby is invoked, first by the “refusai to copy,” and then, by Meiville’s use of”unwindowed
wali” in Pierre. This resistance is to being used by business; that is, Melville, could flot stand the
idea ofbeing skillfully “managed,” or properly distributed such that he exists only in an
apparently characteristic niche. Writing stands for itself, and the fact that it needed the proper
image to seli meant that it was not being sold to an audience that would understand it. However,
Melvilie was embroiled in this issue, and this is evident in several ofhis works. In his Typee, he
portrays his characters as blank pieces ofpaper to be fed into a printing machine. Weinstein
writes:
Melviile makes these characters “march on in unvarying docility to the autocratic
cunning of the machine.” His construction of fictional character, in other words, seems to
recapitulate the machine’s relation, its “metallic necessity” and “unbudging fatality,” to
the “blank-looking girls.” Both the paper and the women become “destined to be
scribbled on. . . what sort of characters no soul might teil.” One might argue that because
the factory women in this story object neither to the machine nor to the boss, Melville
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caimot imagine an alternative to this system of production. And yet like the operatives
who “handl[e] such white bits of sheets ail the time which makes them so sheety,”
Meiville as a professional writer could become “sheety” through his necessary contact
with paper. Meiviile risks becoming blank at the hands of a literary marketplace that he
feels is determined to make him “mardi on in unvarying docility” to an aesthetic
ideology that requires its own version of blankness—the blanking of Melville’ s presence
as literary laborer. (8$)
That the characters are ofthe sort that “no soul could teil” necessarily indicates Melville’s
concem with the “blankness” of character; flirther, he was disturbed by what this meant for him,
as author and producer of the blank characters. What does it imply for nineteenth century
society, and does it gain much in significance as the twentieth century comes to a close? On the
other hand, is it merely a precursor to today’s “blank fictions,” a term coined by the
contemporary critic James Annesley; and if so, what can it mean for American literature that one
ofits greatest writers can be grouped together with the young writers oftoday that are accused of
being caught up in the superficial layer of culture that is deemed “popular” rather than focused
on the more serious art and crafi of wnting? At the outset, both cases remind the reader that, as
Wordsworth claimed early in the nineteenth century, “Tic world is too muci with us.” Certainly,
Melville would be surprised to find that the same issues that plagued him in the mid-nineteenth
century maintain their hold on writers welI into the twentieth century.
iii. Co-opting Commodity Fiction
Wordsworth’s world of technology refers to human progress that had, in simplifying and
speeding up methods, also resulted in reducing human production (e.g. thinking) into mere
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process (e.g. computing). While humankind had once lefi questions of divine purpose to
Providence, they began to insist on answers once their belief in God and Absolute order began to
waver. One ofthe most important of these is the element ofclosure. The question ofhow and
when one wiil ultimately die—of where life’s narrative will be marked off—translates into the
need for ciosure at the end of a nove! that sufficient!y and satisfactorily answers ai! the questions
the narrative introduces. D. A. Mil!er discusses this issue in his Problems of Closure in the
Traditional Novel:
The accounts oftraditional narrative offered by the Russian Forrnalists, Jean-Paul Sartre,
Frank Kerrnode, Ro!and Barthes, Gerard Génette, Julia Kristeva, and Charles Grive! have
enonnous!y varied ambitions, but they ail rely on the common assumption of an a priori
“determination of means by the ends.” Sartre puts it in a nutshe!1 in La Nausée: “Une
chose commence pour finir.” (Preface xii)
The assumption inherent to most writing is that the narrative must corne to a proper resolution.
This is especialiy probiematic where it concems writing that purports to be “rea!istic” because
questions that remain open-ended, inconclusive and ambiguous in reality are forced to resolution
by the individuai mmd that va!orizes and prioritizes closure. Historicaiiy, readers have a
tendency to process narratives that do not answer to their expectations—that the traditions of
closure, admirable heroes, description that betrays characterization (“thick” characters) and,
above ail, morality wi!1 be upheid—as bad wnting. Thus, the pressure on the wnter to maintain
the priority of these elements is great. The passions of artists who envision new ways of thinking
and new ways of narrating are ultimately opposed to the reader and critic who are cornfortabie
processing narratives to which thy are accustomed. Attempting to understand a new paradigm
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of”story” really would compromise one’s tacitly accepted knowiedge ofthe world and what it
contains. Because what is at stake is the very belief system of the individual, this rarely occurs.
The resultant literary production, then, on the whole, is characterized by homogenization.
In their essay “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception” (1944), Max
Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno write,
Marked differentiations such as those of A and B films, or of stories in magazines of
different price ranges, depend flot so much on subject matter as on classifying,
organizing, and labeling consumers. Something is provided for ail so that none may
escape; the distinctions are emphasized and extended. (Horkheimer and Adomo,
Diatectic ofEnlightenment 123)
They argue that the content ofmuch ofthe culture’s artistic output is only variation on the same
theme. As Philippe Sollers writes, “virtually every book published is a replacement product”
(188). How, then, do these “replacement products” generate satisfaction from individuals in
society. This would scem paradoxical because American society is supposed to be characterized
by the expression ofindependence and innovation. Why, then, does this not transfer to the
cuitural production? An obvious answer is that writers are forced to write for their audiences, and
to respond to their audiences’ expectations from a nove!. The marketplace has aiways been an
issue for most writers to contend with when attempting to publish their work. The difference in
late twentieth century is the transfer of authority from individual artists and publishers to the
corporate publisher. In an interview with Joseph Heiier and Kurt Voimegut, Heller says that “the
effects [of this transfer of authority] will [flot] be beneficial toward literature” (Ma!!ory, par.
121). In a discussion about $imon & Schuster’s decision not to pub!ish Eilis’s American Psycho,
Heller concedes that the book eventuaily did get pub!ished. However, by the time of its
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publication, Ellis’s book was the topic of such controversy that it was destined to become a
bestseller. The dynamics ofwhether or flot to publïsh the book had significantly changed, and
were no longer based upon the book’s ment; it was purely a commercial decision. Assuming that
this is merely an exception to the rule is a mistake. Book pubiishing has fallen into business, like
so many other aspects of twentieth century life. John Updike, author of the Rabbit novels,
complains about the ever-increasing aspects of promotion and business in novel-writing:
“When I first set out on this trail, in the Fifties, writers were not expected to promote
their books, go on the road, or sign them, none ofthat. You were supposed to produce the
books, and that was about the extent of your responsibilities. Now producing the book is
aimost the beginning of your real responsibilities, which are to get out and seIl it.”
(Freeman, “John Updike: The Big Picture”)
Updike, who views author interviews as “a necessary evil of sorts,” stili “worries that about their
effect on art.” Even the interview of Heller and Vonnegut mentioned earlier is entitled “Kurt &
Joe: The Big Show”; interestingly, the interview was published by Flayboy magazine, suggesting
that even criticism ofthe system is co-opted by the system.
Certainly, it is not new that publicity is generated around the author in order to help seÏl
his books. This is evidenced by Melviiie’s refusai to use a daguerrotype ofhimself as a form of
advertising, thereby making the author himself into a fonm of currency. But a recent, and new,
indictment is that noveis have become so similar that the author’s brand is needed precisely to
differentiate his novel from the others. A reason for this is the reliance upon received forms of
“story,” and the resuiting carbon copy ofthe same “beginning, middle, end.” The business of
writing, and wniting itself, has become an institution, and as John Aldridge writes, “[t]he fiinction
ofthe institution is pnimanily the maintenance ofthe institution” (The American Novel 49). Along
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these unes, Coupland includes an interesting iist on lis website entitled “A Marxist/Capitalist
Take on the Novel.” “Borrowed, with love,” as he writes, from David Lodge’s Nice Work, it
inciudes the observations “The novel is both a commodity and a mode of representation” and
“The nove! was the first mass produced cultural artifact” (in. 5, 7). In other words, the mass
production of institutionalized forms of the nove! lias resuited in a commodity, flot a work of art.
Moreover, it has resulted in producing a formula for the financial success ofthese commodities.
Coupland aiso inciudes the following:
The noveiist is a capitaiist of the imagination: he or she invents a product which
consumers didn’t know they wanted until it was made available; manufactures it with the
assistance ofpurveyors ofrisk capital known as publishers, and selis it in competition
with makers ofmarginally differentiated products ofthe same kind. (ln. 6)
The language of commodity culture, of the desire for desire, as it is applied to novel-writing
obtains new significance for an art form that had been previously accepted as the result of
imaginative work, not a process that can be efficiently managed by a machine, or an automatic
process. In Aldridge’s subsequent book of literary criticism, entitled Talents and Technicians:
Literai-y Chic and the New Assembly-Line fiction, he describes the current production of
literature around the 1980s as “interchangeable,” “mass-produced as if by machine” (14), and as
lacking the ability to evoke a “distinct response” (24) from the reader. This type of literature,
Aidridge suggests, reduces the Muse that spurs creation to a manager who pulls the “ON” lever
of an assembly-line. He characterizes the emotional and spiritual void in these works as the
“poiite nihulism” that critic Madison Smartt Bell speaks of in his weii-known essay, “Less is
Less: The Dwindiing American Short Story” (Harper ‘s 1986). Novels are mere copies of copies,
so much flaftened-out and overused puzzle pieces, guaranteed of a fit as long as they are put into
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the proper order. There seems to be nothing left in the text to psychoanalyze or deconstruct,
nothing for the reader to take or create from it.
Aidridge expects a “distinct response” (24) to be evoked from reading these texts;
however, he does flot allow for a different kind ofresponse. With the writing of narrative
conventionalized, and the reading of narrative institutionalized, it would seem hasty to presume
that a group ofwriters would disregard orbe incapable ofreproducing popularly accepted fictive
elements. This is more implausible when one considers that late twentieth century writers are
simply more aware of the necessary elements than probably any other generation ofwriters.
Thus, one must resort to another explanation. Philippe Sollers begins Chapter 7 ofhis Writing
and the Experience ofLimits with an epigraph from Kafka:
You must push your head through the wall. It is flot difficult to penetrate it, for it is made
ofthin paper. But what is difficuit is flot to let yourselfbe deceived by the fact that there
is already an extremely deceptive painting on the wall showing you’re pushing your head
through. It tempts you to say: “Am I flot pushing through it ail the time?” (“The Novel
and the Experience of Limits” 185)
If read with regard to interpretation, Ka&a’s wall becomes the text: penetrating the wall
or text is the goal. If, however, there is a painting on the wall that shows one is breaking through
the wall, one would be tempted to believe it. One will likely flot bother to push ahead with the
attempt. This metaphor suggests that other possibilities may lay behind the masquerade of a
seemingly complete meaning. A critic’ s aim is to deliberately undergo the process of
interpretation—the mathematical assignation of meaning to every symbol, description and
gesture—such that he may proclaim his to be the ‘authoritative’ edition. This should flot,
however, divest the text of other meanings. One interpretation may, like a drawn curtain, simply
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give the appearance of closure. Although this is flot what Aidridge and other classically-trained
readers would expect, it is certainly an exciting possibility; it is also the focus of this study.
Where he and other traditional interpreters see an “interchange[ability] of style and substance”
(Aldridge, Talents and Technicians 24) among commodity fiction writers, there may yet be a
dtfférance that is produced by a change in the point-of-view. But Aidridge is 50 convinced of the
cornpleteness of his interpretation of commodity fiction-writing that he has not looked beyond
his thin first-order interpretation to realize that he has been deceived—there is still something
hidden behind it.
The fiction-writers who are the focus ofthis study slip under the radar ofcritical
acknowledgement because they are at work under the guises of convention. One of the reasons
why they remain largely unrecognized is because their work falis into the recently fashioned
category of “commodity fiction,” and as such is greatly engaged with reflecting postmodem life.
In his essay “Psychodrama: Qu’est-ce que c’est?” Graham Caveney writes, “[Jay] Mclnemey
appears to offer us ‘the commodity kids’—a generation for whom capital and desire are
inextricably bound up within language and the body” (Shopping in Space 67). In a similar
manner, “commodity fiction” is fiction in which capital and desire are inextricably bound up
within language and the nove!. Another term for this type of nove! is “blank fiction” (Annesley).
Issues of importance in blank or commodity fiction are violence, consumption and sexuality;
when description is used, it is sparse, and rarely applies to character. This is due, in large part, to
the commodity fiction writer’s project of depicting the ‘disconnect’ between inside and outside,
between signified and signifier.
There certainly needs to be more scholarship on the recent writing that has taken place in
North America. Perhaps the start of a new milleimium naturally evokes desires for tradition and
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authority, as Mark Kingwell and other scholars ofmillennialism daim. While most writers agree
that the methods of communication that characterize any era have a great effect on tlie “style and
substance” of the writers of that era, there remains a great resistance to new forms, nonetheless.
With regard to the force of this resistance, Sollers writes, “Hence, the wrath and irritation of this
code’s guardians, officers ofsmooth-flowing literary traffic, whenever a book that does not seem
to recognize any ofthe genre’s laws dares call itselfa novel. . . . Afier all, what is a novel?—A
book. And what is a book today? Now perhaps that is our question” ( Writing and the Experience
ofLimits 187). What is a book today, when our methods of communication have seemingly
degraded from letters to electronic notes? Everyday language, for the most part, lias been
replaced with visual cues, and speaking with utterances. If anything can be reserved from these
exchanges and infused with meaning, for most critics, the assumption is that it will flot yield
enougli to redeem itself. For Marjorie Perloff, however, what remains is yet meaningfiul. Her
work
seeks to situate the flight ftom “transparency” (that is, language which aims to look and
sound “natural,” to sound like “real” talk) to “artifice” (that is, poetic language which
foregrounds its own artificiality, for instance, by arranging itself in a series ofblocks or
clusters on the page). This shifi is characteristic of the modernist and postmodemist
writers she most admires today, who write within “the discourses of art and the mass
media,” for it is naive to suppose that “a ‘poem’ could exist in the United States today
that lias not been shaped by the electronic culture that lias produced it.” (“Marjorie
Perloff’)
In tlie same way, narrative must be affected by the electronic culture that produces it. These
changes or effects, for example, are depicted visually in Douglas Coupland’s Generation X in
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which the artificiality of narrative is highlighted, as well as in the language of his subsequent
Microseifs. There is something new in these writings; something is produced that perhaps Jacks
distinction, yet, is absolutely flot the “distinct response” (qtd. in Miller) that Aidridge expects.
Interestingly, it is flot the substance that is new, but the arrangement and presentation of the
codes and conventions ofthe traditional novel. What is new is the freedom and the ability to
exercise the timits of interpretation. Philippe $ollers writes,
[The novel’s] devices are becoming better and better known, despite the efforts ofthose
who would like to prevent such an awareness: someday a machine will invent the most
engaging, most human, most profound novels, in which the imaginary will be at its most
effective—this impoverished imaginary wilJ be more and more easily coded. Men wilJ
more and more ftequentÏy ask machines to make them forget machines, and the
apotheosis of the civilized individual may someday be to live in an entirely noveJized
manner. . . . Thus it should come as no surprise if, ftom now on, the accent is placed, with
an increasingly inept and conflised haste, on the fantastic, EpinaJ surrealism, the neo
baroque, cheap sexuality, more or less organized fabuJation, the ciné-novel, the novel
ciné, ciné and. . . on the irresponsibleforms. ( Writing 188-$9)
It is probable that a dependence on the “irresponsible forms” will merely exhaust these forms or,
at Jeast, the public’s desire for them. But if the accent is placed somewhere else, somewhere in
the apparently “cookie cutter” form of fiction, then that is where true innovation may occur.
Sollers continues, “We call a nove! the incessant, unconscious, mythical discourse ofindividuals.
By that we mean that this discourse depends on a mode of interpretation tending to reveal its
own determinants” (191). If the novel simply cannot avoid these determinants, it must approach
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the investment of meaning in narrative not by changing the narrative, but by some other method.
Divesting codes and signifiers oftheir traditional meanings is one solution.
This apparent divesting ofmeaning in narrative produces James Annesley’s “blank
fiction.” Discussing the works of Ellis and Coupland, as well as other writers, such as Dennis
Cooper, Susanna Moore and Lynne Tiilman, Annesley recovers significance in many writers’
works that other critics had not been able to detect. His Blank Fictions: Consumerism, Culture
and the Contemporaiy American Novel is reviewed in a 1999 issue of Critique:
Annesley clearly enumerates the distinguishing themes of these texts (that is, the themes
that distinguish these texts as “blank fictions”): violence, sex, shopping, labels, and
decadence. By eschewing the “slippery categories ofpostmodemism” in favor ofthe
more precise and more generally applicable concept of the commodity, Annesley aims
for a better sense of the qualities that mark not only this body of fictional work but the
contemporary cultural moment. In his introduction, he daims that blank fictions work to
“provide important insights into the contemporary scene” by illuminating the
“relationship between subjectivity and commodification.” (Mott 92)
The characteristics of postmodemism—consumerism, commodification, fragmented
subjectivities, surfaces and surfeit—are well-known and well-played out by now. But in lis
Hiding in the Light: On Images and Things, Dick Hebdige cautions the reader, in a discussion
that includes Andy Warhol, Roy Lichtenstein (a Coupland favourite) and Marshall McLuhan,
“that that which is obvious matters, that the surface matters, that the surface is matter” (135). As
well, this study argues, it is not simply surface that sustains today: it is the arrangement of
superficial and narrative elements combined with the stance—or poise, if you will—of the
postmodem reader, that when exposed to a particular light, provides an opportunity for
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something new. It is flot the content that is new, it is flot the form that is new: it is the light shed
on the old content and the old forms that substitutes a glimpse of the unnameable for what was
once the revelation oflruth, Beauty and Knowledge. Perhaps, then, the difference between the
“work of art” from the nineteenth century and the novel-as-commodity of say, the I 990s, has
more to do with this postmodem stance or poise than with the too-easy labeling of novels
according to genres and of characters according to type that mechanically denote forrn and
content. In the past, as well as today, however, it is not only that the novel is made for
consumption, but that, at some level, the narrative, the plot, and even the characters are made to
be consumed.
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Section III
Character as Commodity:
The Coolness of Currency
In his Poetics, Aristotle writes, “Character is that which reveals moral purpose, showing
what kind ofthings a man chooses or avoids” (VI). In the contemporary cultural production,
however, characters in Coupland and Ellis make decisions arbitrarily, revealing no underlying
significance. Often, the characters’ choices, though they may be moral or immoral, have no
bearing on the construction of the character’s own morality. That is, even when a character
chooses to act immorally in an instance, the reader cannot conclude satisfactorily that the
character himself is immoral. Although it is expected that traditional literature upholds and
maintains the pnnciple of cause and effect, in some recent literature, flot only are choices
arbitrary, but effects are arbitrary. Even then, consequences are not fully realized in that the
character does not necessarilyfeel the effects; to be sure, he does flot reform, and neither does he
feel the moral imperative to reform. If, then, the character’s actions seem not to express bis
‘inner character,’ what does this mean about character? Was the Death of Character tacitly
assumed when the Death of the Author was declared?
To 5e able to discuss character in this way, it is necessary to revisit the implications of a
conventional and authoritative narrative as a nesting place for character. It is also helpful to think
ofthese through the problematic that Melville’s short story “Bartleby” introduced in 1850,
essentially because it remains an important issue for current writers. In the Journal ofAmerican
Culture, Susan Weiner writes,
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Melville further questioned the efficacy ofwriting as the predominant mode ofdiscourse
both for interpreting experience and for organizing society, and further,. . he concluded
that written representation was challenged by a new mimetic mode, the mass-produced
image. The consequences of automatic reproduction had affinities with what he regarded
as negative developments within the sphere of legal discourse. The simultaneous
development of various aspects of photography formed a constellation of innovations
closely tied to industrialization, which was fueled by the positivism that also
predominated in the legal sphere. The mass production of art, represented by magazine
writing, the fusion ofthe machine and art in the forrn ofphotography, and the mechanical
encoding of law within reproduced copies of copied documents ultimately challenged
pnor concepts ofman, the artist, and the foundation ofthe society of which they were
both a part. The suppositions upon which the mechanical reproduction of images were
grounded were akin to those upon which legal formalism was based, and these concepts
further threatened the predominance of writing as a mode of understanding experience.
Uïtimately this becomes the tragedy of Bartleby and of the humanity he cornes to
represent. (Weiner 65)
Copying, photographing, mass producing and reproducing: the mimesis of forms of the narrative
and of character is not sirnply an issue that plagues—and rernains an obsession of—the twentieth
century. Melville presented it succinctly in Bartleby, the cipher of the nineteenth century that has
been deciphered more than any other “flat” character in American literature. The effects of
industrial innovation and reproduction on Melville are quite evident in his treatment ofBartleby.
In his article on “Bartleby,” J. Wilson writes, “the lawyer says that lie would as soon throw out
his piaster-of-Paris bust of Cicero as he would Bartleby.’ By his comparison, he reduces Bartleby
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to the status of an object, a commodity” (335). Bartleby, the man, has become a mass produced
reproduction, more plaster than human. But, Wilson writes, “he prefers not to be [a commodity],
which makes him the ‘forlomest’ ofmankind. The lawyer describes him as a ‘lean, penniless
weight’, one who spends ail his days copying for ‘four cents a folio (one hundred words)” (337).
Then, Wiison points out the operative word “cost” in the foliowing statement by the lawyer: “To
befriend Bartleby; to humour him in his strange wilfulness, wiii cost me littie or nothing” (33$).
For character to have become something of a commodity is stili relatively new to literary culture
at the end of the twentieth century; for Meivilie to have observed this when American culture
was enjoying oniy the nascent beginnings ofcommodity culture is truly prophetic.
That Meiville could think of a relationship having a “cost” is reflective of the newly
changing social conditions at the time of the initial rise of industrialization and technological
innovation. And, as the individual’s ways of thinking about social relations transformed and
developed, so did his ways ofthinking about himselfwithin society. As new methods of
reproducing pnnt and photography spread, exposure to advertisements and novels became an
everyday occurrence. As the commodification of images becomes more prevalent in
contemporary American society, it begins to have a much greater effect on the individual self
perception. Cindy Weinstein writes that as it is “[i]nformed by the logic of the market,
personhood is produced and reproduced by acts of exchange and incessant circulation” (53). But
in an age where “personhood” no longer possesses a buffer of religion and strong communal tics,
the individual self loses a sense of balance, basing itselfprecariously on the commodity values of
the market.
It would be expected, then, that the identification of the individual with his work would
play a significant part in the commodification ofthe individual. After ail, social position,
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especially in America, is ofien automatically meted out according to occupation. As occupations
have become increasingly particularized and specialized, however, the volatility ofone’s career
path further exacerbates the apparent unity or stability of the individual identity. As Horkheimer
and Adomo write in their essay, “Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception” (1944),
[A] kind ofwelfare state is coming into being today. In order to keep their own positions,
men in top posts maintain the economy in which a highly-developed technology has in
principle made the masses redundant as producers. The workers, the real bread-winners,
are fed (if we are to believe the ideology) by the managers of the economy, the fed.
Hence the individual’s position becomes precarious. (Dialectic ofEnligtztenment 150)
filling a specific niche in one corporation only creates a “successful” identity as long as that
corporation requires the specific service. And, as technological advances occur on a daiÏy basis,
there is now an overwhelmingly high demand for those qualified to fil a particular specialty
niche, and then, there is a need to consider it deffinct to make way for the Iatest innovation in that
field. Identity, based largely upon occupation in a commodity culture, is then exhausted by its
fluctuating, and thus, arbitrary status.
Adorno delineates other ways in which the individual identity, shaky at best, recedes
further into social roles. These roles, he writes, “affect the innermost articulation ofhuman
characteristics, to such an extent that in the age of truly unparalleied social integration, it is hard
to ascertain anything in human beings which is flot functionally determined” (“Free Time” 162).
for one’s choices, desires and inner thoughts to be “functionaliy determined” is to concede to a
gravely pessimistic philosophy. Yet, it is evident that much ofwhat charactenzed individuals in
society as “human” no longer carnes much of the same significance. for example, in Dialectic of
Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adomo cite the proper name as falling into “capnicious,
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manipulable designations, whose effect is adrnittedly now calculable” (165). first names, they
write, have become “advertising trade-marks (film stars’ sumames have become first names)”
and collectively standardized. “In comparison,” they continue,
the bourgeois family narne which, instead ofbeing a trade-mark, once individualized its
bearer by relating him to his own past history, seems antiquated. It arouses a strange
embanassment in Americans. In order to hide the awkward distance between individuals,
they cail one another ‘Bob’ and ‘Harry,’ as interchangeable team members. This practice
reduces relations between human beings to the good fellowship of the sporting
community and is a defense against the true kind ofrelationship. (Dialectic of
Enlightenment 165)
The loss ofthe “true kind ofrelationship” recalls the loss oftrue feeling and brotherhood that de
Tocqueville and Whitrnan decried. But the instant relations, or “instant farnily,” a term Coupland
coins in Microserfs, in cornmodity culture of which Horkheimer and Adomo speak ring true.
They are “instant” because they are prepackaged and bear significance and meaning before they
are even attempted. That is, audiences look to the screen to identify their ideal relationships, and
then atternpt to emulate these in their own social realities:
[T]he popularity ofthe hero models cornes partly from a secret satisfaction that the effort
to achieve individuation has at last been replaced by the effort to imitate, which is
admittedly more breathless. It is idle to hope that this self-contradictory, disintegrating
“person” will not last for generations, that the systern must collapse because of such a
psychological spiit, or that the deceitful substitution of the stereotype for the individual
will of itself becorne unbearable for mankind. (Dialectic ofEnlightenment 155-56)
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In addition to resorting to imitation rather than individuation, the individual is accused by
Horkheimer and Adorno of flattening language. They write that people in society utilize words
and expressions “only because they trigger off conditioned reflexes; in this sense, words are
trade-marks which are finally ail the more firmiy linked to the things they denote, the less their
linguistic sense is grasped” (Dialectic ofEnlightenment 166). In the same way, characters in
stories gain significance because of their use-functions: the hero, the beioved, the viilain, the
sage—each also triggers reflexive understanding for the reader of a story. But employees of a
commodity culture, as well as characters of a commodity fiction, are meant only to function
within the machine of capitaiist knowiedge production. That is, in a system in which employees
and characters are precluded from producing in accordance with their own imaginations, how
cisc can they truly be productive (“bring forth something that was not already there”; 167)? Or is
the possibiiity itself defunct?
To deive further into this question necessitates a review of convention, as it pertains to
character in literature. In his “Conventions,” Raymond Williams writes,
In modem class societies the selection of characters almost aiways indicates an assumed
or conscious class position. . . . Without formai ratification, ail other persons may be
conventionally presented as instrumental (servants, drivers, waiters), as merely
environmental (other peopie in the street), or indeed as essentiaily absent (not seen, not
relevant). Any such presentation depends on the acceptance of its convention, but it is
aiways more than a ‘literary’ or ‘aesthetic’ decision. (187)
The presentation of characters in a narrative is aiways more than simply literary or aesthetic
because, consciously or not, it relies upon the reader’s received bank of knowledge about the
nature of the character regarding the chosen situational constmct. Williams continues:
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Consider the two standard variables in such presentation: personal appearance and social
situation. Almost every conceivable combination of these elements, but also the
exclusion of one or even both, has been conventionally practiced in drarna and narrative.
Moreover, within each, there is a significant conventional range: from briefly typical
presentation to exhaustive analysis. further, the conventional variations in the
presentation of ‘personal appearance’ correspond to deep variations in the effective
perception and valuation of others, often in close relation to variations in the effective
significance of family (lineage), social status, and social history, which are variable
contexts ofthe essential definition ofpresented individuals. The difference in
presentation between the undelineated medieval Everyman and the nineteenth-century
fictional character whose appearance, history, and situation are described in significant
detail is an obvious example. (1 86-87)
It is interesting that, with the advent of blank fiction, characterization seerns to have corne
around back again to Everyrnan. The difference is that he is not the same Everyman; he might be
called Everyman but the reader does flot wish to identify with him. Everyman has become so
damaged that, although he is capable of representing ail members of society, the twentieth
century reader wants to deny him, resist him and, ultirnately, disown him. What has changed is
that, initially, Everyman represented man’s connectedness and collective humanity; today,
however, we find the Everyman character, as in American Psycho, to be a representation of
man’s disconnectedness and alienated humanity. Whereas Everyman once stood for a universal
Truth or Value, he now signifies the absolute loss of Truth or Value. Undeniably, the
precipitating agent of this change is the intertwining of commodity culture with the practices and
manifestations ofeveryday work. Horkheimer and Adomo write, “The capacity to find refuge, to
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survive one’s own mm, by which tragedy is defeated, is found in the new generation; they can do
any work because the work process does not let them become attached to any” (Dialectic of
Entightenment 154). Thus, characters in the 1 990s, remaining “detached” from the sorting and
signifying tendency ofthe workplace, would seem to be at a disadvantage. Knowing that they are
ftee-floating workers makes their currency valid and, thus, reinscribes their commodity status.
On the other hand, individuals who, decades earlier, devoted themselves to one particular job and
remained loyal to their employer (bai-ring the less likely chance of being terminated) had no
currency in the market and thus, were slightly more empowered than their more recent
counterparts. Being off-the-market precludes the opportunity for the individual to be pinned
down by his value as a commodity in the wider sphere ofwork. He has no exchange value (as a
consumer item) until he approaches the possibility of leaving his current job—his monetaiy
value arises from the employer’s desire to maintain his employee so that he does not have to
expend energy (money and resources) in acquiring a new employee. Subsequently, an employee
loses his sense of self-worth as a human being, and retains only his value as a drone to be
shuttled back and forth between corporations. Thus, capitalist society has perfected its saturation
of each member of society, infiltrating individual paradigrns of cognition, as well as production.
“One upshot ofcapital’s assault on perception is ‘capitalist realism’,” writes Richard
Godden in his fictions ofCapital. Put another way, it is “what [Wolfgang fritz) Haug cails the
‘second skin’ ofthe advertised image: ‘perfect’, ‘disembodied’ and drifiing, ‘unencumbered like
a multicoloured spirit into every household, preparing the way for the real distribution of
commodity” (7$-79). The example Godden provides is that of Jay Gatsby in Fitzgerald’s The
Great Gatsby (1925). His “unencumbered’ surfaces—car, voice, smile, shirts, suits and
mansion—seem to drifi directly from ‘the nation’s advertising showcase’, that is from the
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Saturday Evening Post.” The story of Gatsby chronicles the American Dream as revised by “a
man whose voice sounds like a quick flick ‘through a dozen magazines” (79). Pictures in
magazines—flat, glossy, the ultimate generator of desire—are the perfeot description of Gatsby;
they also remain the definitive likenesses of character in modem fiction, and of individuals in
society. Though this is flot as clearly evident for individuals in society because, for the most part,
it is an unpopular and cynical assessment of contemporary society, it is, nonetheless, just as truc.
The epigraph to an essay entitled “Vacant Possession: Less Than Zero, A Hollywood Heu”
figures succinctly the concept ofprocessïng individuals through cognitive paradigms that seem
incapable of differentiating between reality and cultural media:
It is... prevalent in our modem culture, the way in which things become more and more
archetypal or stereotypical; even human beings become more that way, through films, so
you tend to locate your friends in terms of characters in movies. It’s been the case that,
more and more, images take the place of reality. Maybe you find out too late that you’ve
participated in something that’s pretty damaging to the human species, when things
become very collective, you lose the feeling ofindividuality, ofuniqueness. (Claes
Oldenberg qtd. in Young and Caveney 21)
It is interesting that Oldenberg describes the process ofunderstanding one’s own friends through
filmic imagery, although since the human mmd does attempt to assimilate new information on
the basis ofpattems that have ansen from experience, it seems quite logical. In other words, the
mmd automatically begins to configure pre-existing loci for each friend and acquaintance within
the social sphere. The danger here may be that the mmd may flot necessarily differentiate
between “moral” and “immoral” spots in the social web; it merely continues the mechanical
process of finding and depositing similar types together. On the other hand, a parallel practice is
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the locating of appreciation for similar commodities. As Coupland and others believe, belonging
to the same “target market” can make one a member of a generational family. It may also lead to
the processing of individuals in everyday life according to their knowledge and ability to
appreciate known commodities. This is why two people may form an attachment or an
understanding because of their shared memory of a certain breakfast cereal, or DAS modeling
clay. 0f course, there is a significant element of nostalgia at play here, and whether or flot it also
plays a significant part in the accommodation of individuals into previously known types is an
issue to be delved into further.
It has been accepted to some degree that there is an effect on the individual of the
institutionalizing of cognitive paradigms, such that it shows a progress in the mmd (flot, as
Sollers says, a ‘progress’ that is necessarily positive—just fonvard in linearity). The full effects
are yet to be determined, however. While most acknowledge on some level that even one’s
everyday appearance ïs a good part production, packaging and branding, so characters on the
page, over which an author has complete control, must be products in the truest sense ofthe
word. Product placement is no more alien to the page than to the movie screen. 0f course, the
process of selling the reader on a particular character type is crucial: even descriptions found in
traditional novels fali into the definition ofthis kind of”selling.” In this regard, the philosophy of
Alain Robbe-Grillet is especially pertinent. The authors that are the focus of this study seem to
be aware of the French writer’ s ideas regarding the presentation of character in that they tend
towards minimizing, or even deleting, physical detail. This is a strange thing to occur in novels
that are castigated for their supposed dependence on ail that is superficial in culture and society.
Even in Ellis’s American Psycho, the main character’s inner monologues obsessively list the
brand, price and directions on every product lie uses during the day, from exfoliating facial scrub
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to socks—yet disregards the color ofhis hair. For a narrative built on surfaces, this is very odd,
indeed. It resuits in a greater possibility of exchange between the reader and the character: the
less physical detail supplied, the more easily the character may be accommodated into the
reader’s pattem of cognition. The intention no longer is to force the reader to identify with the
character, but to aliow the cognitive machinery, consisting of social roles and types, in the
reader’ s mmd to automatically categorize the character, without requiring rnuch input from the
reader himself. The effect is that which may 5e found in a deck of cards: while the images are
superficially different from each other, the cards themselves are essentially ail the same, except
that they fit into different siots in their own hierarchy of value, or power. The niches in which
they fit correspond to the notations or marks upon the individual with respect to the collective.
This resuits in a circulation of intended effects on the reader/viewer, who, in acknowledging the
currency of the effect thus “cashes” it in, participating in an exchange of value. The effects, as
welI as the individual who puts these effects into action—the actor—are made current by their
value in a media or popular culture that subsumes, to a great extent, ail other cultures within it,
including corporate, ethnic and academic. John Fekete refers to this as the vampiricization of ail
other cultures and knowledges. In his Lfe afler Postmodernism, he analyzes what he refers to as
“vampire value,” the resuit of
recycled value referents, abstracted from originating contexts and circulating ad libitum
in a rapidly expanding value universe of tactical manipulation, infectious contact.
Baudrillard would cali this the ecstasy ofpanic: “a mode of propagation by
contiguity, like contagion, only faster—the ancient principle of metamorphosis, going
from one form to another without passing through a system ofmeaning.” In the world of
hyperreal sign-values and value-signs, potentialities without end, the medium of value
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tends to become the frame of a flickering half-life, anemic, parasitic, and thirsty for real
bodily fluids. Insubstantial, dematerialized, dead value joins up with insubstantial,
disseminated, dead power in a panic passion of resurrection through the ftesh blood of
desire which, upon commutative transfusion, ever recedes into a bloodless and dis
oriented desire of desire. It is not inappropnate to speak here, at least in tendency, of a
culture of vampire value. In intellectual culture, both the nostalgie pursuit of the
permanent value referents as regulators and the nihilistic refusals of value discourse
altogether may be perhaps characterizable as mimetic replications, incarnations, and
effects of the vampirical postmodem dispiacement of creatively oriented value-life. (74)
The exchange of signifiers with the intention of creating meaning is what Fekete refers to as
“value creation in the social-ontological sense, including the proj cet of creating representations
and practices of self, society, and value that can compete successfully with the diminished
figurations of life under subjection to vampire value” (75).
“The project of creating representations and practices of self’ is what is integral to this
study of the individual in literature, and subsequently, to the possible meanings of individual
lived reality in society. Signifying oneseif in order to “compete successfully in life” is flot
necessarily a new concept. During the time that Melville was writing “Bartleby,” Marx and
Engels published their Manfesto for the Communist Farty (1848), in which they state
These laborers [proletariats], who must sell themselves piecemeal, are a commodity, like
every other article of commerce, and are consequently exposed to aIl the vicissitudes of
competition, to ail the fluctuations ofthe market. (“Bourgeois and Proletariats” 328)
12$
For the labourer to be a commodity, an “article of commerce,” suggests that the increasing
commodification ofhuman life is inextricably linked to the lifestyle that is more and more
dependent upon work in a competitive market. In fact, it follows quite logicaliy.
What also seems a logicai progression is the reading of literature, and media, as a way to
figure oneself into the socioeconomy. The theory is one that Deirdre $hauna Lynch expounds in
her The Economy ofCharacter (1998). Lynch shows how individuais in the nineteenth century
needed to find ways of envisioning their places in a newly changing society, and how they did
this by “reading” themseives into the noveis that they read. This chapter takes as its title Lynch’ s
concept of “character-as-commodity” because it is an important precursor that marks the
beginnings of commodity culture and, perhaps, more importantly, the birth of the human need to
see oneselfflaftened, glossy, commodified. For exampie, in Coupland’s Generation X “the
experience of fictional others is offered up as yet another mode of consumption” (Lainsbury
230). One assumes that individuals have aiways had a natural desire to add to the betterment of
themselves and their communities, to add value to both; however, this wish, that began
innocently enough, somehow mutated into something quite different. At one time, the individual
desire was to add value to the social; the perversion of this desire, paradoxicaily, resulted in a
system of “vampiric value,” which presumes the evacuation of originary human value, and
substitutes the appearance ofhuman value. And, in most cases, when the appearance ofhuman
need and human desire are revealed as not at ail human to begin with, the result can be
something quite monstrous.
The question remains: Is this dependency on Fekete’s “socio-ontological” economy the
natural—and only—solution to finding value in character and characterization in contemporary
literature? The key to finding a way out of this predicament is, first of ail, to follow Robbe
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Grillet and admit the inadequacy of depending on signification and placement in the
socioeconomic narrative to “create” character. On these grounds, the works of Ellis and
Coupland—uncontested representatives of the commodity-fiction contingent—will be analyzed
in order to propose that the answer to Fekete is “no.” By directly engaging with the socio
ontological problematic that Fekete identifies, rather than making the mistake of attempting to
avoid it, these authors write characters that are able to maintain a hold on their own
characterizations and, thus, slip out ofthe clutches ofthe conventional interpreter.
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Section IV
Characterization and Flatness
in Bret Easton Ellis
Although the average reader would flot describe the writing of Bret Easton Ellis as
moralistic, more and more ftequently, these words are appearing in critical reviews ofhis best
known works, Arnerican Psycho (1991) and Less than Zero (1985). One of these critics,
Elizabeth Young, daims that the absolute lack of moral order in novels such as those written by
Bret Easton Ellis necessarily reveals an invocation to a moral authority to intervene. It is
unquestionable that the eau for intervention is experienced by the reader in Ellis’s work. Indeed,
the reader is “an important site in the reaim of extreme, explicit literature” (Walker, par. 12).
Critical interpretations of Ellis’s writing face the difficulty of disceming intended meanings of
characters, actions and motivations that are simply, at base, ambiguous. Ofien, “ail political,
critical engagement is left to the reader” (Walker, par. 9; original emphasis). Obviously, this
makes it difficuit to compose conclusive, or neariy conciusive, studies of Ellis. However, once it
is accepted that the balance between analyst and that which is being analyzed has shified, the
approach may shifi from being purely scientific to being slightly more intuitive. If much of
contemporary fiction shares the underlying anxiety that humanity is becoming too automated,
then the requirement of using that very human sense of intuition may be intended by the author.
Afler ah, in interviews, Ellis has repeatedly refened to his writing as an intuitive response.
Generaiiy, the emphasis on flat, surface characterizations, as weii as the explïcit violence
and sexuaiity, found in Ellis’s novels make them oft-cited examples ofthe genre of fiction lately
classed as “transgressional.” The group ofwriters who produce this hard-hitting, ofien
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disturbing, fiction includes Chuck Palahniuk, Irvine Welsh, Hunter S. Thompson, and Kathy
Acker. And, since transgressing the norms and conventions of novel-writing manifests itself in a
variety of ways, flot only hinging upon graphic violence and sexuality, the anti-social nature of
Douglas Coupland’s novels makes him also a member ofthis group. As Palahniuk states in a
2002 interview with Charles Russo of The Guardian Literaiy Supplement, contemporary readers
live “in an age starved for genuine experiences, instead of cathartic phony experiences through
the media, structured, engineered experiences” (Russo, par. 33). Bret Easton Ellis’s approach to
precipitating this “genuine experience” in the reader is to write feelings and actions that he could
be sure none ofhis readers had already experienced before, either in real life or in readerly life.
Ellis forces readers through unbearable scenes, ones in which the reader’s own humanity
implores her to put a stop to the action, while the characters in the scenes either passively allow
the action to progress or actively take control ofits further progression. In this way, ElIis’s
novels simply cannot be read successfuÏly in the old, accustomed ways.
In Ellis’s world, characters are famously given minimum ‘props’ with which to proceed.
On top ofthis, they are continuously distracted from reasoning, understanding, and even more
basic functions, such as observing or communing with others. These characters are unable to
intervene in the narratival action of the nove!: in Less than Zero, “mundane” (123) Clay watches
from doorways as feelings of shame pass through him; in American Psycho, Patrick Bateman
blocks doorways and “like[sj to dissect girls” (216). Yet, for both characters, the machinery of
everyday life motors on, regardless Qftheir attempts to throw wrenches into it. Clay’s objections
conceming the violence and cruelty that occur in front ofhim hardly registers on others. And,
plainly, as Mike Grimshaw points out in his article in CTheoiy entitled “Cultural Pessimism and
Rock Cnticism: Bret Easton Ellis’ Wnting (as) Heu,” Patrick Bateman “cannot convince anyone
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that lie is the horror that is lis transgressive ontology” (par. 15). No matter how plainly he
confesses to people, they cannot accept successful, fich, good-looking Bateman as a murderer. In
these two main characters,
Ellis provides what Ortega Y Gasset in Mati and Crisis cails “crisis man,” living “la
vita minima—a life emptied of itself, incompetent, unstable.” Crisis Man acts in two
main ways—with “skeptical frigidity, anguish, desperation,” or with “a sense of fury,
madness, [and] an appetite for vengeance because ofthe emptiness ofhis life.”
(Grimshaw, par. 8).
Thus, Clay—typified by his “skeptical frigidity, anguish, desperation”—and Bateman—full of
“fury, madness, [andj an appetite for vengeance”—are flot that distant from each other. As Ben
Walker points out, “The relationship between ‘transgression’ and ‘subversion’ is flot simply
reciprocal, complementary, correlative but rather is dependent on textual deployrnent (how, by
whom and toward what ends these texts are used, seen and read)” (par. 4). This means that the
prospect of Arnerican Psycho successfully subverting the problems of characterization depends
wholly on the individual reader. For example, if the revulsion stemming from Bateman’s cruel
and insane actions does not carry over, in the reader’s mmd, into the sections in which Bateman
“just want[s] to fit in” by being charming, sympathetic or in bis own words, “graceful,” then the
critique is flot communicated to the reader. But what is the attraction for the reader in reading
these inconclusive shards; what is the gain? The resuit is only a reader infatuated with a
narrator’s infatuation with himself (and bis brand-name products). As Benjamin concludes in his
essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” (1933-35), “Mankind, which in
Homer’s time was an object of contemplation for the Olympian gods, now is one for itself. Its
seif-alienation has reached such a degree that it can experience its own destruction as an
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aesthetic pleasure of the first order” (Illuminations 242). The character is not concemed with
epiphanic understanding; he is simply too engrossed with himself. The reader’s inability to roli
him into a complete character produces a lack of cohesion that resuits in at least two separate
strands of narrative (the narrative ofthe insane murderer, the narrative ofthe label-conscious
preppy)—together in one character. In a commodity culture, these expressions of character stiil
carry enough currency to warrant a “fullness” ofcharacter; what is more is that, in an age in
which TV programs like The Oprah Wïnfrey Show may highlight women in love with
impnsoned mass murderers, the commoniy held indicators of success, romance and manliness
just may suffice as justifiable reasons for a compartmentalizing reader to find Patrick Bateman a
“hero” of sorts: frustrated, damaged and ail the more worthy of saving.
Much ofthe need to justify one’s actions according to logic, regardless ofhow extreme
and unwarranted the actions may be, is charactenstic of America in the late twentieth century.
Some ofthe topics of The Patty Winters Show, a daily program Patrick neyer fails to see, are
themselves so absurd or inhumane that, eventually, they cail into question the obscene nature of
Patrick’s actions. The focus, instead, remains on society in its entirety, and the fact that at some
level, individuals commit sirnilar kinds of sadistic torture on each other. In his essay, “The
Mechanical Bride” (1951), Marshall McLuhan writes,
For the satiated, both sex and speed are pretty bonng until the element of danger and
even death is introduced. Sensation and sadisrn are near twins. And for those for whom
the sex act has corne to seem mechanical and merely the meeting and manipulation of
body parts, there oflen remains a hunger which can be called metaphysical but which is
not recognized as such, and which seeks satisfaction in physical danger, or sometirnes in
torture, suicide, or murder. Many of the Frankenstein fantasies depend on the horror of a
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synthetic robot running amok in revenge for its lack of a “soul.” Is this not merely a
symbolic way of expressing the actual fact that many people have become so rnechanized
that they feel a dim resentment at being deprived of full human status? (McLuhan,
Essentiat McLuhan 27)
In Ellis, individuals have, at base, been stripped oftheir humanity. In American Psycho, it is
replaced with rage; in Less than Zero, it is replaced with shame. Yet, the mechanization ofthese
souls dictates that the characters no longer trulyfeel the emotions of rage or shame; instead, an
overpowering fear, specifically, a “nameÏess dread,” follows them everywhere. In both novels,
however, the author attempts to shifi the grid upon which character lies, such that boundaries are
blurred and some kind of new information is able to be imparted to the reader. This chapter will
discuss Ellis’s Arnerican Psycho and Less than Zero with respect to the possibilities of
encountering this new information. In the first section, “Living ‘la Vita Minima,” characters are
depicted as “empty” or “hollow.” This lack of substance or personality translates into a lack of
agency in the second section, “Consuming lmagery.” Finally, in the third section, “Making Do:
Character as Overblown, Aporetic and Missing-in-Action,” characters wiÏÏ be shown to retrieve a
sense of agency through slips in the narrative which defy readerly expectation.
ï. Living ‘la Vita Minima’
In Ronald Sukenick’s short story “The Death of the Nove!” (1969), the author makes the
observation that “Fiction constitutes a way of looking at the world,” in which there are a set of
absolutes which every individual believes. However, he points out that in our “world ofpost
realism,” “ail ofthese absolutes have become absolutely problematic. The contemporary
writer—the writer who is acutely in touch with the life of which he is part—is forced to start
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from scratch: Reality doesn’t exist, time doesn’t exist, personality doesn’t exist.” And, if there is
no sense of time, then there can be “no destiny, only chance” (41). One may sec that character
lias been divested of major elements that normaliy help to estabiish personality, and thus,
viabiiity in reality-based literature. This is most apparent in Ellis’s work, which takes as its focus
the individuai in society. Refemng again to Ellis’s thematic simiiarity to Jose Ortega Y Gasset,
Gnmshaw writes that lis writing is “reminiscent ofthe elitist societal criticism of[Gasset’sj The
Revoit ofthe Masses (1932).... Likewise Ellis’ noveis are tales lamenting the tnumph of mass
man, men who, as Ortega states, set “no value on themselves,” who “feel like everybody cisc”—
yet “are flot concemed” (Grimshaw, par. 1). These one-dimensionai cut-outs—mass man—
abound in Eliis’s novels so much that it is ofien difficuit to differentiate one character from the
other. Indeed, American Psycho and Less than Zero verge into comical and ofien absurd
territory, emphasizing the interchangeabiiity of men and women, the repetitiveness of everyday
life and, ultimately, the heu that this creates.
Considering the purely functionai nature of characters and characterization in Ellis’s
works, it is perhaps not surprising that family relations are drawn with respect to financial tics,
rather than familial ones. When Patrick is asked by the father to uncover where bis brother, Scan,
has been, and what he has been doing, it is a request made in conjunction with the family lawyer.
The oniy trace ofthe younger Bateman is from European hotel buis, though the famiiy is not
convinced that it was necessariiy Scan who stayed at the hotet, anyway. Retationships, in Fuis,
are forged on money, whether they are filial, spousal (lis girifriend imagines riches upon
marrying Patrick), or even incidentai (Christie, a prostitute who knows ofthe vicious heights of
which Patrick is capable, accepts a second ‘date’ with him, only becausc she cannot afford to
deciine his lucrative offer—this time, she us tortured and kilied). Perhaps a secondary theme is
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that these financial relationships, though built on the hierarchy ofAmerican socioeconomy and
possessing the appearance of permanence, are actually extremeÏy tenuous. In EÏIis’s more recent
nove!, Gtarnorarna—famously about models who happen to be terrorists—the narrator is told,
“[T]here’s a hole in your truth” (397). Evidently, the hole in the Truth is the hole in the Money.
In an interview with Jaime Clarke, Ellis admits that money lias become “hollow”: lie was
“meeting a lot of young guys who were working on Wall St.,” lie says, “and I thought, great,
here’s the perfect takeoff point for what I want to do; it’s about money, it’s about hollow money”
(Clarke 1). Literary critic Jonathan Keats writes that in keeping the “the sum total of character
development in his novel less than zero, Ellis is able to suck the reader through that A lice in
Wondertand hole as smoothly as cocaine through a $100 biil” (2). Thus, the connections between
hollow truth, hollow money and hollow men are solidified.
One connotation of “hoÏlow money” is the manner in which the young men in Ellis’s
novels make their money: passive inheritance. The suggestion is that working to earn the money
oneseif would somehow make that money more solid, worthwhile and valuable. In opposition to
this is money that is flot put to any functional or purposeful use, for example, the $350 dinners
that Ellis and his “friends” consume nightly. These rich diners, who are neyer really that hungry,
and the uninterrupted presence ofbeggars on the street outside the restaurant make for a striking
contrast, one that is emphasized by taunting ofbeggars with a dollar bili, and the ultimate
retraction of it. As Liz Young writes, “Money remains the bottom une at ail times and everyone
has difficulty distinguishing their friends. They ah look interchangeable and as Ellis lias largely
refrained ftom providing any detail of character the ‘human’ element is consistently devalued,
adding to the impression of an author manipulating robotic puppets” (106).
137
The lack ofmeaning generated by this puppet show is further expiored by the “recycling”
ofcharacters tbroughout Eilis’s novels, and more interestingly, by the “literary kidnapping” of
characters from other novelists. American Fsycho’s Patnck Bateman appears in a “sick-joke
cameo” in Glarnorarna, and Vïctor from The Rutes ofAttraction finds himseifwith a seemingly
much more important role narrating most of Gtamorama until he gets repiaced (Wake,
Culturevulture). An implication here is that, aithough they are considered integral to sorne plots
and peripheral in others, ail characters are essentially interchangeable. The reader’s mmd adjusts
to accommodate the character into the particular type needed by the specific juncture in the
plot!action. From this point ofview, it is logicai that Ellis professes an interest in “how
pomography affects a reader.” He says, “It’s such a consumer item. It does what it’s supposed to
do. Like toothpaste or coffee or ciothing” (Clarke 3). This concept of character as pure function
is similar to Dougias Coupland’s ‘pornographie’ denarration offlollywood celebrity lives, in
which the ‘truc’ essence is voided as the proofs of ‘reat life’—family, work, social position,
physicai descnption—add up.
0f these major proofs of successful characterization, work is integral to understanding
the character’s place in society and, thus, historically, for the purposes ofthis study an even more
important indicator than family. Especiaily in modem American society, in which family
members are often detached and no longer live in the same neighbourhood or even state, much
more may be said about an individual when thejob type îs known than when family is
represcnted. The complex dealings with a character’s position in society—what is fictionalized,
and what is wiped from the fiction—is addressed in Raymond Williams’s “Conventions,” an
important report on institutionalized customs associated with wnting fiction. Williams says that
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throughout history there have aiways been certain ways ofunderstanding literature and certain
ways of understanding the writing of literature. In this respect, he writes,
The convention which allows [“such matters as work or income”] to be treated as
unimportant, or indeed to be absent, in the interest of what is taken as primary identity or
an alternatively significant social character, is as evidently general as that less common
but stiil important converse convention through which peopie are specified only at that
level of general and social economic facts, with no individuation beyond them.
(Williams, “Conventions” 186-87)
In American Psycho, Ellis plays on these conventions. Patnck Bateman is a handsome,
successful stockbroker, but he is neyer depicted doing work. He inhabits that space behind the
desk in the office, but his desk drawers are filled with CDs, pomography and his Zagat restaurant
review guide. The top of his desk is covered with 3 copies ofmen’s health and fashion
magazines, and his walkman earphones are constantiy hooked atop his head, pumping it with pop
tunes from Whitney Houston or Phil Coliins. Though his secretary, Jean, dutifiilly “brings him
the Ransom file, which she did not need to bring” (66), or later, “places a file on top of the desk”
(257), these are the only mentions ofhis need to complete work for hisjob at Pierce & Pierce.
Instead, Jean spends most ofher time juggiing his tennis court reservations with dinners. Late in
the novel, he admits, “my appearances in the office the last month or so have been sporadic to
say the least. Ail I seem to want to do now is work out, lifting weights, mostly, and secure
reservations at new restaurants I’ve already been to, then cancel them” (300), though canceling
sought-afier reservations, especially in New York, is considered antisocial or even subversive.
Patrick’ s charade of working is made increasingly tenuous, as the reader leams that Patrick, as if
ashamed, is hiding his family’s wealth and the fact that he does flot need to work. The lack of
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inner motivation for Patrick to remain at his job, and the fact that he does not need to—as weil as
the suggestion that Patrick’s father owns halfofWall $treet—call into question why Patrick goes
to bis office at ail. Even he finds this question looming before him, when a male admirer forces
him “to consider that maybe a life connected to this city, to Manhattan, to myjob, is flot a good
idea” (292). The emphasis on “not” suggests that most people assume that a life worth leading is
one that has strong ties to the flourishing of a career. The resultant anxiety produced by this
tension is indicated when Patrick, wondering if she might sleep with him again, takes his first
‘love’ Bethany, to dinner:
“Patrick.”
“Yes?”
“What’s wrong?”
“I just don’t want to talk about. . .“ I stop. “About work.”
“Why not?”
“Because I hate it,” I say. “Now listen, have you tried Pooncakes yet? I think
Miller underrated it.”
“Patrick,” she says slowly. “If you’re so uptight about work, why don’t you just
quit? You don’t have to work.”
“Because,” I say, staring directly at her, “I. . . want... to. . . fit. . . in.”
Afler a long pause, she smiles. “I see.” There’s another pause.
This one I break. “Just look at it as, well, a new approach to business,” I say.
“How”—she stalls—”sensible.” She stalis again. “How, um, practical.”
(236)
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Wanting to fit in—everyday society, the workplace—is a deep, underlying motivation that
exhibits itself in cracks and fissures of the apparently smooth social group to which lie belongs.
Though Patrick maintains an appearance of a successful (and sane) Wall Street broker, he also
does not try too hard to disguise the proofs ofhis insanity. While the reader is led to believe that
Patrick is an anomaly in nature/society, the constant action ofmistaken identities eventually
wears down this assumption, as do other suggestions to the opposite.
The desire to “fit in” also brings to the reader’s mmd the interchangeability of characters,
and the reader’s need to make the character sufficiently inhabit a particular role. It creates a
problematic for the reader, who is able to identify in Patnck elements of Holden CaulfieÏd—only
with a more sophisticated, witty sheen—and yet, must balance this somehow with the horrific
Jack ofhumanity he also displays. Where is the character when two opposing personalities may
be constmcted from the same text? Or, is there even one? When Patnck asked a friend what he
told the detective regarding a missing colleague, he confesses that he was able to divulge
“Only the usual,” lie sighs. “That he wore yellow and maroon ties. That he had lunch at
‘21.’ That in reality he was not an arbitrageur—which was what Thimble thought he
was—but a merger-maker. Only the usual.” I can almost hear him shrug. . . . That he
didn’t wear suspenders. A beit man. That he stopped doing cocaine, simpatico beer. You
know, Bateman.” (322)
The tally ofthis information fails to construct any kind ofreal information as to who the missing
fellow might be. The fear that is produced, in excess ofthat which is produced by Bateman the
sadistic killer, is that this is the extent of ail relationships in this world, and that none ofthe
characters, uitimately, are able to be distinguished from each other. But this is the supposedly
sane world which contrasts with Patrick’ s mad one, where “everything seemed duli: another
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sunrise, the lives ofheroes, falling in love, war, the discoveries people made about each other”
(282). Yet, Patrick feels,
I had ail the characteristics of a human being—flesh, biood, skin, hair—but my
depersonalization was so intense, had gone so deep, that the normal ability to feel
compassion had been eradicated, the victim of a slow, purposeful erasure. I was simply
imitating reality, a rough resembÎance ofa human being, with only a dim corner ofmy
mmd functioning. Something horrible was happening and yet I couidn’t figure out why.
(282)
One assumes that Patrick distinguishes himself from the rest of the characters in the novel by
realizing that he is mereiy acting out a personality that he does flot possess. But the reader begins
to suspect that he is not the only one in his social sphere who feels this way. When Patrick
intermpts “a total. . . Waii Street guy” writing “Kill ail Yuppies” on a bathroom wali, he is
momentariiy confused, perhaps dismayed (374). The reason for this is that Patrick’s method of
avoiding erasure is to create some kind of ‘life,’ or action, outside and unrelated to lis social
persona. But discovering in the men’s washroom this other person who maintains a charade of a
Wail Street persona, without completeiy investing in it, perturbs Patrick. What confuses Patrick
is the fear that, in creating an altemate persona, lie stiil has not differentiated himself from the
average guy lie meets for drinks. Fatrick is supposed to be “Mr. Wali Street” (283); even in lis
insanity, he cannot single himself out from the faceless crowd.
One method of distinguishing himself is the traditional dependence on physical
description. Patrick’s habit, or obsession, is to detail every product he uses, wears or eats. This
practice extends to those acquaintances he meets. At first it is odd, then even more disconcerting,
as lie interrupts murders to thoughtfully list ail articles ofhis victim’s ciothing. 11e even outlines
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a description ofa homeless person’s clothing. As Elizabeth Young writes in ber article, “The
Beast in the Jungle, the Figure in the Carpet: Bret Easton Ellis’s American Psycho,” it is
by his rigid adherence to an adspeak dress-code for his characters [that] Ellis continues
his emphasis upon deindividualization in contemporary society. Finally, and very
ironically, Ellis’s use ofdetailed dress-code to obliterate rather than to define character in
the traditional sense, ends up contributing to the rnechanics ofthe plot in an entirely
traditional sense—the “plot” such as it is, eventually tums upon the impossibility of
anyone distinguishing one character from another. (Young, “Beast” 103)
Naturally, such a plot can only depend upon “terse writing and intentionally minimal character
development” (Kocurek, par. 6). In fact, the minimalism ofEllis’s characterizations is extreme.
Often, the exact same descriptions are used to refer to a variety of people and, in addition, sorne
characters are described as looking like other characters. Whereas physical attributes ought to
provide the most solid of indicators, the reader bas no real information (other than gender) that
would differentiate any of the characters. From the beginning of American Psycho, mistaken
identities abound. In the opening scene, “a guy who looks a lot like Luis Carruthers waves over
at Timothy and when Timothy doesn’t retum the wave the guy—slicked back hair, suspenders,
hom-rirnmed glasses—realizes it’s flot who he thought it was and looks back at his copy of USA
Today” (5). The formulaic description, “slicked back hair, suspenders, hom-rimmed glasses,”
finds itself, sometimes slightly rearranged, repeated many times throughout the novel, always
describing somebody different. Product description finds itselfovershadowing the characters
and, eventually, the narrator’s wording betrays a lack of concem, almost laziness, when it cornes
to identifying differences between people. At one point, he mentions, “Like me, like Charles,
[Luis] wears his haïr slicked back and he’s wearing Oliver Peoples redwood-framed glasses”
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(222). Traditionally, the display ofhigh-end consumer goods is supposed to distinguish the
monied upper-class from the lower-class poor. But these products are the minimum rnarkers of
EIlis’s characters, so that individuaiity continues to recede. At a club, “The Chandelier Room is
packed and everyone looks familiar, everyone looks the same” (61). Earlier, when Patnck
notices that his giriffiend, Evelyn, is flirting with Timothy Price, he engages her in the following
conversation:
“Why don’t you go for Price? . . . He’s rich,” I say.
“Everybody’s rich,” she says, concentrating on the TV screen.
“He’s good-looking,” I tel! her.
“Eveîybody ‘s good-looking, Patrick,” she says remotely.
“He lias a great body,” I say.
“Eveïybody has a great body 110W,” she says. (23)
Evelyn’s emphasis on everybody and every body being the same, along with her refusai to be
engaged in conversation with Patrick, indicate that it really does not matter to her whether or not
it is Patrick, Timothy, or another man speaking to lier in her bedroom. The interchangeability of
people is highlighted when it is reveaied that she is having an affair with Tim Price, and again,
when Patnck realizes that Courtney—the woman lie is having an affair with—”wants tofuck
McDermott. But it doesn’t really matter. Even though I’m more handsome than Craig, we both
look pretty much the same” (250). It is as if his girlfriend’s infidelity would not bother him, as
long as she stuck to his type. Later, he thinks,
Owen has mistaken me for Marcus Halberstam (even though Marcus is dating Cecelia
Wagner) but for some reason it really doesn’t matter and it seems a logical faux pas since
Marcus works at P & P aiso, in fact does the same exact thing I do, and lie also has a
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penchant for Valentino suits and clear prescription glasses and we share the same barber
at the same place, the Pierre Hotel, so it seems understandable; it doesn’t irk me. (89)
Patrick accepts the fact that people mistake him for others with whom he shares either physicai
resemblance or socioeconomic standing because it does not occur to him that they rnight identify
him tbrough means other than outward appearance. In fact, Patrick also joins in this careless
typecasting. When he is at the Tunnel nightclub and the doorman asks, “How are you, Mr.
McCullouch,” Patnck responds, “Fine, uh, Jim,” as if knowingly refemng to the doorman by the
wrong name (78). Later, when he asks another man if his name is Ricardo, the man nods, “sure”
(79). The implication is that this man’s name is flot Ricardo, but that this man does not care to
identify hirnseif, anyway. Again, what seems to make Patrick different from others—his point of
view that society is full of interchangeable people—proves, in the end, to solidify his sirniiarity
with them. The resuit is a nihilistic comrnunity in which humans and objects are grouped
together, sorne of whom share in the knowiedge of an aporia of individual distinctness. This
scene is one of “metaphorical violence,” Ellis believes, because “in this society, when you look
at it at a surface level, everything is flattened out to such a degree that the murder of a young
wornan.. . or sitting at a certain table [at a restaurant], or a Huey Lewis CD, is really flattened
out to the same effect, and that’s really what American Psycho is ail about” (This is Not an Exit).
American Psycho is also about a man who murders flot in an effort to do away with humanity,
but in an effort tofind if. For Patrick, the object that he kiils is being tested for identity: if it
cornes up ‘missing,’ it must have been a ‘real’ person, with farnily, neighbours and co-workers—
with a life. But nobody cornes up missing, so nobody must be dead.
This dystopic vision is shared by the narrator in Less than Zero, who, at dinner with his
father, realizes that “I’m introduced only as ‘my son’ and the businessmen ail begin to look the
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same and I begin to wish that I had brought the rest of the coke” (42). Later, at a bouse party, he
notices “there are mostiy young boys in the house and they seem to be in every room and they ail
look the same: thin, tan bodïes, short blond haîr, btank look in the blue eyes, same empty
toneless voices, and then I start to wonder if I look exactly like them” (152). While Clay is
conscious of this fear of being exactly like anyone cisc, it is ironic that he is not aware that bis
descriptions ofhis two sisters ultimately createjust as strong an impression as the copies of
himself whom he begins to fear. Although the sisters make appearances throughout the novel,
they are neyer differentiated, except to state that one sister (flot which one) is older than the
other. At one point, he guesses, “the older ofmy two sisters.. . I think is fifteen” (23). But
repeatedly, he refers to them only as “the older one,” or “the other one”: “Why do you lock your
door, Ciay?’ one ofthem, I don’t know which one, asks again” (24). Interestingiy, he uses the
same technique when, at a café, he describes two girls sitting at a nearby table:
One’s peeling an orange and the other’s sipping an espresso. The one who’s peeling an
orange asks the other if she should put a maroon streak through her hair. The girl with the
espresso takes a sip and teils her no. The other girl asks about other colors, about
anthracite. The girl with the espresso takes another sip and thinks about this for a minute
and then teils her no, that it should be red, and if not red, then violet, but definitely not
maroon or anthracite. I look over at ber and she looks at me and then I look at the Perrier
bottie. The girl with the espresso pauses a couple of seconds and then asks, “What’s
anthracite?” (Less than Zero 46-7)
Although Ciay notes the girls’ conversation in detail, the only description he deems important to
mention has to do with the objects they are holding in their hands. This is truc even though he
expresses an interest in them, fiirting from his café table. In terms of identification, these girls
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are “the one with the espresso” and “the one with the orange” (or simpiy, “the other one”). The
effect is a gaggie of sameness, much like the “thin, tan bodies” that une the pool at the house
party.
Fuis bas aiways been interested in the literary edict that characters shouid be “well
rounded.” Ris creative expression has indicated this ftom an early age. As a ten year-old, he
wrote a story entitled, “Harry, the Flat Pancake,” which was “about a boy who wakes up one
moming and realizes that he’s a flat pancake-like thing. He just walks around and bas a normal
day as a pancake. . . . Then, I think, people chase him down the street and want to eat him, and
pour syrup and butter on him” (This is Not an Exit). Ellis believes that, for a child, this storyline
must be seen as a manifestation ofbottled-up anger. However, the “flatncss” is also suggestive of
the thinness of a negative on a film reel, the movie screen, and the glossy magazine layout that
have taken over the mindscape—where pictures had once been produced from the imagination,
and not merely replicated visually. At the same time, however, it is obviously a metaphor for the
literary consumption ofcharacter. Afler ail, even “extreme attempts at individuality are doomed
because personality itselfhas become a commodity” to be consumed (Young, “Children ofthe
Revolution” 20).
For Ellis, the insincerity oftraditional characterization, and the attempt to avoid its trap,
is a major preoccupation. This leads to a blurring of character in his works; at times, even gender
becomes unctear. In an interview for Hotwired, he admits that his “characters’ lives are so blurry
and indistinct that it even hazes over something as primal and elemental as sexuality” (Ellis,
“Bret Baston Buis on Hotwirecf’ par. 57). In Less than Zero, characters are identified more by
the sexual act, and less by which gender they belong to. What takes the place of individual
differentiation in terms ofpersonality, career, family or even gender, are the things that hold
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currency in the culture; these are, as Liz Young states, beauty and youth, essentially ‘star power.’
But these elements are limited in how they can be considered integral to character, since they are
bound to change and transform as time goes on. The categories that hold currency in our culture,
then, are obviously shiffing and lack form. Ellis blends gender categories, signaled by the use of
unisex names such as Blair (female) and Lindsay (male) and, as well, by the lackadaisical
sexuality of main character Clay, who can barely remember whom he has slept with, regardless
ofhis or her gender. Clay’s uncommented-upon bisexuality adds to the instability ofhis
character, if only because the reader cannot add this to a stockpile of information about the
character from which she can predict future events or choices. Instead, even Clay seems
confused as to whom he might have chosen to sleep with:
I realize for an instant that I might have slept with Didi Heliman. I also realize
that I might have slept with Warren also.
I open my menu and pretend to read it, wondering if I slept with Raoul. Name
seems familiar
“Raoul is black, isn’t he?” Kim asks after a while. I haven’t slept with Raoul.
(Less than Zero 2$)
But this gender confusion is flot even an issue that plagues Clay; for him, there is barely a sign of
intellectual distress, or complex personality. He is, as Ellis says in This is Not an Exit,
“Everyboy” and, at the same time, a “moral void” that the author dares to refer to as a
“conceptual character.” Earlier, he wonders how his friend, Trent, “can mistake a black teenage
boy, flot anorexic, for Muriel [a presumably white girl], but then I see that the black boy is
wearing a dress” (21). Thus, although the characters in Less than Zero seem to have more
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freedorn to extend beyond stereotypical walls, the blurring of individuai characters makes it
difficuit or perhaps unworthwhiie to ascertain distinct personaiity traits.
In American Psycho, the blurring across individual unes oniy occurs within pre-set types.
For exampie, female characters are only interchangeable within their gender-identified category.
In the opening scene with Timothy, oddiy, both Evelyn and Courtney are wearing “a Krizia
cream siik blouse, a Krizia rust tweed skirt and silk-satin d’Orsay pumps from Manolo Blahnik”
(8). Often, the only real differentiation between female characters in American Psycho is given
by socioeconomic status: women are either rich or street prostitutes, and men are either rich or
homeless beggars. Yet, at base, women are an obvious choice when it cornes to stereotyping,
since they have been so heavily stereotyped historically. They require money, are used for sex,
and also, are used in what has been seen by some as something of a caricature of traditionaliy
male-dominated medicai knowledge: afier ail, Patrick admits he “iike[s] to dissect girls.”
Predictabiy, ethnic and hornosexual stereotypes abound, as well. Though Patrick verbalizes tracts
containing notions of equality for ail, and the need to eradicate hatred and discrimination, his
actions and thoughts when flot at work at his public persona reveal extrerne hatred towards
Chinese, Jewish and African-Arnerican people, as well as women and the poor. Indeed, the
characters of ethnicity are oflen portrayed as typical stereotypes: Chinese people own the
laundry, African-Arnericans are on crack, and “dumb and slow” (166), and an older gay man
displays effeminate affections (164). In Less than Zero, Clay thinks, “Nobody’s home,” although
he knows that the maid, a “nobody,” is in the house (10). He thinks she is “the new maid, or
maybe the old maid” (11) and, uitimately, it does not make a difference either to him or to the
narrative. Conversely, in American Psycho, Patrick’s image as an independentiy wealthy, clean
cut young man is flot exempt from stereotypicai assurnptions. In the opening scene alone, he is
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referred to as “the boy next door” three times by his girifriend, Evelyn (11, 18, 20), and once by
his friend, Timothy Price (37). At the end of the novel, when lie tries to divulge his sordid
actions, his Iawyer does flot believe him because he thinks of Patrick Baternan as a “goody two
shoes” (387).
In American Fyscho, as in Less Ttzan Zero, characters are subject to a high degree of
interchangeability, signaled by the repetition throughout the novel ofkey phrases or motifs.
Some of these phrases, mentioned earlier, include descriptions such as “suspenders, slicked-back
hair, hom-nmmed glasses” and “Oliver Peoples nonprescription redwood-framed glasses.” The
question, “Did anyone know that cavemen got more fiber than we do?” (51), pops up more than
once. Ofien, Patrick refers to himself as an “automaton” or describes himself as reacting
unthinkingly or mechanically. Taken together, the effect is that the motif ofrepetition
underscores the entire endeavour of characterization—and, by extension, novel-writing. In a
documentary about Ellis, contemporary author Jay Mclnerney says that the reader can almost
achieve a “Zen-like state, having to do with the repetition of phrases, the repetition of products..
[which are] likc a mnemonic” (TÏzis is Not an Exit). In fact, the terrn, “as if by rote,” is
repeated numerous times by Patrick, serving to continually highlight the function ofrepetitive
actions and behaviours. For example, he obsessively mentions or thinks, especialÏy at
inopportune moments, that he needs to retum video tapes to Video Haven. He aiways rents Body
Double, so much so that on one occasion the video store clerk is plainÏy unable to disguise lis
horror. As well, the Broadway production of Les Miserables plays over the entire novel,
providing an ironic statement on the cognitive dissonance of the very rich who buy reams of
tickets to the shows, and the real-life Les Miserables which they encounter, and avoid, as they
exit the theatre. The play, about a man who is in flight from a discoverer of his real identity,
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reflects upon Patrick’s life because by the end of the play, the hero and the audience realize that
the new identity is the ‘real’ one. He is the character he consciously chose to act out; there is
nothing behind the pose. Indeed, Patrick enjoys the play so much that, after he kilis Paul Owen,
he steals a copy of the musical from his condo, even though he had already bought two copies of
the CD from the store earlier (219). The question ofwhether the taped recording of Les
Miserables is of the British or the American cast lingers, again and again, at various times
throughout the book. When he attends a U2 concert, “The lead singer, Bono, {screeches] out
what sounds like ‘Where the Beat Sounds the Same” (144). Patrick, who does flot enjoy the
concert, admits several times over the course ofthe novel that he “hate[s] live music” (143) and
that “live music bugs” him (74); for a character obsessed with repetition—with re-watching a
videotape 37 times, re-listening to one ofmany copies of the same Les Miserables recording and,
essentially, interacting interchangeably with a monotony of characters, many of whom “look like
models”—Patrick does flot enjoy surprises. He wants live music played just like it sounds on the
CD, with no variations. According to Walter Benjamin, it is irrefutable that “reproduction as
offered by picture magazines and newsreels differs from the image scen by the unarmed eye.
Uniqueness and permanence are as closely linked in the latter as are transitoriness and repro
ducibility in the former” (“The Work of Art,” Illuminations 223). Patrick’s obsession with
sameness highlights the themes of ‘transitoriness’ and the ‘reproducibility’ ofhuman life, as well
as in art. For Patrick, difference is threatening because it calis into question the world as he sees
it: a place full ofpeople who are merely copies ofthemselves and, thus, interchangeable. In this
way, Ellis extends Benjamin’s conclusion that the reproducibility ofa work of art dissipates the
individual aura that surrounds that work of art, ending in its ruin. Ellis imports this concept into
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the novel: by making characters who are mere copies, he devalues their aura as humans of
special interest, or as currency.
‘Copies’ that do flot stray from the original ‘models’ proliferate in Ellis’s works, so that,
when they are needed, they are “fit in[to]” the structure ofthe narrative. An important indicator
ofEliis’s approach to characterization, ofthe appropriation, repiaceabiiity and ultimate
disposability ofhis characters, is given in two unes from Patnck Bateman: “Last night I had
dreams that were lit like pornography and in them I fucked girls made of cardboard. The Patty
Winters Show this moming was about Aerobic Exercise” (American Psycho 200). In this way, it
may be understood why he dreams of cardboard cutouts, rather than the ‘realistic’ characters that
appear rounded and human. By stripping character down to its cardboard cut-out, Ellis makes it
easily discemibie for the reader to conceive that at base ail characters, like ail 80s TV shows, are
flattened into repeats. And, fittingly, Patrick loves reruns. But Clay is similarly haunted by
monotony. Afler visiting his mother in a psychiatric institution, he copies her sunglassed stance
whule waiting for his processed meai at a Fatburger chain restaurant. Stuck, uncomfortabiy,
staring at the walls which are an “almost painfui yeiiow. . . under the glare of the fluorescent
lights” (20), he listens to the song on the jukebox. In his tiny booth, Clay iistens to what may be
considered Ellis’s theme song: “Crimson and clover, over and over and over and over....
crimson and clover, ovei- and over Crimson and do-oh-ver.” For Patnck and Ciay, action
provides no relief, no resoiution. They are stuck in the machine ofnarrativai reproduction,
piaying out their parts over and over without any hint ofprogress.
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ii. Consuming Imagery
The hypnotic quality ofthe song, “Crimson and Clover,” conjures up the drug culture of
the 1960s, and adds to the mesmerizing milieu of Less than Zero. The repetitive nature ofthe
song means that it coincides thematically, as well, with Arnerican Psycho. The image of Clay,
sitting in a booth at the diner and listening to the trance-like chorus reverberate—over and
over—is a fitting emblem for this section, in which the human instinct of communion is disabled
by its absorption into the scene or spectacle. Being consumed with as well as consumed by the
spectacle effectively paralyzes the character. The subject-object problematic of Theodore
Dreiser’s $ister Came and Sinclair Lewis’s Carol Kennicott is revisited with a vengeance, close
to the tum ofthe next century. In fact, Ellis states, “there’s this notion in Glamorama that
perhaps what you’re reading might in fact be a movie and that freed me up a bit. Toying with
that idea—is this real? is this a movie?—let me take chances” (Clarke 3). for Ellis, the motifs of
camera, movie studio, actors and models function in a manner that is similar to Carol Kennicott’s
envisioning of herself in the photograplis of Gopher Prairie, or the stage upon which people
corne in droves to “see Carrie’s frown” (Sister Carne 248). Ellis is intngued with the idea that
“we basically perform ail the time in our daily lives.” Dunng an interview, he says,
There’s so much surveillance in the world: in airports, banks, malis and this alters the
way we move and talk and interact with each other. It’s very subtie but there’s a degree
of acting going on in society. So I wanted to capture that and that performance idea
meshed with how dramatic the characters in the book act. (Clarke 3)
In twentieth century America, where every transaction is made more efficient, more secure or
more accessible, the theme of looking upon a scene logicaiiy transforms into a scene of
surveillance. But as individuals, in Ellis, have become ‘automated,’ they begin to resembie
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something of a human Automated Teller Machine, gazing out into the city streets and lacking the
ability to respond or interact. In contrast, Came and Carol Kennicott were engaged in visions of
their own interactions within society. Characters in Ellis, however, are disengaged from their
senses, or else, being emotionally detached from each other, are precluded from communicating
their own desires and fears. In his essay, “Makin’ flippy-floppy’: Postmodernïsm and the
Baby-Boom PMC,” Fred Pfeil attributes this unfortunate state ofhuman interaction to
[the] consumerized selfs endless construction, fragmentation and dissolution at the hands
of the invasive, ail-pervasive, media. . . . Otherwise the sheer confusion of contemporary
consciousness, our identification with different aspects of a fictive media, the odiously
intimate, constant consumption and recycling of mass fears and fantasies which
comprises the media process leads to a blurring of what we regard as the self and the loss
ofour capacity for authentic, autonomous action without the shadow of self
consciousness. (Pfeil 1990)
It is this “authentic, autonomous action” that traditionally signified the classical hero, in whom
the reader places ber admiration and respect. But the shadow of self-consciousness is a detriment
to true action, since every act in its undertaking requires so much processing that the choice to
maintain one’s composure smothers engagement. In Ellis, the resuit is that when the intent to
truly communicate, commune, with another, the individual expression is unable to hit its mark.
Most attempts are met with stares; however, even this “response” is not intended to commune, as
the stare is aiways aimed in another direction—the self or the spectacle. Mirrors, flashing lights,
animated images—these props, aiways written into Ellis’s scelles, threaten to conquer the
personality quotient when human characters fail to make an impression in the scene. In the
process, the individual seems “lost in thought”—though it would be more precise to say “lost in
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unthought”—while the dynamism ofthe spectacle, like a specter, seems always liovering, in
close proximity, ready to take possession ofthose who fail to impress themselves on the scene.
for Clay—whose name suggests “mundane” (something his psychiatrist accuses him ofbeing
[123]), and aiso, that which has yet to be molded, and gives no impression—this specter
manifests itself in the constant, striking fear that surrounds Los Angeles, as well as his more
personal shame. For Patrick Bateman, it takes the form ofthat “nameless dread” that follows him
everywhere, and seemingly presents itselfat even very innocuous moments. Yet, at the same
time, the divestiture ofthought, of compassion and ofhuman communion means that both
characters assume the role ofthe specter themselves. for Patrick and Clay, the inability to
commune because of the constant diversion of energies towards the spectacle of self leads to
decisions to act or not to act, each ofwhich holds grave consequences. For both characters, an
almost powerless absorption into the spectacle of commodity culture translates into a fixed stare
that immobolizes them.
Ellis’s characters betray a fascination with representations ofthe self, such as mirrors,
televisions, and even posters oftheir favourite rock musicians. Though these reflections
oftentimes are typically spectacular, the extreme individualistic behaviours that the characters
exhibit suggest that they are taking in the spectacle as expressions oftheir own personalities.
Afier ail, why eise do teens put posters of sports heroes and musicians on their walls but to be
that person, insert themselves into that particular spectacle? Thus, staring off into the distance at
these posters, music videos and other emanations of commodity culture, can be identified as an
act of consumption of the self. “Don’t Eat Yourself,” implores Coupland, in Generation X.
“Wonder fhe for sale” is a motif running through Clay’s mmd, and the novel, Less than Zero.
Later, listening to a song, he thinks of “Images of parents who were so hungry and unfulfilled
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they ate their own chiidren” (Less than Zero 207). And a warning: American Psycho ends with
the tag, “This is flot an exit” (399), although the neon sign “MEAT” above a prostitute in an
earlier scene—pointing to Patrick Bateman’s creation of murder as another purchasable
commodity for consumption (Walker, par. 9)—stands in opposition to this.
Ellis has identified people in a certain segment of society that have been absorbed into
the spectacle of themselves. This is symbolized by the mirrors and the emphasis on surfaces,
paradoxically, because whiie the characters are thoroughly absorbed by the scene, they are yet
deflected by the flatness of commodity culture that simply does not, and cannot, possess the
ability to contain. In American Psycho, this is described in an emblematic scene of American
culture in the twentieth century:
I have almost an overwhelming urge to walk in and browse through each aisle, fihling my
basket with botties ofbalsamic vinegar and sea sait, roam through the vegetable and
produce stands inspecting the color tones of red peppers and yellow peppers and green
peppers and purpie peppers, deciding what flavor, what shape gingerbread cookie to buy,
but I’m still longing for something deeper, something undefined. . . . (Arnerican Psycho
163)
The difference here is that, for Patrick, the attempt to find “something deeper, something
undefined” is through torture and murder. His stroli through the market—his idyll—also
complicates his urges. Eventually, he becomes frustrated by too many choices—”too rnany
fucking videos”—vying for bis attention in the Video Haven.
The movie video, the video game: these trendy products ofthe 8Os are important symbols
in Eliis’s works because they provide the imagery of commodification that he beiieves has come
to fil the void within Amencan youth. Liz Young notes that it is Ellis’s “expressed beliefthat
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only the most extreme and disruptive images or experiences can penetrate the bland vacuity of
his generation” (“Beast in the Jungle” 93). In fact, in American Psycho, the one thing that
interests Patrick—it may be too far to say that it gives him hope—is when someone appears to
have identified this void in him. When Evelyn attempts to pressure him to commit to marnage,
Patrick breaks up with her and, apparently, she becomes upset:
“You.. . are flot. . . .“ She stops, wiping lier face, unable to finish.
“I’m not wliat?” I ask, waiting, interested.
“You are not”—she sniffs, looks down, her shoulders heaving—”alI there.
You”—she chokes—”don’t add up.”
“I do too,” I say indignantly, defending myseif. “I do too add up.”
“You’re a ghoul,” she sobs.
“No, no,” I say, conftised, watching her. “You’re the ghoul.”
(American Psycho 343)
While Patrick is at first interested in seeing whether Evelyn will finally see things as they are, he
becomes confused because she accuses him of exactly what lie sees in her: emptiness. But
Patrick remains dismayed because, shortly afler this exchange, Evelyn “looks remarkably
composed. She’s been carefiul flot to let the tears, which actually I’ve just noticed are very few,
affect her makeup” (343).
In Less than Zero, Clay spends an aflemoon in an arcade, descnibing its dizzying
offenings in much the same way as Patnick describes hïs aftemoon in the grocery store:
Later, in the video arcade, Trent plays a game called Burger Time in which there are ail
these video hot dogs and eggs that chase around a short, bearded chef and Trent wants to
teach me liow to play, but I don’t want to. Ijust keep staning at the maniacal, wiggling
157
hot dogs and for some reason it’s just too much to take and I walk away, looking for
something else to play. But ail the games seem to deal with beetles and bees and moths
and snakes and mosquitoes and frogs drowning and mad spiders eating large purpie video
flues and the music that goes along with the games make me feel dizzy and gives me a
headache and the images are hard to shake off, even afler I leave the arcade. (199)
Clay is probably the most ‘sensitive’ ofEllis’s characters, though ail are in varying degrees
disaffected and detached. Ellis admits Clay disturbs him the most, since he is stili connected to
his feelings ofhumanity. “T don’t want to care,” he says to his giriffiend, Blair. “If I care about
things, it’d just be worse. It’ll just be another thing to worry about. It’s just less painful if I don’t
care” (205). Stiil, he cannot move to himselfto act, though he may feel that something should be
done and, in the end, his inaction inhibits his ability to perceive when the moral line is being
pushed back. With a paucity ofproofto constitute an inner life, Clay must be considered an
empty void moving through the city’s passageways, and taking in the most terrible images that
reality can offer, a nightmare version offiâônerie, in a slightly different arcade. “1 need to see the
worst,” he thinks, as he goes with his ffiend, Julian, to watch him prostitute hirnself. “I wonder
what the man and Julian are going to do. I teil myseif I could leave. I could simpiy say to the
man from Muncie and Julian that I want to leave. But, again, the words don’t, can’t, corne out
and I sit here and the need to see the worst washes over me, quickly, eagerly” (175). It is,
however, precisely this measuring and fabricating of an “extrerne” which an everyday sort of
violence and degradation goes unchecked against. The reader’s sense of morality tells her that
this scene is more hornd than the previous one in the video arcade. Yet, it is the video game that
makes Clay physically sick.
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In Ellis, the concept ofviewing, or more precisely starilzg, is an important one. In this
respect, it is helpful to refer to Susan Sontag’s distinction between looking and staring:
Consider the difference between looking and staring. A look is voluntary; it is also
mobile, rising and falling in intensity as its foci of interest are taken up and then
exhausted. A stare has, essentially, the character of a compulsion; it is steady,
unmodulated, “fixed.” (Sontag “The Aesthetics of Silence” 9)
Taking this definition into consideration, the repetition of staring throughout Ellis constitutes a
statement that his characters are caught up in or by something, and that it is out of their control.
There is no “rising and falling in intensity” as the characters exhaust the foci ofinterest because
the characters do not register any change in consciousness. Patrick’s urge is to consume the
experiences of killing and torturing (corresponding to the late twentieth-century trend ofbuying
experiences, such as skydiving, commando runs, etc., in which your life is on the une), just as
the avcrage consumer is fihled with urges to consume imagery in the form ofproduct. In Less
than Zero, Clay needs to see Julian, and certainly seems a conflicted though attentive observer.
The character’s undivided attention is compelled by the imagery of commodification,
such that any attempt at interaction between characters, at true communion,—verbat, visual or
physical—is thwarted by the demands of the distraction. This is fiirther exacerbated by things
that deftect and mirror surfaces. In American Psycho, much ofthe ‘surface’ is constituted in the
social chit-chat and everyday conversation in which Patnck engages. for the most part, any two
characters who speak to cadi other mistake or simply do not perceive each other. They involve
themselves in conversation only “by rote,” as Patrick often says, that is, they perceive only what
they expect to hear or happen in the conventions of everyday life. So when Patrick teils a girl that
he is in “murders and executions,” she hears “mergers and acquisitions” (American Psycho 206).
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When Paul Owen telis him how lie got the Fisher case, Patrick “[keeps] nodding, pretending that
this primitive info is revelatory and says[s] things like ‘That is enlightening’ whule at the same
time telling him “I’m utterly insane” and “I like to dissect girls” (216). Indeed, these characters,
as Ellis says, are involved only with “surface transaction.” Essentially, the individualistic quality
of contemporary society has blown over into something beyond narcissism, whereupon people
simply are not there even for the most nominal exchange with others. These ‘walls’ between
people are apparent in a scene in which Patrick is speaking to a doorman at lis building:
When I bnng my head backup to see if any of this lias registered I’m greeted by the
expressionless mask of the doorman’s heavy, stupid face. I am a ghost to this man, I’m
thinking. I am sornething unreal, something not quite tangible, yet still an obstacle of
sorts and he nods, gets back on the phone, resumes speaking in a dialect totally alien to
me. (71)
And, yet, this is how the majority ofthe world’s transactions proceed; nobody realÏy hears or
conceives what the other is saying. Patrick is unreal, a ghost; however, members of society have
all become specters because in consuming products in order to project a certain ‘image,’ they
have ended up deflecting the possibility ofliuman correspondence in exchange for an
appreciative look. If as Jay Mclnerney says in This is Not an Exit, reading American Psycho was
like “flipping through the pages of Vogue magazine,” then in truth, the characters are alt models,
and therefore, not paid to speak. Models, like these characters, have nothing beyond the literal
outlines of their bodies on the flat page. What ‘inner life’ could they possibly have? Ellis gives
the reader the following example, in which Evelyn asks Patrick, “Where are you going?” In
response, Patrick thinks,
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I make no comment, lost in my own private maze, thinking about other things: warrants,
stock offerings, ESOPs, LBOs, IPs, finances, refinances, debentures, converts, proxy
statements, 8-Ks, 1 O-Qs, zero coupons, PiKs, GNPs, the IMf, hot executive gadgets,
billionaires, Kenkichi Nakajima, inflnity, Infinity, how fast a luxury car should go,
bailouts, junk bonds, whether to cancel my subscription to The Economist, the Christmas
when I was fourteen and had raped one of our maids, Inclusivity, envying someone’s life,
whether someone could survive a ftactured skuÏl, waiting in airports, stifling a scream,
credit cards and someone’s passport and a book of matches from La Cote Basque
splattered with blood, surface surface surface, a Rolis is a Roils is a Rolis. To Evelyn our
relationship is yellow and blue, but to me it’s a gray place, most of it blacked out,
bombed, footage from the film in my head is endless shots of stone and any language
heard is utterly foreign, the sound fiickering away over new images: blood pouring from
automated tellers, women giving birth through their assholes, embryos frozen or
scrambled (which is it?), nuclear warheads, billions of dollars, the total destruction ofthe
world, someone gets beaten up, someone else dies, sometimes bloodlessly, more oflen
mostly by rifle shot, assassinations, comas, life played out as a sitcom, a blank canvas
that reconfigures itselfinto a soap opera. It’s an isolation ward that serves only to expose
my own severely impaired capacity to feel. I am at its center, out of season, and no one
ever asks me for any identification. . . If I were an actual automaton, what difference
would there really be? (342-3)
Beyond the surface, beyond superficiality, the reader is finally presented with an expenence of
Patrick’s free-thinking unconscious—not the how-to’s ofmurder which his consciousness
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contains. Here, in the depths ofPatrick’s mmd, there is only—”surface surface surface”—more
imagery to consume. There is no inner life here, only perhaps a parody of one.
In Less than Zero, the reader tends to think that some degree of inner life stili inhabits the
form that is Clay. Yet, the bits of conversation and the sensationalistic imagery he observes
resound in his head until, certainly, it approaches the parody of Patrick Bateman’s interiority. In
a scene very similar to that between Patrick and the doorman, Clay experiences a sudden fear
that he, too, is invisible. He thinks,
Eyes suddenly focus in on the eyes of a small, dark, intense-looking guy wearing a
Universal Studios T-shirt sitting two booths across from me. He’s staring at me and I
look down and take a drag, a deep one, off the cigarette. The man keeps staring at me and
ail I can think is either he doesn’t see me or I’m not here. I don’t know why I think that.
People are afraid to merge. Wonder tfhe for sale. (26)
In Less than Zero, nobody looks anyone else in the eye, whether they are close, personal friends
or strangers. The fact that Clay omits the “My,” or doesn’t say, simpiy, “I focus in,” at the
beginning ofthis inner monologue means that the reader gets a filmic image ofClay’s eyes
before constructing the image of the stranger’s eyes. It is as if the vast expanse ofClay’s
mindscape is so distracted that he literally forgets himselfbecause his consciousness first
identifies an objective view ofhis own eyes, flot the subjectivity that he supposedly inhabits.
CÏay’s subjectivity, however, is flot one that impresses itsetfupon the scene. More likely,
it tends to seek out scenes in which he may lose himself: “Disappear here” is a motif that repeats
throughout the novel. It first appears in the opening scene, where Clay notices it on a billboard
for a hot vacation spot. Thereafter, the biilboard, along with other images on posters and in
advertising, seems to haunt him. In his own room, he stares at a Beach Boys poster, “trying to
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remember which one died” (50); another time, he describes himself staring at an Elvis Costello
promotional poster:
The word “Trust” hovering over his head, and his sunglasses, one lens red, the other blue,
pushed down past the ridge ofhis nose so that you can see his eyes, which are slightly off
center. The eyes don’t look at me, though. They only look at whoever’s standing by the
window, but I’m too tired to get up and stand by the window. (11)
More ofien than not, Clay is so consumed with staring at something that he cannot take part in
conversations, however simplistic. When Trent asks him to go to a movie, Clay thinks, “It takes
me a littie while to say anything because there’s a video on cable of a building being blown up in
slow motion and in black and white” (100). Here, it is apparent that the human connection is
waylaid in favour of the image. When Clay visits a record store, he “stare[s] at the covers and
before [he] realize[sÏ it, an hour’s passed and it’s almost dark outside” (94). Again, flipping
through a Ptayboy magazine, he “start[s] to space out and stare[s] at the framed poster for the
“Hotel California” album; at the hypnotizing blue lettering; at the shadow ofthe palms” (111).
But Clay is flot the only one. At a party, he says,
I lean against a wall and break out into a cold sweat and there’s a young guy who I sort of
recognize sitting in a chair staring at me from across the room and I stare back, confused,
wondering if he knows me, but I realize it’s pointless. That guy is stoned and doesn’t see
me, doesn’t see anything. (181)
Clay isjust as unsure about bis friend, Daniel, who could be “staring in the water [of the pool] or
just passed out” (55). 0f course, the constant presence of sunglasses on both Clay’s parents
as well as bis girlfriend, Blair, gives them an equally effective method of neyer looking another
person in the eye. This fixed, yet unseeing, gaze is reminiscent of T. S. Eliot’s “staring forms” in
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“The Wasteland.” They are suggestive of wasted attempts to commune and, ultimately, wasted
lives. The staring form is found throughout the novel, but reaches emphatic peaks when Clay is
urged by a friend to see a kidnapped girl tied to a bed, and again, when he is brought by the
friend to see a dead body in the alley. One of the other kids who corne to see the body “sticks a
cigarette into the dead boy’s rnouth and they look at that for five minutes” (185).
But Clay does flot necessarily need sensationalistic scenes to be just as intensely taken by
it. Fie is equally rnesmerized by his own reflection in minors, by the ocean, by the flashing lights
ofthe Valley, or by scenes ofdegradation and death. Fie stares blankly, waiting to identify, or
waiting to be identified, and thus give body to himself. The novel provides the reader a kind of
limbo, where characters are utterly consurned with the scene and, finally—mesmerized—fall into
complete and unconscious flatness.
In both of these novels, Ellis presents moments in which the main characters are given a
shred ofhope to believe that someone will finally identify them for who they are: mere personas.
At dinner with Evelyn, Patrick suddenly experiences a thrill of sensation because he thinks that
bis girifriend bas finally corne to a position where she is willing to “acknowledge [hisj
character”: “for the first tirne since I’ve known her she is straining to say sornething interesting
and I pay very close attention” (121). But Evelyn only interrupts to ask whether it is Ivana
Trurnp at a nearby table. Later, when she telis him how she imagines their wedding ceremony, he
says,
“I’d want to bring a Harrison AK-47 assault rifle to the ceremony. .. . “Or an AR-15.
You’d like it, Evelyn: it’s the most expensive of guns, but worth every penny.” I wink at
ber. But she’s stili taiking; she doesn’t hear n word; nothing registers. She does not fully
grasp a word I’rn sayïng. My essence is eluding her.” (124)
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But Patrick’s “essence” is simply more surface.
Similarly, Blair telis Clay, when they were dating, “it was like you weren’t there” (204).
In response, Clay “stud[ies} the biltboard”. . . . [and thinks] “Disappear Here.” He pretends flot
to hear lier. She continues, “Other people made an effort and you just. . . it was just beyond
you.” Before this, he “starts making paranoid connections” when Blair mentions the film,
Invasion ofthe Body Snatchers (141). The implication is that there is an original Clay and that,
inside the cardboard spectacle, he is a thinking, feeling, human character, whose purity of
essence eventually will shine through. However, Clay is not simply “aftaid to merge”; lie is
unable to. Fuis writes,
People aftaid to merge on fteeways in Los Angeles. This is the first thing t liear when I
corne back to the city... . Though that sentence shouldn’t bother me, it stays in my mmd
for an uncomfortably long time. Nothing else seems to matter. (9)
The reason why this sentence haunts Clay throughout the nove! is flot because he is afraid to
merge, or commune, with anotlier, but because lie suspects lie cannot. Invasion ofthe Body
Snatchers makes him “paranoid” because, just as Patrick suspects that he is just as vapid as the
ernpty video box lie takes to the counter at Video Haven, Clay distrusts the conjecture ofhis own
humanity. Even the Elvis Costello poster, commanding him to “TRUST,” cannot convince him.
lii. Making Do:
Character as Overblown, Aporefic and Missing-in-Action
A neon-lit Christ stands forlomly in the background. ‘You feel confused. You feel
ftustrated,’ [the television evangelistj teils me. ‘You don’t know what’s going on. You
feel hopeless, helpless. That’s what you feel there is no way out ofthe situation. But
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Jesus will corne. He will corne through the eye of that television screen.... [L]et this be
a night of Deliverance. (Less than Zero 140)
As Clay listens to the preacher on TV, the reader is set up for the “deliverance” that will bring
Clay back to the living. The expectation is that the character will find some way out of the
situation, though he feels boxed in by the trappings ofhis everyday life in a highly commodified
culture. That is what a hero is: “a good example”.. . “an idol”. . . . A mode!.
But the fashion models of Vogue rnagazine and the models ofclassical literature are not
so heroic. They foÏlow mies, traditions and conventions. As Ellis says, models do nothing but
stand around and do what tliey’re told. This, lie says, about his nove!, Glamorama, is why they
make good terrorists. The true terror in American Psycho and Less than Zero, then, is flot the
visceral carnage or sexual degradation: it is the terror of having to decide for oneseif, without the
old forms, what a particular character means.
A truc hero, in fact, is “a conqueror” who breaks down musty, old idols. Someone who
tmly embodies the vitality of life, which, in itself, is an unquantifiabie essence. The vitality of
!ife, in narrative, is as unexpected and unpreprogrammed as real life is. It forces the reader to
think and create new pathways in narratival expectation. Thus, the “way out of the situation” is
to flot give in to the easy association that the reader—through expenence and knowledge of the
old forms—will provide, “as if by rote.” The way out of the situation, as Miche! de Certeau
suggests, is to remove the old forms ftom these “heroes who lose narnes and faces as they
become the ciphered river of the streets” (de Certeau y). After ail, as Bono, the iead singer ofthe
band U2, is misheard by Patrick Baternan, “A hero is an insect in this world” (146) of
convention.
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Ellis utilizes three approaches to destabilizing these old fonus and, thus, revitalizing
character. These are (1) the overblown character in which excess cannot be accommodated; (2)
the aporetic character that precludes the reader from predicting behaviours and actions from the
evidence, which would provide a characterological guide or map such that, in any given
situation, the reader would be able to deduce logically what the character would do next, based
on what the character has done in the past; and (3) the character that is missing-in-action, that is,
a character whose situation, setting, psychology, and so forth, are clearly set out for the reader,
while there are indications that the outer life ofthe character does flot match up with the inner
life.
For the characters in American Psycho and Less than Zero, the “Me generation” culture
of drugs, MTV and excess guarantees that there is no consensual “reality” to be found. For
example, while some readers find that there is simply no agreed-upon “reality” in Arnerican
Psycho because there are many sections which cannot be definitively classified as fact or fantasy,
others insïst it is more “realistic” than would have been a more sanitized version ofthe novel
because the experience of visceral reaction to the wnting is more “real” than a repetition of
readerly reactions that have been well-studied and well-honed.
The Overblown
Overblown characters create a skewed effect that prevents the reader from easy
accommodations. This approach to interpretation stems from the ideas of Teresa de Lauretis and
Elaine Marks. De Lauretis’s approach to breaking stereotypical roles, taking off from that of
Marks, cails for “a reinscrib{ing] in excess—as excess—in provocative counterimages
sufficiently outrageous, passionate, verbally violent and formally complex” to destroy the
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stereotypes (27). In other words, this approach “makes strange” or defamiliarizes by allowing
recognition while preventing cognition. Thus readerly assumption is problematized. This
overblown character is presented in so fantastic a manner that it is difficuit to accommodate it to
the known types without feeling as if the character is putting on a show, just as Patrick Bateman
states emphatically, tofit in. What occurs is a masquerade, since the character only feigns
compliance with the act. This ends, essentially, in the reader’s inability to completely process the
character, to really know the character by understanding his motivations, limitations and desires,
in short, his psychological makeup. According to Georges Bataille, excess is “that which
challenges a closed economy Q,redicated on utility, production and rational consumption)”
(Walker, par. 5). Since the average reader is exposed through media imagery to serial killers,
cold-blooded murderers and the insane so much, she is accustomed to the concept of them; they
bear no threat to the closed system. On the other hand, the detail and graphic nature of
Bateman’s killings have the function first of refiising to elide details which become
uncornfortable at first, and hon-ific later; and second, of slowing down the acquisition of a mental
picture, 5° that the horror is truly feit—this carmot 5e grouped together with those more sanitized
‘horror’ flicks made for commercial audiences that provide only a momentary thrill orfrisson,
and typically—based on the suspense or the expectation ofworse—leaves the audience feeling
relaxed and open to the laughter of relief. Increasingly frenzied situations remove the cool
collectedness of3ateman’s outer layer and, as opposed to the gruesome act, introduce a cartoon
like quality to the scenes, because of their frantic and uncontrolled nature. His personal
escapades are hyperbolic, ofien approaching hilanty because they spoof on received ideas of
“murder.” Ben Walker finds that Patnck Bateman is “the embodiment of the postmodem
condition of superfluity; money is flot used for basic material satisfaction but for perpetual
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excess and inhuman ends” (par. 5). But ït is Ellis, as weIl, who becomes the embodiment of
superfluity, using literary convention and traditional reader expectation notfor basic narratival
satisfaction, but for some other, opposite end. In contrast, Walker writes, “pornography is used
to obtain climax, it strives for a perfection, a seriousness, an absolute.” But ElIis’s writing does
strive for perfection, leaving gaps and inconsistencies throughout 80 that readers are called upon
to adjust their understanding of the story tofit into traditional systems of cognition. Thus, the
choice is forced upon the reader, who may either identify the ways in which the character
conforms to type, or the ways in which the character departs from it. But a reading that allows
Patnck to conform to type would be an incomplete and, therefore, faulty one. To understand his
character, one must examine the ways in which it departs from type.
It is fitting, then, when at a party Patnck mentions that “spooky photographs by Cindy
Sherman Iined the walls everywhere” (279). Sherman’s works are known for attacking
stereotypical assumptions through the use ofexaggeration and caricature. Her self-portraits
feature herseif in multiple stereotypical roles, but because she ensures that the adoption of the
role is neyer fulïy complete, the reader’s assignation of identity to Sherman is neyer realized. She
accomplishes this by presenting herseif in a way that unsetties the viewer: she is neyer absolutely
‘the housewife’ or ‘the sexpot’; there is aiways something in her presentation that belies the easy
appearance of type. The resuit—of allowing information into the scene that contradicts initial
appearances—is an eventual vacating of lier ‘identity.’ Perhaps this is why Patrick finds her
photographs “spooky.” The shifting images refer only to each other, neyer to an ‘inner’ self or
personality. While indicative of a thoroughly postmodern aesthetic, Sherman’s work also
reminds the reader of Ellis’s description of his writing as a compilation of “surface transactions.”
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In essence, Ellis and Sherman are working on the same project, though one is labeied a feminist
and the other is labeled a misogynist.
The major conceit running through American Psycho is that of Patrick Bateman, the
psychokiller. But, as Ruth Helyer points out,
[I]n much the same way as the traditional Gothic tales, {Patrick’s] frightening side is so
excessive it can border on the comical. He seems to “act up” to his psychotic tag at every
opportunity. At one point, havingjust finished murdering a passer-by and eviscerating his
dog, he lets out his ecstatic “high” by streaming tiwough the streets in his $4000 black
leather designer trench coat, thinking, “I’m running. . . . screaming like a banshee, my
coat open, flying out behind me like some kind of cape” (166). He is self-consciousiy
frightening, and feels incredibly powerful, even invincible, due to bis abulity to distance
himself from the action, yet stili enjoy partaking of it, as a resuit of parodying himseif.
His larger-than-life capacities are emphasized again when he attacks Bethany:
“{E]ffortlessly I’m leaping in front ofher, blocking her escape, knocking lier unconscious
with four blows to the head from the nail gun” (245). When lie describes how evil and
dangerous he is feeling, his biatant honesty is taken by the conditioned reader as
melodrama: “I feit lethal, on the verge of frenzy. My nightly bioodlust overflowed into
my days and I had to leave the city. My mask of sanity was a victim of impending
siippage. This was the bone season for me and I needed a vacation.” (730-31)
The resuit is flot terrifying, at ail; rather, Patrick is seen as a humorous figure, providing the
comic relief necessary to momentarily remove or compartmentalize the scenes in which he
expresses no mercy. for example, when he needs to dispose of a body, he does it so that a
maximum number ofpeople see him in this compromising situation. Patrick’s clownish
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buffoonery reveals that he is flot adeptly skilled in murder. Patnck knows much more about
luxury products than murder and intrigue. Ellis writes,
[Ajfter wrapping [the body] up in four cheap terry-cloth towels I also bought at the
Conran’s Memorial Day sale, I place Owen head-first and fully dressed into a Canalino
goose-down sleeping bag, which I zip up then drag easily in to the elevator then through
the lobby, past the night doorman, down the block, where briefly I run into Arthur Crystal
and Kitty Martin, who’ve just had dinner at café Luxembourg. Luckily Kitty Martin is
supposed to be dating Craig Mcdermott, who is in Houston for the night, so they don’t
linger, even though Crystal—the rude bastard—asks me what the general rules of
wearing a white dinner jacket are. Afier answering him curtly, I hail a taxi, effortlessly
manage to swing the sleeping bag into the backseat, hop in and give the driver the
address in Helis Kitchen. Once there, I carry the body up four flights of stairs until we’re
at the unit I own in the abandoned building... . (219)
That Patrick is so sensitive to consider Arthur Crystal a “rude bastard” for extending the forms of
etiquette is hularious, especially since Patrick is swinging a dead body in a sleeping bag. That
Arthur and Kitty simply do not notice the lumpy sleeping-bag makes this a comic scene. But
Patrick’s ability to consistently focus on brand name and catalog-like description—even in the
midst ofmurder—is absurd. Patrick does not allow the reader to accept him as a murderer who
must be feared because he is always too delicately wrapped up in ascertaining the label of a
clothing item or the gauge of a fine knit. The focus, then, is not so much on what constitutes
reality but on what is really important in contemporary Amencan life. Human life is overtaken,
again and again, by the need to own the latest style ofsunglasses, or the most coveted dinner
reservations. What is real, or what should be important, is continuously called into question.
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Later, he becomes the focus ofa high-speed police chase in a typical, and strangely incidentai,
cop-and-robbers scene. At this juncture in the story, Young writes, “the novel seems to enter into
a parodic version ofa cop-killer thriller” (“Beast in the Jungle” 114). 0f this scene, HeÏyer
writes, “the action accelerates into a ‘cops and robbers’ type chase, compiete with tires
screeching, bullets ricocheting, and innocent people dying” (741). But it doesn’t realty matter—
Patrick is not taken into custody, nobody knows about bis police dbase and, indeed, nobody
believes it when he tel Is them. Regardless ofhow many times the narrative literally ‘jump-cuts’
into different genres, none of these genres is able to infuse the story with the tme sense ofdrama
and tension the reader needs in order to believe in the narrative’s ‘reality.’ As a resuit, Patrick’s
narration ofhis supposed reality cornes across as unhelievable and comical.
Another example of Patrick’s overblown character is in the presentation ofover-the-top
‘stock’ elements. Ruth Helyer writes, “Gothic characters are typically highiy stereotyped and
Patrick is no exception, teetering precariously between categories the reader can easily
recognize” (728). Indeed, Patrick dispÏays the proper accoutrements ofa gothic madman curn
master. For example, his parents are a suitably unknown and mysterious entity: his mother is in a
psychologicai institution; his father bas “something wrong with his eyes” (366). The question of
his money is mysterious, as well, since it is not specified how Patrick became so rich that he does
not need to work, except to suggest that lis father owns “haifofWali Street.” As well, Patrick’s
own “work” can be seen as mystifying; he does flot do anything, though he has the “work space”
of an office, secretary, and desk, and when he is asked why he works on several occasions, he is
defensive, daims to “hate it,” and “chang[es] the subject.” But Helyer also points out that Patnck
fits the profile ofother standard characters, as weil: he is the spoiled and aimless son ofthe
wealthy, the vain egotist with ‘model’ good looks, the serial killer, the “tali, dark, and handsome
172
leading man” (728). The choice to present Patrick in several stereotyped ways means a constant
battie in the reader’s mmd to adjust and re-adjust the information already gathered on this
character. Obviously, “romantic heroes” do flot usually commit heinous crimes of torture and
murder. Definitely, murderers do flot use Clinique facial scrub and worry about aging. They do
flot imagine themselves in commercials for wine coolers or tanning lotion, holding the product
up to the camera (372). They do flot “buy balloons and . . . let them go” (266) in a comy
representation ofhappiness and couples in love. Certainly, as in Clay’s case, they do not express
dissatisfaction with their given roles, suspecting that “{l]ove affairs are fiction, or psychodramas
in which the protagonists assume roles culled from collective conscious, the flickering,
fluctuating fictions of fashion and film” (Young, “Vacant Possession” 38). So, when Clay
escaped with Blair on their romantic retreat, they shouid not have succumbed to their eventual
boredom, becoming irritated with each other, but should have fallen in love instead, given the
wine, the beach, and ail the necessary accoutrements that traditionally translate into Romance.
These inconsistencies, however, work to overcome the stereotypes and assumptions that readers
begin to “tack” onto characters as soon as they begin reading. It makes the reader’s job ail the
more intensive, but also, ail the more rewarding.
To the same end, the language Ellis often uses to move between scenes lends a filmic—
thus, distanced—quality to the narrative. Scene changes are signaled by a “slow dissolve” (7), or
“smash cut” (11). Later, he describes a scene as opening with “a smash cut from a horror
movie—a jump zoom” (292).” Patnck ofien shifis between “I” and “you,” and even refers to
himself as “him” at highly stressful moments. Added to the moments when he questions whether
he is asleep or awake, the question of the “reality” ofthe narrative is again pressed. Ben Walker
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writes that if novelists continue in the employment of “forms of domination, exploitation then
what has been ‘liberated’?” He finds,
Arnerican Psycho is redeemed by Ellis’ purposefiti exaggeration. The author lets Patrick
Bateman colonise the narrative to such an extent that it is a constant challenge to the
reader to transcend, resist. There are occurrences in the text that are ‘too-obvious’ for
Ellis not to be ‘aware’, for example the author places one particular prostitute girl in front
ofthe sign “MEAT.” This comic-strip hyperreality cannot be treated in the same way as
realism. (par. 8)
Thus, in determining the realism ofthe narrative, the reader must take into consideration the
elements of description that do flot necessarily cali attention to themselves—like the sign that
reads “MEAT”—during scenes ofmurder or surface transactions. One constant element in the
novel is the increasing accommodation on the part of the reader while reading the many dinner
scenes. first, the securing of tables at trendy restaurants gives Patnck more of an “adrenaline
rush” than his many murders (75). Mostty, however, the elaboration ofthe presentation and
dining room create a picture oftypical extravagance, until the menu is discussed. Are these
“real” meals that assault the reader’s mmd? Characters mix meals ofchicken in between absurd
sounding entrees, including “free-range squid” (95), “mud soup” and “charcoal arugula” (214).
finally, there is an exchange between the waiter and Patrick:
“. . . and for entrees we have monkfish with mango suces and red snapper sandwich on
brioche with maple syrup and”—he checks his pad again—”cotton.”
“Mmmm, sounds delicious. Cotton, mmmm,” I say, rubbing my hands together eagerly.
(235)
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One may almost overlook the fact that the waiter may simply have rnisread his notepad because
the outrageousness—mock—nature of the foods served in these dinner scenes has already been
established. Thus, when Patrick Bateman says that he appreciates the art of David Onica because
“it has a kind of. . . wonderfully proportioned, purposefully mock-superficial quality,” the reader
must take this information and make itfit in with the narrative so far. “Purposefully rnock. . .
Patrick repeats, and Ellis’s approach to characterization cornes into focus.
The Aporetic
It has been established that the necessary boundary between reality and fantasy is
problernatized in Ellis. Because ofthe sketchy nature ofthis boundary, so rnuch that is
‘naturaÏly’ taken for granted in traditional storytelling is lost. A solid, ‘full’ character cannot be
forrned, making it impossible for the reader to assemble the elements needed to construct an
understanding of the character, to validate certain readerly expectations and, eventually, to be
able to envision conclusion. To this end, Ellis’s use of the present tense in American Psycho and
Less than Zero actively resists conclusivity by consistently pushing the past away and remaining
in the immediate present. There is nothing that is ‘known’ with respect to a goal or outcome;
everything is aiways on the verge of happening. A sense ofthe aleatory reigns because anything
can present itself, at any given moment; the character has no control over the narrative and,
moreover, no self-control. The reader cannot know what he is capable of, or whether he is
capable of anything at alt. In this way, the reader is precluded from total and absolute
consumption of the literary character, precisely because she cannot know without a doubt what
future choices he would make. Since these characters do flot build towards any one type, the
reader cannot know what to expect from the character. Then, one really cannot describe a given
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action as being typical of any character; on the other hand, actions do flot corne across to the
reader as surprising or out of character either, since the reader has failed to formulate
expectations which govern her reading one way or the other. This glides dangerously into
territory in which the reader simply does flot care what the character does. So when the reader
does carry on, what is her rnotivation for following the story? What pulls the reader forward, if
flot character developrnent? Can it simply be the machinery of the narrative, itself lacking in
personal investment? Is the uncovering of consequences of actions so interesting as to keep the
reader reading; in fact, can it be, in some cases, that the intrigue in the narrative is not the
consequence to the character, but rnerely the consequence itself?
The aporetic character embodies a set of conflicting proofs that present insurmountable
obstacles to satisfactory resolution. for the average reader, a satisfactory resolution is a
traditional one that setties most or ail ofthe conflicted modes ofpersonality in narrative. This is
traditionally done in a manner that adds complexity to a character, thus, making it more real. But
the characters found in Ellis are rife with contradictions that are ultimately unresolvable. Their
decision-making processes are unknown to the reader because choices seem arbitrary or
dependent only upon chance or extemal factors. Because characters in novels build towards
some kind ofenlightenment, the lack or inconclusivity ofthis achievement in the character oflen
means, as well, that the narrative lacks resolution. But so many loose ends in the narrative as
well as in the character’s motivations—while a “messier” story—also means to many readers a
more ‘realistic’ presentation. Things seem to happen for no reason, and human questions and
doubts remain unanswered over the course of many lifetimes. Accordingly, the perfected,
pristine qualities of the conflict, the complication, the quest, the love interest, the hero, the
climax and the denouement are no longer valorized as the essential trademarks ofa ‘good’ story.
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However, the issue of satisfaction cornes up once again, for the accustomed ways ofprocessing
information in the story are stili the ones with which most readers approach fiction. Thus, as in
the use of overblown conventions, the aporetic character or plot point depends upon a received
framework of classical knowledge. So while “we are dealing with an unknown entity” in Patrick
(Helyer 733), he is only really unknown because it becomes truly difficult to differentiate
between the monster that he seems and the almost equal degree of casual brutality that is slowly
uncovered about other members ofthis society. For example, when Patrick interrupts a “Wall
Street guy” in the men’s room writing “Kili Ail Yuppies” on the wall, the message is that several
or ail ofthe people he meets socially are also living the life that he lives: one of”surface
interaction,” an exchange ofrnasks. The only variable is the degree to which the edges oftheir
social masks approach one another. Later, when he retums to the apartment in which he has
murdered and lefi several bodies, he has no method ofdealing with the knowledge that is settiing
upon him that the pleasant female sales agent has cleaned up the grisly site and covered up the
murders to ensure a hefty profit on her unit. He becomes as mortified as the reader in the face of
this “business-casual” inhumanity. If Patnck acts insane, then how much worse are the
supposedly sane agent’s actions? As Helyer writes, “if [Patrick] cannot identify himself against
the likes ofthe real estate agent, then lis boundaries become detached and free-floating” (729).
If he is the “American psycho,” then how can he sustain this distinction, if the reai estate agent
herselfcommits acts that are just as horrific? Does EItis’s flrst chapter titie, “April fools,” mean
to suggest that Patrick Bateman is not 50 different ftorn everybody else?
The sketchiness ofthe character is made worse by elements in the narrative that are
casually introduced and given no further explanation, though some is required. Eventuaily, it has
to be accepted by the reader that Patrick’s role of the narrator is played as unreliable. But the
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onus of credibility shifis from under the reader’s focus and begins eroding more tangible,
‘factual’ elements. For example, Patrick mentions his favounte talk show, The Patty Winters
Show, alrnost every day, documenting each topic. As the narrative progresses, topics such as an
interview with Bigfoot, or an interview with a Cheerio force the reader to question how rnany of
the other shows mentioned were faise. But when Patrick mentions topics such as DwarfTossing,
the reader can no longer decide whether this is a fiction or a recounting of a ‘true’ event in
Patrick’s everyday reality. There are also several mentions ofdreaming, or even hallucinating,
that further eau into question which events in Patrick’s life are ‘real’ or fiction. He thinks,
I haliucinate the buildings into mountains, into volcanoes, the streets becorne jungles, the
sky freezes into a backdrop, and before stepping out ofthe cab, I have to cross my eyes in
order to clear rny vision. Lunch at Hubert’s becomes a permanent hallucination in which
I find myselfdreaming whule stiil awake. (86)
On another occasion, he describes throwing up on an acquaintance—who irnprobably remains
“unfazed”—and thinks, “Oh God, this is a nightmare” (152). At a restaurant, he is “wearing a
tuxedo for no apparent reason” ami the biil stiil cornes to $300 even though they are at a
restaurant with crayons on the tables (166). Evelyn is asking hirn questiona that “belong only in
someone’s nightrnare” (167). Later, he meets a colleague on the street:
Afier he says, “Hey, Davis,” I inexplicably start listing the names of ail eight reindeer,
aiphabetically, and when I’ve finished, he srniles and says, “Listen, there’s a Christrnas
party at Nekenieh on the twentieth, see you there?” I smiie and assure him 1’ll be at
Nekenieh on the twentieth and as I waik off, nodding to no one, I eau back to him, “Hey
asshole, I wanna watch you die, motherfuck-aaahhh,” and then I start screaming like a
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banshee, moving across Fifty-eight, banging my Bottega Veneta briefcase against a wall.
(17$)
The frequent mentions of dreams, combined with these descriptions of meetings with apparently
normal people who do flot react properly to the events that Patnck daims are happening, furthers
the instability in the narrative. A suggestion, of course, is that members of society are so
individualistic that they do not waste a moment of consciousness on anyone else, and thus,
actually do not notice any ofthe abnormal things Patrick says or does. But ignoring the words of
an acquaintance on the street is believeable while ignonng fresh vomit on oneseif is not. The
question of whether certain scenes actually occur or flot is a constant in Ellis. The reader is
compelled to review the elements from a narrative continually resisting accommodation, but
many of the points simply are not conclusive, leaving the reader to wonder which ones were
indeed April Fools’ jokes.
The titie of the first chapter—April Fools—has two connotations: the first is that Patrick
is pulling a joke on the other characters in the nove!. He presents himself as a very successful,
handsome and normal man, with a solid group of friends and acquaintances. He leads an envied
life. But his ability to pull off another life, one in which he embodies the absolute depths of
inhumanity, allows him to feel he is ‘April fooling’ society. On the other hand, as the narrative
progresses, he begins to uncover a variety ofdetails about his friends and acquaintances that
destabilize this conceit. He begins to notice his girlffiend’s “Jack of camality” (334), and it “fus
[him] with a nameless dread” (336). Upon this realization, he asks her, “Why are you constantly
undermining my stability?” suggesting that he feels his way oflife is being threatened by the
inhuman quality in her that he usually attributes to himself. Again, if he cannot use others as a
“backdrop” against which he may construct a self, he fails apart. Whether this is a literary
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supposition or a psychological one, ultimately, he will deconstruct himself The quest ofthe
subject is to impress his individuality upon the world by constructing borders that separate him
from the rest of society and therefore valorize him; but, ironically, Patrick’s borders lay on the
shifting sands of commodity culture, and this is what threatens to topple his construction.
But the most interesting point upon which readers are bound to focus is whether the
character will choose to be good or evil. Even given the horrific acts that Patnck perpetrates on
society, the reader—if she chooses to read on—has been trained to look for certain things. One
ofthese things is redemption: will he see the error ofhis ways, find God or hope, and “let love
in?” The absurdity ofthis notion is yet balanced by the strength ofthe formula that has
constituted most ofhis storytelling. The necessary elements are present. lis secretary, Jean, is a
“good girl” who, like a baim for his tortured sou!, will save him, many him—change him. At
one point, he seems tired of the ki!ling, and telis a woman lie lias just slept with that she shou!d
go home or she might get hurt. She says, “Alright. I don’t want to get too involved anyway”
(213), and leaves. But the question is whether Patnck does this because he is tiring ofhis
lifesty!e, !osing the bloodlust—or whether this is just an arbitrary action, just as sense!ess as one
ofhis unrnotivated murders.
The climax ofPatrick’s despair at his meaningless exchanges is the action scene in which
he shoots a police officer and is chased by the police. He manages to make it to his office, is
relieved in the sanctuary of its “anonymity” and, apparently wanting to end this life of chaos and
murder, he phones his lawyer and makes a confession over the phone:
I decide to make public what has been, until now, my private dementia, but
Harold isn’t in, business, London, I leave a message, admitting everything leaving
nothing out, thirty, forty, a hundred murders, and whi!e I’m on the phone with Haroïd’s
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machine a helicopter with a searchlight appears, flying low over the river, lightning
cracks the sky open in jagged boits behind it, heading toward the building I was last at,
descending to land on the building’s roof across from this one, the bottom of the building
surrounded already by police cars, two ambulances, and a SWAT team leaps out of the
helicopter, a haif-dozen armed men disappear into the entrance on the deck of the roof,
flares are lined up what seems like everywhere, and I’m watching ail ofthis with the
phone in my hand, crouched by my desk, sobbing though I don’t know why, into
Harold’s machine, “I lefi her in a parking lot. . . near a Dunkin’ Donuts. . . somewhere
around midtown. . .“ and finally, afier ten minutes ofthis, I sign off by concluding, “Uh,
I’m a pretty sick guy,” then hang up, but I eau back and after an interminable beep,
proving my message was indeed recorded, I leave another: “Listen, it’s Bateman again,
and if you get back tomorrow, I may show up at Da Umberto’s tonight so, you know,
keep your eyes open.. . (354).
At this point, there seems no going back. Patrick has confessed, his lawyer will phone the police,
and Patrick will be incarcerated. But after a few days, nothing bas happened, and there is no
word ofthe bodies of which he fias just disposed. Why is there no consequence to his repeated
confessions, or to the police chase? Heightened narrative tension and drama seeks an outcome, if
flot a conclusion; instead, in American Psycito, the tension dissipates, and the narrative merely
unravels.
Part of a character’s construction, whether he is good or bad, is affected by the
appearance ofa “good woman” by his side. For Patrick, Jean is the woman who will straighten
him out. Interestingly, Ellis provides a continuation ofthe novel on fis website, and in it, the
reader finds Patrick and Jean ‘happily’ marned. In American Psycho, Patrick honestly admits to
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her, “I’ve thrown away a lot of time to be with you, so it’s flot like I don’t care.” He thinks,
“Why flot end up with her?” and “Everyone is interchangeable anyway” (376). Ironically, the
confirmation that individuality is only a myth cornes at the very moment he contemplates making
a new start in his life by making Jean an important part ofit. When a baby in a nearby stroller
stares at Jean and Patrick, they stare back, and he thinks, “It’s really weird and I’m experiencing
a spontaneous kind of internai sensation. I feel as if I’m moving toward as well as away from
something, and anything is possible” (379). Patrick thinks, “[I’ve experienced] what I guess
passes for an epiphany,” and “[I] accept lier love.” Given that the narrative is running on weli
established but dual tracks, it is difficuit to fuliy ailow this moment to set off the necessary plot
points that lead to the traditionally romantic ending. At points such as these, the reader must
negotiate between (at least) two paths. As Liz Young writes, “rather than being presented with a
well-ordered fictive universe, secure in its moral delineation, the reader is forced to engage
personally with the text, to fil in the blanks, as it were, if he is not to produce a compietely
coarse and slip-shod reading” (“Beast in the Jungle” 100). Thus, Patrick, when looking at Jean,
thinks, “It’s aimost as if she’s making the decision as to who I am” (378), lie is also taiking about
the reader. He continues, “It’s as if her mmd is having a hard time communicating with her
mouth, as if she is searching for a rational anaiysis of who I am, which is, of course, an
impossibility: there... is. . . no. . . key” (264). Given this ‘due,’ the reader tends to be brouglit
back to a balance between one reading and another. Back in the beginning ofthe novei, Patrick
sometimes admits that he is very much “the gentleman that [he] can be” (78). He lias aiways had
the ability to 5e botli the gentleman and the sadistic murderer. Nothing lias changed in his
character since tlien except that, nearing the conclusion of the book, the reader expects—needs—
something to change. And yet, Patrick reminds the reader that he has “no patience for
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revelations, for new beginnings, for events that take place beyond the reaim ofmy immediate
vision” (264). But the reader also has no patience for certain things. The reader has her own
agenda to impose, just like Patrick’s ex-girlifiend, Bethany, who unfortunately meets a gruesome
death: “Oh Patrick,’ she says. ‘You’re stiil the same. I don’t know if that’s good or bad. . . . Say
it’s good.” (241).
The Missing-in-Action
For the character that can be considered missing-in-action, the une between identity as an
outer construction (physical, social, public) and identity as an inner consciousness (mental,
personal, private) presents indications of impermeability. A hardening of the border between the
two selves occurs—not because the character is created and exists within a dehumanizing
socioeconomic framework, but because it is constructed by this particular machinery. Ellis’s
characters, Young writes, “by the very dint of their lack of individuality in a homogenized
socïety, cannot be ‘created,’ cannot be bom as personalities in the old sense, because as Ellis
suggests, personality in the manner of individuals can no longer exist” (Young, “Chiidren of the
Revolution” 19-20). Thus, characters are compelled to act by forces outside themselves, rather
than by the more classically accepted influences ofpsychology. And, while they possess many of
the features of a typical character, there are also indications that they simply do flot exist. They
do flot just present a set of ambiguities, as do aporetic characters; in fact, theirs is a situation in
which there are no ambiguities because, at base, ail information is inconclusive. With respect to
the titie ofEllis’s first novel, characters amount to “less than zero”: flot only do they possess
‘zero’ character, but they are subject to a process of literary consumption that controls their
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movernents like so mucli machinery. While these characters may 5e conscious of their actions,
there is no corresponding measure of motivation.
American Cipher
At the end ofAmerican Psycho, the narrator says,
There is an idea ofa Patrjck Bateman; some kind of abstraction. But there is no real me:
only an entity, sornething illusory. And thougli I can hide my cold gaze, and you can
shake my hand and feel flesh gripping yours and maybe you can even sense our lifestyles
are probably comparable. . I simply am flot there. My self is fabricated. . . rny
personality is sketchy and unformed, my heartlessness goes deep. . . my hopes
disappeared a long time ago. (376-7)
The “idea ofPatnck Bateman” is the idea of someone like Patnck: a young “Wall Street guy”
who “look[s] like a model.” In other words, lie represents a target market. And by taking up and
fully embracing his role as consumer, he becomes “someone who is composed entirely of
inauthentic cornmodity-related desires [and] cannot exist as a person” (Young, “Beast in the
Jungle” 121). Critics refer to Patrick as a devïce or a cipher. Any information that cornes from
Patrick enlightens the reader as to what drives society, not what drives Patrick. But even Patrick
doesn’t know wliy he chooses to do the things he does. At dinner with his brother, Sean, lie
“keep[s] thinking ofreasons why I’m sitting here, right now, tonight, with Sean, at Dorsia, but
none corne to mmd. Just this infinitely recurring zero floats into view” (American Psycho 228).
Patnck lias no explanation or “back story.” His is a narration that focuses on process—a process
shorn of motivation. Whether discussing his cleansing rituals or lis killing rituals, lie patiently
lists ail pertinent details from start to finish. This is “what being Patnck means to [him]” (399),
he says. But “being Patrick” is confusing. Even in the description of his skincare routine near the
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beginning of the novel, lie slips from “I wash” to “You should” to “One should.” This occurs, to
even greater effect, near the end when lis killings become more frenzied. But it oniy shows that
lie is presenting fact, flot personal opinion or desire—not personality. This is merely a
regurgitation of information. (Perhaps, then, lis vomiting on an acquaintance on the street was
only a vomiting of information, which would explain the acquaintance’s lack ofresponse.)
Patrick seems lost himself. He watches a show about multiple personalities. His thoughts are
often fragmented and, at various times, completely chopped off as if he had been interrupted. In
speaking to a girlfriend, he even refers to himself as “him.” Scenes are oflen described as
opening with a “slow dissolve” or “smash cut,” and although this is the language of Hollywood
and media that Ellis wants to portray, it is also suggestive ofa change in consciousness. What
happens in between these “scenes”? Does another consciousness take over? At a noisy bar called
Tunnel, when Patrick is being introduced to someone, he can onÏy make out, “this is You.”
Eventually, “You, Hugh, Who, fades into the crowd” (56). Added to the preponderance of
mistaken identities and the suggestion of spiit personality, a reading that takes ail information in
the novel into account can produce no definitive statement about this character.
Similarly, in Less than Zero, Clay describes the images or events he witnesses without
actually betraying much about himself at all. Whether he grows or changes throughout the
narrative is a choice that has to be lefi up the reader. Young writes,
This is made explicit in the succeeding novel, The Ruies ofAttraction, in which Clay
appears as a comical no-account person, a joke, incapable of any sort of personal growth
and the concept ofthe “hero” striving towards maturity is finally, in lis case,
deconstructed and negated. (Young, “Vacant Possession” 22).
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But Clay as “hero” is already ajoke in Less than Zero. When lie is embroiied in romantic
conflict with his girifriend, and she asks him why “you were neyer there” (204) in him, he cannot
answer because he is too busy “studying [aï billboard” (203). When he sees lis friend, Julian,
shooting up so lie can stand prostituting himself, Clay looks down at the floor. And when he sees
a girl being raped by another friend, he oniy wonders, “Why?” Ellis himseif lias said that Clay
“isn’t a hero at ail to me. He’s like this big void” (Amerika, par. 9). Specifically, Clay is merely a
reporter of spectacle, just as Patnck is.
The question of what exactly may constitute spectacle is an important one in Ellis. This is
because the meaningless shards ofimagery—”A sharpei I am thinking” (80)—that occupy
Patrick’s mmd can be just as compelling as the video of a building being biown up by which
Clay 15 absorbed. for the sharpei is flot simply an idea ofa pet; it is an idea ofa particuiar
lfestyle that connotes its own set ofdetailed minutiae. Thus, the vacation biilboard that reads
“Disappear Here” with which Clay is obsessed in Less than Zero is a spectacle in itself. And
then, with the lack of any other movement in tlie scene, the descriptions of these spectacles—reai
and imagined—take the place of action in the scene.Raymond Williams writes that conventions
for the description of action in literature are “especially marked in three kinds ofhuman action:
killing, the sexual act, and work” (“Conventions” 188), and that these vary for the particular
society. for example, “violent death is ‘central’ in Greek tragedy, yet is neyer presented but is
reported or subsequently displayed” (188). In the case ofArnerican Psycho, sexuai acts and
killing are constantiy presented, in excess, suggesting perhaps tliat this novel is flot about sex and
murder. If Greek tragedies are about vioient death, but neyer show it, perhaps American Psycho
is also centrally about the type of action it clearly omits: work. Tlie disappearance of work in
Eliis mirrors a disappearance ofpersonality: nothing is “interesting” anymore, except for Price
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who promises “I’m getting out” and “I’m leaving” (60), and Patrick’s girlfriends when they seem
to suspect him ofbeing ail surface. What Patrick finds interesting in these people is the
possibility that they, and hopefully the reader, have done the work ofreading the spectacle which
presents itself as the narrative ofAmerican Psycho, rather than be absorbed by it.
One of the tasks when attempting the work of reading in Ellis, then, is to determine the
purpose ofthe sexual and violent action and its effect on the character ofPatrick. Williams
writes,
the detail ofthe [action] is predominant. It is flot a question of abstract ‘appropriateness.’
It is often a question of whether the killing is significant primarily in its motivation or
consequence, or whether these are secondary or irrelevant to the event and to the intended
experience of the event itself. (18$)
But the killing in Arnerican Psycho is rarely motivated, and neyer has consequences. So why is
this action so central to the nove!? It takes over the space in which character used to reside. Pure
visceral shock at unfolding events steps in where the character of Patrick disappears. But does
this reaction really oniy occur in the case ofdepraved killings? No—the commodification of
human life has made it such that the contemporary reader experiences a visceral reaction to
signifiers ofwealth and privilege, just as Patrick finds himselfhyperventilating when trying to
get reservations at a trendy and exclusive restaurant. In American Psycho, then, the increasing
action that builds towards the narrative climax is merely composed of a string ofbrand names.
Characters in Place
At the same time, action is flot the only thing that ‘fus in’ for characterization. When
Patnck thinks that a holiday in the Hamptons wiIl cure him ofhis ailment, lie “connects his
geographic location, the city, with his state ofmind” (Helyer 732). But characterization
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according to geography is flot new. For Coupland, Generation Xis characterized by Paim
Springs, Microseifs by Silicon Valley, and Polaroidsfrom the Dead by Los Angeles. And in
Ellis, American Psycho is characterized by New York, Less than Zero by Los Angeles, and
Glamorama by Hollywood. The stories almost teli themselves. The characters remain the same.
What differs is which character acts as narrator; in other words, what differs is which voice does
ail the ‘taiking’ in a bid to confer a sense ofhis own identity. But for these authors, ‘character’ is
flot substantiai enough, on its own, to give the novel purpose and meaning. Other literary
elements rush in to take over for character: Young writes that place “has started to function as
character.” She explains,
The Paris Situationists ofthe fifties were the first to see this and they developed the idea
of the psycho-geographical derive, a driffing in which the observer hoped to subvert the
organization of the capitalist environment by wandering randomiy through the urban
[soullessj Ïandscape. (“Vacant Possession” 23)
Much in the way of de Certeau’s use of “tactics” to subvert a higher order, the Situationists’
flaneur undermined the planned environment of the city and its business rationale—”to make
people more organized and economically productive.” In doing so, the flaneur infused a hfe into
the landscape and retrieved it from corporate emptiness. Character-as-consumer, it seems, needs
to be empty in order to keep up the constant consumption of artifice—new product and new
imagery. Ellis’s Patrick Bateman thinks, “where there was nature and earth, life and water, I saw
a desert landscape that was unending, resembling a sort of crater, so devoid of reason and light
and spirit that the mmd could flot grasp it on any sort of conscious level and if you came close
the mmd would reel backward, unable to take it in” (374). He goes on to say, “This is the
geography around which my reality revolved” (375). In other words, the literary landscape has
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divested itself of interiority; subsequently, it lias become the final, and logical, frontier for the
Arnerican spirit ofManifest Destiny, rebom as consumerism. Cliaracters in Ellis definitely
approach consumption in the manner of ftontiersmen drifters—and whether they “want” to
subvert the narrative-as-commodity or whether it is the reader who wants them to, they
successfully thwart convention. As such, these characters are flot “productive” in that they are
not easily consumable as narrative products.
for Ellis, the narrative product, or depersonalized individual, is an important focus. The
author admits that it is motivated by lis feelings towards his father, “the ultimate consumer,”
who “slipped into that void” (Clarke 2) in which consumption pattems denote personality. In an
interview, Ellis admitted that he wrote American Psycho as a way of saying to his father, “I’m
going to escape your grasp someliow” (Clarke 2). Here, the author sets up an interesting tension,
since the drive to avoid the pull of autliority, whether it is the Father or the Grand Narrative
sometimes ends in new methods of evasion. In a discussion of Ellis, Jonathan Keats reminds the
reader that while American Psycho may be vacuous, it is “only in the sense that Flaubert made
‘Un Coeur Simple’ vacuous that lie might slip througli the shackies of plot” (Keats, par. 13).
And, then, the concepts of ‘siipping through’ and disappearing are fundamental to Ellis’s
characters. for example, Patrick narrates,
Whule taking a piss in tlie men’s room, I stare into a thin, web-like crack above the
urinal’s handie, and think to myselfthat if I were to disappear into that crack, say
somehow miniaturize and slip into it, the odds are good that no one would notice I was
gone. No. . . one. . . would. . . care. (American Psycho 226)
This thouglit ofPatrick’s is mirrored by lis brother Sean’s ‘disappearance’; Sean does disappear
as if into a crack in the wall. Nobody, including lis parents and family lawyer, knows where lie
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is. In fact, although they receive buis from France or from other parts ofthe world, and they pay
them, they have no real proofthat lie was there, as his signatures don’t match, and there is no
other way ofknowing if he was really there or flot.
One person who does disappear is Paul Owen. Patrick murders him and disposes ofhis
body because he is jealous of Owen’ s acquisition of the Frasier file. When Detective Kimbali
cornes to Patrick’s office to question him about Owen, the two men have an interesting
conversation. Ellis writes,
It’s very quiet in the office right now. The room suddenly seems cramped and sweltering
and even though the air-conditioning is on full blast, the air seems fake, recycled.
“So. . . .“ Kimbail looks at his book helplessly. “There’s nothing you can teli me
about Paul Owen?”
“WelI.” I sigh. “He led what I suppose was an orderly life, I guess.” Really
sturnped, I offer, “He. . . ate a balanced diet.”
I’m sensing frustration on Kimball’s part and he asks, “What kind ofman was he?
Besides—” he falters, “the information you’ve just given.” (276)
Patrick’s characterization ofthe air as “fake, recycled” is humorously suggestive ofthe
characters that cycle in and out of the narrative. Also, Kimball “falters” because he knows that,
although Patrick believes he is being helpful, he is actually flot imparting any knowledge
conceming Owen whatsoever. Patrick describes Paul Owen just as the reader might describe
Patrick. Later, he asks the Detective how the case is looking:
11e stops, looks dejected. “Basically no one has seen or heard anything.”
“That’s so typical, isn’t it?” I ask.
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“It’s just strange,” he agrees, staring out the window, lost. “One day someone’s
walking around, going to work, alive, and then.. .“ Kimbail stops, fails to complete the
sentence.
“Nothing,” I sigh, nodding.
“People just. . . disappear,” he says.
“The earth just opens up and swallows peopie,” I say, somewhat sadly, checking
my Rolex.
“Eerie.” Kimbail yawns, stretching. “Really eerie.”
“Ominous.” I nod my agreement.
“It ‘s just”—he sighs, exasperated—”futile.”
I pause, unsure of what to say, and corne up with “Futility is. . . hard to deal
with.” (276)
0f course, it is easy to disappear in the city. But it would be nice if someone cared, as Patrick
says above. Patrick finds out that Paul Owen’s girifriend, Meredith, was the one who hired
Detective Kimbail in order to find her boyfriend. But later, it is suggested that she is only
interested in Owen’s whereabouts because he owes lier sorne money. In fact, after his meeting
with Kimbail, Patrick runs into Meredith and sees that she is already with a new man; more
surprising is that neither she nor Patrick even mention Paul Owen and the fact ofhis
disappearance (277). Subsequently, when Van Patten asks about his meeting with Kimbali,
Patnck says, “ail I really remember is something like how people fail between cracks” (322).
In Less than Zero, Clay is surrounded by news of people disappeanng. He is obsessed
with a phrase on a biliboard that reads “Disappear Here,” which becomes a recumng motif in the
novel. Whenever he drives past the biliboard, it “freaks [him] out a littie” (3$). 0f course, often
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when he and his friends are together, they are metaphorically apart, since one or more of them
are busy staring off into the distance and cannot focus on what the conversation is about. In a
way, they too are disappearing because it is as if they are not there; Blair accuses Clay ofnot
being there when they were going out, ofit being “beyond” him to try. “You’re a beautiful boy,
Clay,” she says, “but that’s about it” (204). Even their friend, Muriel, whom they visit in the
hospitai as she is being treated for anorexia, threatens to dïsappear as she continualiy stawes
herselfand gets smaller and smalier. Similarly, Clay’s paleness, a symptom ofhaving gone East
to school, can be seen as making him ‘disappear’ compared to his tan friends. But in reality, as
bulletins from the daily news fliter through the television and radio, people are disappearing.
More than one ofhis friends “disappears” (77) inexplicably, as does his sister’s kitten. At a
party, a film student engages Clay in a conversation about the film, Beastman! and Clay asks
how he could like the film:
“Didn’t it bother you the way they just kept dropping characters out ofthe film
for no reason at ail?”
The film student pauses and says, “Kind of, but that happens in reai iife. .
I stare ahead, at Blair.
“I mean, doesn’t it.”
“I guess.” She won’t look at me. (132)
Or perhaps she cannot sec him to look at him; Ciay’s fear is that he is going to disappear orbe
‘dropped’ “for no reason at ail.” Even the names ofthe clubs Clay frequents are suggestive of
disappearance into a penpheral space: Land’s End, Nowhere Club, The Edge, The Wire. And it
is the decreasing space of this penphery upon which Clay and his friends exist that is a major
concem for them. He thinks, “I sit on the bench and wait for them, stanng out at the expanse of
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sand that meets the water, where the land ends. Disappear here. I stare out at the ocean until
Griffin drives up in his Porsche,” and asks him “What’s the matter?” (73). The frightening thing
for Clay, the fear that constantly haunts him throughout the novel, is that the boundary between
the sea and sand seems to be forever encroaching upon the land. That is, Clay worries that the
waves of commodity culture are moving in quickly to drown whatever ‘humanity’ might remain
in him, and his panic is so great that he cannot move or do anything about it. At any time, he
could be enguifed by it and become pure commodity, whule whatever links to hurnanity he may
stili possess would invariably disappear. The “frontier” has changed, and rather than constantiy
expanding outward, it is moving inward to take over American souls. This is why, as the
television evangelist says, “there is no way out ofthe situation” (140). There is nowhere to go.
By default, Ellis’s characters absorb into the geography of place, either by disappearing
into cracks within it, or disappearing into the television screen. But the most interesting example
is that of Tim Price: eariy in the American Psycho, in a club called Tunnel, he literaliy disappears
into a ‘crack’ in the narrative. These cracks constitute spaces that teclmicaiiy should flot be there.
What is referred to as ‘weii-written’ often means ‘seamless,’ where ail questions are answered,
ail loose ends are tied up, and ail obvious ‘cracks’ in the surface are patched up. In Arnerican
Psycho, however, Tim Pnce simply cannot be properly integrated into the narrative. As a resuit,
the narrative breaks down, furtherjeopardizing the composure of Patrick Bateman’s character. In
the opening scene of the novel, Patnck calmly sits in the back of a cab as Pnce sounds off on the
state of society, among other things. Later, we realize that Patnck is the one who thinks these
things, and the manner in which lie quietly observes Pnce suggests that maybe he is watching
himsef When they get to Evelyn’s brownstone, Tim experiences the first of many cases of
mistaken identity:
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“It looked a lot like him.”
A slow dissolve and Price is bounding up the steps outside the brownstone
Evelyn’ father bought her, grumbling about how he forgot to retum the tapes he rented
iast night to Video Haven. (7)
The question is why the narrator finds it necessary to mention the “slow dissolve”; afier ail, there
has been no scene change. The use of camera techniques such as this indicates that there has
been a change in perspective, but in American Psycho, it is suggestive of a change in subjectivity.
Also, as one reads further, the fact that it is Bateman who obsessiveiy rents and retums tapes at
Video Haven becomes ciear. When they get to Eveiyn’s apartment, Patrick wonders if he shouid
have gotten flowers for his girifriend. Pnce responds: “You’re banging her Bateman. Why
shouid we get her flowers?” (7). Inside the apartment, Patrick keeps wondering when Price wiIl
“vacate the premises” (21), and later, Evelyn “laughs, then claps as if delighted by Timothy’s
reluctance to vacate” (23). But this act of ‘vacating’ sounds like the moment, in a person with a
‘spiit’ personaiity, that one personaiity departs and another takes over. Then, when Tim teases
Eveiyn and she responds, “You ‘re projecting,” perhaps this is a suggestion that Patrick is
projecting, and that Price reaiiy isn’t there. Afier ail, Patnck refers to Tim Price as “the oniy
interesting person I know” (22), and Patnck uses the word “interesting” oniy to refer to moments
when he thinks people have figured him out, are focused on him alone. How could Patrick,
narcissistic to an extreme, allow himself to think Tim was interesting, unless Tim is actually
Patrick?
Later, at Tunnel, a club fit with a set of train tracks and a train tunnel, Pnce performs a
stunt that further complicates lis function in the narrative. First, when an acquaintance “tries to
siap him in a friendly sort ofway on his back hejust hits air” (57; ernphasis added) as if he isn’t
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there. Then, he is described as “staring at the train tracks as ifpossessed” (56; emphasis added),
until he jumps onto the rails. The narrator says,
Suddenly McDermott grabs my arm. “What the fuck is Pnce doing? Look.”
As in a movie, I tum around with some difficulty, standing on my toes to see Price
perched on the rails, trying to balance himself and someone lias handed him a champagne
glass and drunk or wired he holds both anns out and closes his eyes, as if blessing the
crowd. Behind him the strobe light continues to flash on and off and on and the smoke
machine is going like crazy, gray mist billowing up, enveloping him. He’s shouting
something I can’t hear. .. . {D]uring a perfectly timed byte of silence I can hear Price
shout, “Goodbye!” and then, the crowd finally paying attention, “Fuckheads!” Graceflilly
he twists bis body around and hops over the railing and leaps onto the tracks and starts
running, the champagne flute bobbing as he holds it out to bis side. He stumbles once,
twice, with the strobe light flashing, in what looks like slow motion, but he regains his
composure before disappearing into blackness.
“Price! Come back! “I yell but the crowd is actually applauding his performance.
Madison is standing nearby and sticks his hand out as to congratulate me for
something. “That guy’s a riot.” (6 l-2)
The interesting thing here is Madison’s need to “congratulate” Patrick. Why would he
need to congratulate Patrick at ah, for something Price had donc? Why does “Bateman [perk]
up” when Pnce reveals that he is “pissed about Reagan lying; how can he be so smooth on
outside” (396)?
The Tunnel club provides an important scene. Patrick’s obsession with video tapes
reaches its height when it comes to the Brian de Palma film, Body Double (1984), which he rents
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at least 37 times. Interestingly, the plot here foliows a man narned Jake who, in attempting to
stop a thief rob a woman with whom he lias become obsessed, becornes “incapacitated by
claustrophobia when the thiefruns through a tunnel” (Internet Movie Database). Whatever the
Tunnel symbolizes in American Psycho, Patnck is aftaid of going through it, possiblyjust as
Clay is afraid of disappearing. Going outside the narrative plot means what, for a character,
except denarration—nothingness? Subsequentiy, Tim Pnce does disappear: nobody is concerned
or does more than casually mention him, until they ail but forget him. The same occurs with ail
ofthe other characters who go missing, in any ofEllis’s novels. In Tim’s case, however, he
returns: “for the sake offorrn,” Patrick narrates, “Tim Pnce resurfaces, or at least I’m pretty sure
he does” (383). For the sake ofform and ofsurface, Pnce cornes back to the narrative, but in the
language of spiit personality, Patrick may be describing one self taking over for the other. And
when he does retum, the “smudge on his forehead” that is rnentioned is probabiy a play on the
practice of expurgating or representing one’s sins on Ash Wednesday. If these are Patrick’s sins,
there is no doubt that he would commit them again.
The question of who Patrick really is, however, cannot be answered so sirnply. The
borders Patrick erects in order to construct his own individuality ultirnateiy function to erase it.
He uses other characters as fous against which his character should distinguish itself but, instead,
these characters tend to meld into him. Eventually, the reader questions whether he is Price, or
Paul Owen, or Marcus Halberstam, or even one of the more marginal characters to whom his
visage has been attributed. For Patnck is a “model” for characterological form, thephysicaÏ
comptement to an inner consciousness which Ellis sirnply did flot infuse. Patnck cannot even be
considered a reporter; he does flot exist as a fully-functioning character. He lacks a shared sense
ofreality, a personality from which both history and the future can be ascertained; indeed, lie
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lacks character. As Young writes, “We might as well consider him a spirit; the Zeitgeist, ail
yuppie, all-corrupt” (Young, “The Beast in the Jungle” 118). To be precse, Patnck is a
disembodied Everyman, a perversion ofthe spint ofbrotherhood and commonality which writers
aspired to infuse into their characters throughout history. Each ofEttis’s characters—good or
bad—fails to impress himself upon the scene. 11e is an absolute zero into which event rushes in
to impart a semblance of form, of surface and, ultimately, of character. One must conclude, then,
that Patnck and Clay are officially missing-in-action.
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Section V
Characterization and Type
in Donglas Coupland
During an interview with Guy Lawson, Coupland speaks ofthe need for a kind of
“intellectual triage.” In a society in which, he says, the amount of”genuine” information doubles
every few years, it is crucial that decisions are made conceming what is useful to validate and
uphold and what is flot. This, of course, poses a great dilemma. As well, it seems to signify a
change to normalized ways ofunderstanding, for as Coupland says, “the people who are going to
be very important to the culture in the next few years are. . . [not the people who] provide
content, but people who provide context” (109; emphasis added). Lawson finds this intriguing as
Coupland “deal[s] with the tension between type and archetype, between the individual
experience and the collective experience” (Lawson 109). For the purposes of this study, as well,
the tension between content and context is a vital and complex one. Coupland’s observation of
the waning import and privilege of content, and the subsequent waxing of context is a valuable
one. Taking into account the author’s engagement with the rendering of narrative and character,
it will be shown that this tension between content and context informs the tension between
convention and interpretation in ways which have flot been addressed either by the critical or
popular reception ofhis works.
Lawson’s reference to “type and archetype” and “individual experience and collective
experience” recalls the historical progression ofthe dynamic between character and
characterization as set out in Section I. As discussed, archetypal character, that purveyor of
collective experience, is best exemplified by Everyman. Character then developed into the
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Romantic individual, the depths—and spiritual heights—ofwhom had been previously
uncultivated. Then, at least by the nineteenth century, character was reduced to a “type” that
seemed to revisit Everyman, except that this character represented the “individual” as a single,
disparate unit (not as a Romantic individual, for example, connected by the ftatemity of
Whitman or, earlier, the metaphysical union of an earthly compass, as in John Donne). The
progression argued here concludes thusly: flot in a reincamation of Everyman, but a reproduction
of Everyman, such that he is no longer capable of embodying ail that Everyman stood for.
Perhaps a reason for this is that he, in fact, no longer has a leg on which to stand. Once a body
invested with individual agency, with the chance for redemption, with the probiems but also the
hopes and dreams ofthe fuifiliment ofhumankind, Everyman is now disembodied. for this
reason, Genie Babb’s project of”reconceiv{ing] the production and consumption of narrative as
not simply a mental operation, but as an embodied activity” (197) is intriguing. In this respect,
Coupland’s chapter titie in Generation Xadvising his reader, “Leave Your Body,” gains greater
significance than the inherent suggestion to leave behind individualistic pursuits and identitarian
limits. Everyman, the character of narrative and the individuai of society, is divested of ah those
things that yield possibiiity for connecting, for coliectivity. No longer a being that either admits
his humanity or is empowered by it to change the system, Everyman bas become one with the
system; he fits into discrete siots in the overali scheme. In fact, Everyman is no more; there is
only Everymachine.
î. Recycling Narrative
In Coupland, the narratives of History, Religion and Capitalism are paramount. His
knowledge of, and apparent engagement with, the postmodem project of exposing and then
199
rejecting these narratives is crucial to grasping the full impact ofhis writing. Then, it may be
observed that lis Generation X Tales for an Accelerated Culture (1991) certainly “capitulates to
capitalistic forces”; indeed, James Annesley considers Coupland’s narrative to be “complicit”
with them (qtd. in Mott 92). On the other hand, Coupland does flot exhibit the conceit ofhaving
overcome those forces. They do, indeed, abound in his works; Coupland revels in commodity
culture, whether he disparages or venerates it. As Christopher Mott points out, Coupland “is
criticized for describing a protagonist who champions ‘anti-materialist’ ideology while using
materialist metaphors” (93).
First, Coupland’s approach to narrative is one that rightly solicits examination. While it is
true that the language in Generation Xoften inspires opposition to the commodification of
everyday life, on the other hand, the structure categoricaÏly supports it. Coupland’s “interlocking
narratives” (Lainsbury 233) reinscribe inherited forms ofthe overarching system ofstory. Rather
than imagining, perhaps, a new kind oflogic to narration, he is caught up in the reproduction of
the old forms; in fact, it may be termed a hyperreproduction. While he does admit to an
awareness ofthis reinstatement of power in his narrative, he also betrays a fascination with these
forms that indicates he is perhaps optimistically engaged with the problematic; still, he is unable
to depart from the systems of storytelling that have been passed down to him. In this way, he
may be compared to the group ofwriters that are accused ofproducing “blank” or “assembly
line” fiction; in other words, his writing, like that of several young writers at the second
millennium, is guilty of adding to the homogenization of fiction. In this regard, it is important to
recail, as Lainsbury does, that Frednc Jameson, in his seminal Fostmodernism, or the Cultural
Logical ofLate Capitalism (1991), “presents the contemporary moment as one of historically
unprecedented homogeneity.” Jameson writes, “the postmodern must be characterized as a
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situation in which the survival, the residue, the holdover, the archaic, has finally been swept
away without a trace” (309). He continues, “We no longer are encumbered . . . with the
embarrassment of non-simultaneities and non-synchronicities. Everything has reached the same
hour on the great dock of development or rationalization” (310). But Jameson’s use of the word
“embarrassment” bespeaks a pushing back or repression of material, the resuit of which,
typically, is a rupture produced elsewhere. The easy containment ofsuch emotion in a kind of
synchronicity is unconvincing if it is to be maintained that the cookie-cutter fictions are produced
by cognitive paradigms that are yet heavily strnctured and monitored, but stiil encased within
humanform. After ail, even classical exegesis maintains the effect of form on function. In fact,
Jameson writes that the individual has internalized the technologicai process that characterizes
the age in which lie lives—in this case, the computer processing unit. Benjamin, much eariier,
also referred to this phenomenon, stating “the mode ofhuman sense perception changes with
humanity’s entire mode of existence” (“The Work of Art,” Illuminations 222). The possibiiity,
then, of the human form affecting the output of the internai machine is one that certainiy
warrants further discussion. In any case, Jameson’s hasty disregard ofnon-synchronicities is
disappointing. As J. A. McClure writes, in his “PostmodernlPost-Secular: Contemporary Fiction
and Spirituaiity,” “Jameson’s effort to produce an effortiessly secular and utterly desacraiized
present is unpersuasive but iliuminating” (Modem fiction Studies 144). It is indeed iliuminating
that there exists at ieast one generation that seems to have become detached from the sacred;
however, it can be shown that there is something that survives, a residue, so to speak, that merits
close examination.
The first worthwhile criticai anaiysis of Generation Xwas wntten by G. P. Lainsbury and
pubiished in Essays in Canadian Writing in 1996. Lainsbury discusses Coupland’s
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foregrounding of novei-writing as a project that places a great deal of value on inherited
convention. This is accomplished, at the outset, by an emphasis on the artificiality oftraditional
construction and format, that is, Coupland reacts to the convention oftraditional narrative,
thereby inextricably entwining it within his own text. Lainsbury writes ofthe novel’s
embracing of tecimological innovation and its appropriation of techniques from other
media. The infoblip sidebars are indicative of a joy taken in the sheer profusion of
terminology—tliey are a mutant crossbreed of the continental aphoristic tradition and the
pragmatic considerations ofmagazinejoumalism in an era of declining pnnt literacy.
The reader is aware at ail times ofbeing inside a constructed thing rather than inhabiting
the capitalistic dreamspace of contemporary realism. . . . Coupland’s training in the visual
arts influences bis construction ofthe book. It just does flot look like a novel. Then there
is a bizarre juxtaposition of the bland liomogeneity of the well-groomed, white, middle
class cartoon characters and the flip iconoclasm of their utterances, flot to mention a hip
reference to the American pop art tradition of Roy Lichtenstein et al. finally, there are
the omnipresent paragraph symbols and the cloud-motif “openings” at the start of each
chapter—a stylistic tic that calls attention. through their absence, to the conventions of
the literary presentation ofthe material. (230-31)
It is apparent that Coupland is interested in emphasizing the structure underlying his narrative.
Indeed, his chapter tities mimic these concerns: “Quit Recycling the Past,” “Re Con Struct,” “Fat
Your Parents.” In them, lie communicates a desire to quit old forms and break with inhented
tradition. 11e attempts to present a narrative that self-consciously repeats the process of narrative,
through the act of storytelling. His characters decide to crafi futures, through storytelling, as an
attempt to impose a conclusive point to their lives. They are able to exercise control by deciding
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when and how to introduce events in the lives of their characters; they measure the distance
between start and finish and deposit conflict, climax and resolution accordingly. This power,
however, is illusory because the repetition of beginning-middle-end structure reveals a
preservation of the closed system of narrative that postmodemism abandons.
ii. Consuming ‘Opting Out’
Generation X spawned a wealth of literature that disparaged the apparent ennui and
idleness of late twenty- and thirtysomethings during the 1 990s. Consequently, there was a
backlash of criticism that recovered the balance of accusation. The book popularized the terrn
“Generation X,” although Coupland was flot the originator of the terrn, which is the title of an
earlier Billy Idol song. It is interesting to note, however, that in 1995,
Coupland denied any connection, saying: “The book’s titie came not from Billy Idol’s
band, as many supposed, but from the final chapter of a flinny sociological book on
American class structure titled Class, by Paul fusse!!. In his final chapter, Fusse!! named
an “X” category ofpeople who wanted to hop off the merry-go-round ofstatus, money,
and social climbing that 80 often frames modem existence.” (Coupland site)
This corresponds with the explanation ofthe term given by the narrator of Generation X. He
speaks of”the young generation shinjin ru—that’s what the Japanese newspapers calI people
like those kids in their twenties at the office—new human beings. It’s hard to explain. We have
the sarne group over here [in America] and it’s just as large, but it doesn’t have a narne—an X
generation—purposefully hiding itself’ (56). From this description, the reader is provided with a
more substantial understanding ofthe novel’s purpose. However, the image of the social
dissident coincided with the arrivaI ofgrunge on the rock scene, and commingled to produce an
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image of a typical GenXer that was more powerful in its attraction: young, overeducated and
jobless, and disrespectful, at that. That symbol functioned as one of the most successful selling
points for advertising campaigns that eschewed a pinpointed market niche for a much wider
expanse ofthe global marketplace. This is because Generation X was mystified and expanded by
sellers to maximize the target market. The most popularly accepted time period for when
GenXers were bom is between 1961-$1, which is surprising in that Coupland was only born in
1961. Even more unexpected, considering its currency among young people bom in the I 980s, is
that the book itself identifies as its core constituent those who were bom even earlier than
Coupland, “in the late 1 950s and I 960s.” But, depending on the source, there are many different
dates bracketing off the generation, more oflen than not, including younger people who
originally were too young to be part of a generation concemed with jobs, futures, and the end of
the world at the beginning ofthe 1990s. Much of the hype that surrounded Coupland’s novel was
generated by advertisers to sweep up and engage the interest (and dollars) of as many youth as
possible. In this way, investigative engagement with the novel was waylaid until many years
later, and the emphasis remained on stylistic techniques in a manner that was flot conducive to
opening dialogue.
Generation Xbegins just after the narrator, Andy, and lis two friends have decided to
leave the lives to which they are accustomed in order to start over in Paim Springs. Their choice
is to try living “in the periphery.” They wonder if the new perspective will allow them to begin,
once again, to feel and understand the effects of actions on their lives, rather than simply
knowing what those effects should be. The book jacket describes them as “fanatically
independent individuals, pathologically ambivalent about the future and brimming with
unsatisfied longings for permanence, for love, and for their own home.” To embark on their
204
project offeeling, ofovercoming ambivalence, they decide to make stories out of their lives by
creating and sharing narratives. Their disgust with the excesses of late twentieth century society
leads them to the desert, a symbol ofminimalist aspirations, but also “a profound and clear cut”
symbol of”the most propitious place for divine revelation” (Ciriot 79). The desert, “located
outside the sphere of existence” is “susceptible only to things transcendent” (79). In fact, Andrew
Tate finds that the friends’ decision to go to the desert to escape modem life “echoes Henry
David Thoreau’s project of self-sufficiency at Walden Pond; the Transcendentalist desire for ‘an
original relation to the universe’ by stripping away the burdens of history is also played out here”
(330-3 1). Indeed, Andy “notes that his joumey to this strange place is prompted by his desire ‘to
erase ail traces ofhistory from [his] past” (Tate 331). For Andy, the narrator, and his friends,
Claire and Dag, this application of attempting a life worth living—far away from the excesses of
a commodity culture that defines meanings that are incongruous to a deeper human
understanding—seems to fit. The narrator writes,
Claire says that it’s flot healthy to live life as a succession of isolated little cool moments.
“Either our lives become stories, or there’s just no way to get through them.”
I agree. Dag agrees. We know that this is why the three of us left our lives behind
us and came to the desert—to teil stories and to make our own lives worthwhile tales in
the process. Everyday life as narrative.
(GenX8)
Thus, the three form a pact which plays out over the course of the novel. The characters
themselves are young, hip and cognizant of the damaging effects to their existences that will
occur without the faith, hope and belief in their own futures. The friends wish to escape their
everyday lives, but by attempting to control their own lives by enforcing structures that do not
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truly exist in reality, they in fact reimpose the “grand narratives” that govem the representation
of reality in literature. The nanator refers to their storytelling as a confessional, Alcoholics
Anonymous-type of therapy (13-4), but their episodes ofstory-bingeing indicate that they have
only become further entrenched. Their stories are predicated on comrnodified expressions of
love, success, and paroxysms of eschatological nightmare or ecstasy. Dag’s fantasy of a nuclear
attack occurring while he shops in a grocery store is flot an uncommon one, though his addition
of a same-sex kiss may be. Wlien lie explodes at bis boss lie commits a crime against social order
that many employees imagine but cannot carry out. This is because the cathartic quality of
immediate nuclear catastrophe isjust as satisfying as that of destroying the sanctity ofthe
socioeconomic hierarchy: in either case, it isn’t personal. Hurling human emotion at an agent that
propagates an inhuman system is merely an instinctive response. These fears and anxieties are
not generated in the personal realm; they certainly do flot approach the level of the individual
psyche.
Perhaps it is because individual anxieties have settled onto the same common anxiety—
resulting from the urge to upset the system and the paradoxical fear of succeeding—that ail
stories ultimately deal with the same conflict. But if ail conflict derives from the sarne source,
then stories become homogeneous. The desire to uncover some absolute truth or meaning from a
story corrodes because the newness which inspires hope is flot to be found. The vastness of
world cultures opposed to the apparent homogeneity of ‘everyday experience’ that is common to
members of late capitalist societies has confused the reader. The function of stoiy has become
disabled. The nanator of Generation X admits that the world “lias gotten too big—way beyond
our capacity to teil stones about it” (5). The implication is that the characters’ plan to engage in
narration in order to find and attribute some meaning to their lives collapses. Andy tetis a story
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about a man named Edward, but first confides in the reader that this is a “secret” story that he
won’t even tel! Claire and Dag: “poor Edward—his life seemed to be losing its controllabilfly”
(4$; original emphasis). Wishing to reinstate a sense of mastery and dominion over his own life,
Edward cloisters himself in lis room for a decade, invulnerable to the outside world:
In ail the tirne he had been sequestering himself, being piquant in bis little room, the rest
ofhumanity had been busy building something else—a vast city, built flot ofwords but of
relationships. A shimmering, endless New York, shaped oflipsticks, artillery shelis,
wedding cakes, and folded shirt cardboards; a city built of iron, paper-mache, and playing
cards; an ugly/lovely world surfaced with carbon and icicles and bougainvillea vines. Its
boulevards were patternless, helter-skelter, and cuckoo. Everywhere there were booby
traps ofmousetraps, Triffids and black holes. And yet in spite ofthis city’s transfixing
madness, Edward noticed that its multitude of inhabitants moved about with ease,
unconcerned that around any corner there might lurk a clown-tossed marshmallow cream
pie, a Brigada Rosa kneecapping, or a kiss from the lovely film star Sophia Loren. And
directions were impossible. But when he asked an inhabitant where he could buy a map,
the inhabitant Iooked at Edward as though he were rnad, then ran away screaming.
So Edward had to acknowiedge that he was a country bumpkin in this Big City.
He realized he had to leam ail the ropes with a ten-year handicap, and that prospect was
daunting. But then, in the same way that bumpkins vow to succeed in a new city because
they know they have a fresh perspective, so vowed Edward.
And he promised that once he made his way in this world... . he would have a
little pink booth, out back near the latrines, that sold (among other things) maps.
(Gen X 50-1)
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Edward is a traditional man, one who loves his leather and dark wood library ofoak
bookshelves. For ten years, he lives a life of cornfort and decadence, until bis faithful dog,
Ludwig,
rnagically and (believe me) unexpectedly tum[s] from a spunky, affectionate littie
funmoppet with an optirnisticallyjittery little stub ofa tau into a flaring, black-gurnrned
sepia gloss rottweiler that pounced at Edward’s throat, missing thejugular vein by a hair
as Edward recoiled in horror. (49)
Having created a perfect littie nest of comfort and knowledge-building, Edward is forced to
hover at the top of his ladder, wheeling back and forth at his bookshelves, as his fear and panic is
increased by the awakening of scores of “millipedes and earwigs” and Ludwig’s monstrous tum.
OnIy because ofthis sudden terror in his life does Edward decide to leave his once safe abode.
But when he escapes, he finds himself in a postmodernist world—”a vast city, built flot ofwords
but ofrelationship.” He cannot navigate this new “ugly/lovely world,” and decides that he needs
a map, where he miglit find a legend to orient and define his situation and, thus, himself. Ail
those absolutes which presented themselves as being fixed and predicated on totalities of
meaning—Truth, Love, God, History—disappear in the age ofpostrnodernism. Accornpanying
this disappearance is an immediate influx ofanxiety, a panic attack in the suddenly ‘free’ world,
to which Edward us subjected. Once he cornes out ofhis room, he is instantly lost, absorbed, in a
new terrain upon which meaning has cornpletely vanished because the relationships are arbitrary
and bis accustomed perspective cannot be regained. Thus, Edward’s future plan to seil maps
reveals an endearing, because sadly human, need to be able to find hirnseÏf in the chaos of
postmodem society. It means that, although Edward rejoins the new world with the holy grau—a
“ftesh perspective”—he is already moving towards the jettisoning of it, while trying to re
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establish the old, fixed perspective that gave him a faise sense of comfort and stability. He looks
for thc map to draw an arrow for him, situating him at once within this new shopping mali with
the words, “You are here,” but cannot find one. Edward’s desperate search for a map replicates
the friends’ search for stories. Both the map and the story are structured on a supposition of
historicai precedent, ofways ofunderstanding, which is the comfort for which Edward and the
storyteliers yearn; it is also the thing that cannot process terror, symbolized by the demonic dog,
once they are faced with it. It cannot 5e accommodated using iogical, traditional codes for
understanding. Why Andy chooses flot to share the Edward story with the others is curious:
perhaps he feels that Edward’s terror wiii remind them of their own predicament.
Martine Delveaux writes, “Rather than constituting a means of escaping, the act of
storytelling represents a way to keep reaiity in check.” Certainly these attempts to “keep reality
in check” are fruitless; what is imperative is the acknowledgement that the practice ofuphoiding
a reality that is composed ofmaps, definitions and formulae adds to the support and maintenance
(flot the usurping) ofthe dominion that Lyotard’s ‘grand narratives’ enjoy. Then it may be
observed that, for critics, what passes for play on convention is actually a committed reliance on
a grand scheme. for example, Coupland’s chapter tities, typographical symbols, and definitions
of”types” ofpeople (for example, Basement Dwellers and Poverty Jet Set are sub-categories of
the larger Generation X) are merely reinscriptions of “the social.” Coupiand’s reorganization and
sociological filtering of humanity cannot be seen as constituting a break with the past. Jean
Baudrillard, in his essay “In the Shadow ofthe Suent Majorities,” considers the social to be ail
institutions of “urbanization, concentration, production, work, medicine, education, social
security, insurance,” and “capital, which was undoubtedly the most effective socialization
medium of ail” (65). $imply stated, these institutions shape and form “the masses,” which are
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hyperdelineated to the state of implosion, a “black hole” ofnothingness. In this respect,
Coupland’s narrative complies with the project ofthe social, in that it establishes
institutionalized thinking. Even his tities, by recreating the language of sociopolitical slogans,
thereby institute the power and force of convention and bureaucracy that one would assume he
would wish to reject.
iii. Jettisoning Narrative?
One ofthe socializing powers that Baudnllard famously discusses is the Real. The need
to know what is reat, as opposed to what is individually perceived, is a typically hurnan one.
Members of society corne to consensus as to what is capable ofbeing included in the Real; they
then hold onto this constructed “truth” and refer to it as a shared sense of reality, the more truc
depending on the numbers who reaffirm it. When Andy begins a story about his visit to Japan,
Dag is compelled to ask, “Wait. . . This is a true story?” (54). The emphasis at this moment on
differentiating between Andy’s real-life experience and the “bedtime stories” they teli each other
only clarifies the uselessness of atternpting to distinguish between story and reality. This is
especially truc in a novel that accentuates the storytelling process. Even in “reality,” when one is
called upon to relate an event or experience, the priority of making it sensible to the
reader/listener necessitates leaving out or smoothing over excess. In other words, there is aiways
a “point” to these revelations that has currency in the Real, though this may not be the case in
truly feit experience. This obligatory logic to storytelling indicates that the conforrnity of
accepted forms of narration is not, in fact “true to life” or perhaps even valid. This is why the
narrator thinks ofRiike:
{If the individual who is solitaiy. . . . goes out into the morning that isjust beginning or
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looks oui’ into the evening that isfult ofthings happening, and fhefeels what is going on
there, then his whole situation drops from him as from a dead man, although lie stands in
the very rnidst oftfe. (58-9; original emphasis)
The concept ofone’s “situation” dropping from oneselfis, because ofthe absolute freedom it
confers, a seductive one. To find a new perspective that is unencumbered by structures of the
Real would seem to bring the human mmd back to an origin, to the immediate experience and
perception oflife, unflltered by the lens ofhistory and by the consensual methods of
understanding. But the description is too reminiscent of Edward’s story, in which lie lias the
chance to “stand in the very midst of life,” but is too weak or fearful to do it without his map.
However, Rilke’s words inspire Andy to conclude that there is “too much history” in the city in
which he was raised, and that he “need{s] less in life. Less past” (59). While the individual is
held captive by meaning that has been socially and historically inherited, Andy’s desire is to
divest himself ofthe old, and map out lis own meanings. 0f course, even if he did this, lie would
not necessarily be breaking with the past. Those who are in the positions of producing meaning
inhent the accompanying power that privileges those meanings over others. This revolution of
the Wheel offire merely alÏows the redistribution ofprivilege; surely, this does flot necessitate a
rupture in the meaning-making system. It is, in fact, a normalized pattem of social activity. What
should be looked for, rather, is an evocation of meaning that arises from the juxtaposition of
structural and characterological detail; this evocation ofmeaning cannot be found in any
dictionary of syrnbols or encyclopedia of types.
Coupland’s novel presents the completeness, the perfection, ofthe classic nove!. At best,
critical understanding ofhis work would posit that he plays with surfaces, yet maintains the
integrity of an underlying narrative structure. In other words, the recombinatory process of
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elements within lis structures apparently do not evoke innovative ways of understanding.
Coupland’s storytellers add a “clause” to their pact to make stories out oftheir lives: Andy says,
“The only rule is that we’re flot allowed to interrupt, just like in AA, ami at the end we’re flot
allowed to criticize. This noncntical atmosphere works for us because the three of us are so tiglit
assed about revealing emotions” (Generation X 14). Instituting this clause, Andy continues, “was
the only way we could feel secure with each other.” In lier article, “The Exit of a Generation,”
Martine Delvaux refers to this activity as creating a “safe house.” But this law against
interrupting or cnticizing reinscribes an authoritarian regime. DeÏvaux’s “safe house” only
produces false comfort. In the same way, Andrew Tate finds that Coupland’s “work seeks a new
sacred vocabulary constructed from the detritus of an obsessively materialist culture and
represents a serious attempt to read an apparently godless world in spiritual terms” (327). But it
is a mistake to assume that Coupland’s quest for depth relegates him simply to a spiritual man
looking for God, and wondering, “Why are we here?” b do so would be to group him with
writers of lesser fiction. His crafi, and his quest, is larger than this. The fault in this reading,
however, does flot lay with the writer: it lays squarely on the interpreter who subscribes to a
hegemonic interpretation. To conceive ofthis, one must revisit the structures and assumptions
that build towards a classical reading of Generation X. For example, when Dag can’t explain lis
reasons for suddenly abandoning lis friends for a few days, Andy advises, “Then make a stoly
out of it” (68). The result is flot necessarily comic, but sad; it suggests a senseless group of
people, dumb and deaf but for the exchange of explicit signs which they use to attribute meaning.
In this way, they may live a “full” life, neyer needing to engage their minUs and spirits; indeed,
they recali William Blake’s “fully-enclos’d man,” a human being who sees knowledge as
something to be inherited, neyer critiqued or re-evaluated. Coupland betrays his own modem
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brand ofthe reinstitutionaiization ofthought in one ofhis “sidebar” definitions: a “Personal
Taboo” is “A smaii mie for living, bordering on a superstition, that ailows one to cope with
everyday life in the absence of culturai or reiigious dictums” (76). In an attempt to raise chiidren
who would think for themselves, rather than subscribe to various codes ofbe1ief the narrator
daims the parent generation raised them “without religion.” And because, as he says, History
ignored the white, middle-ciass demographic from which he hails, lie is sufficiently unfettered,
sufficientiy denarrated, perhaps, to perceive in non-conventional ways. Yet, neither he nor the
other characters in Generation X seem to achieve this level of perception, for their personal
taboos, or “small mies for living,” merely re-impose structures on their lives of which they had
beiieved themseives free.
Coupland, to be sure, is greatiy concemed about the power ofthese institutions on
individual lives. lis PoÏaroids from the Dead (1996) is a departure from the novel proper, more
so than may be claimed of Generation X. Whereas Generation Xhad consumed itselfwith the
narrative, with the sped up, convulsive repetition of the group’s tag-team storytelling, his later
book is comprised of short pieces of writing, which in truth cannot be called short stories.
Combined with his “observational” approach to fiction, they lie somewhere between story and
creative non-fiction. In Part Three: “Brentwood Notebook: A Day in the Life,” Coupland puts
forth a concept of character, with respect to “story,” that holds great significance for the purposes
ofthïs study. In this chapter, he discusses the lives and fame of”characters” such as Marilyn
Monroe, the glamorous Hoilywood actress, and O. J. Simpson, the ex-football player who was
iater accused ofkilling lis wife in ajealous rage; though Simpson was acquitted, he found
himseifthe focus ofthe fame-making media hype. Coupland’s rationale for dhoosing these
people, and their accompanying stories, couid very weli be that it is easier for the reader to
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accept these human beings as literaiy characters. Celebnties are, in fact, the absolute
intermediaries between “real” people and fictional characters, conjoining the socio-ontic
narrative with that of fiction. That is, the presentation of a fully delineated character, fully
rounded, fully-knowable, is casier to accept as the “image” of a Hollywood star than in the self
constnicted image ofthe individual in society (which is believed to be more “real”). For
example, when at the end ofthis section Coupland informs the reader that Gloria Allred asked
for the death penalty for Simpson, he mentions that she “wore what appeared to be a laminated
ultraglamorous color photo ofNicole Brown Simpson, roughly the size ofa playing card,
attached to the front of her business suit” (189). 0f course, this is a common strategy to
humanize the victim to the media and the public. But when the necessity for this action is further
examined, it must be acknowledged that the masses have lost the ability to flully comprehend
meaning without proper signification. The implication is that the full absorption of the human
loss ofNicole $impson wiIl not be complete unless she is properly humaitized first. But when
Melville’s resistance to the circulation ofhis own image is recalled, it must be acknowledged
that Nicole Simpson’s image was crucial to the selling of her story to the public, just as
Melville’s was needed to seli his. That the photograph was the size ofa playing card is
rerniniscent of the illustrated cards of popular literary characters that circuÏated during the
nineteenth century, which Deirdre Shauna Lynch discusses in The Economy of Character. And
that the image was ultraglamorous and laminated indicates the postmodem desire for
representations ofhumanity that are glossy and composed, for perfection that is airbrushed and
edited to completion. What this means is that changes to human cognition have resulted in the
privileging of image over human life; certainly, flot as many people would have “bought into” or
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invested in the story of Nicole Brown Simpson had the construction ofher humanity flot
appeared on the lapel ofAllred’s business suit.
Alternately, O. J. Simpson’s “character” was finely shaped by the note that he wrote prior
to leading the San Diego police on the emblematic highway chase. It read, “Ptease think ofthe
real O. I and not this lost person” (Coupland, Polaroids 182). Again, the invitation to invest in
lis humanïty, as opposed to “this lost person,” is predicated upon the appearance of a real O. J.,
except that the real O. J. that he meant is the image he had constructed—not the living person
who was being chased by the police at the time of the note-writing. As the thousands of
supporters who lined the overpasses proved, the postmodem mmd is fully directed in its
understanding by the image, rather than the excess of information that lias not yet been
airbrushed from that image. As “Simpson once told Sports Iiiustrated about fame: ‘You realize if
you’re living an image, you’rejust not living” (Polaroids 182). Regardless, Simpson’s
dependence on the image to overcome the reality of lis actions contributed greatly to the
judgement ofhis “tnie” character.
Considering these examples, an individual who lias become famous is a clever analogy
for a character who exists only in a very specific narrative. In other words, the risc to fame is
itself a narrative, one that is ofien, incidentally, pre-packaged. The biograpliy of a famous person
is aiways already a good stoly. In this way, a famous person is tIc perfect choice with which to
open discussion conceming the portrayal of an image that hovers somewhere between personally
feit existence and the manner in whidli that existence is received by the viewer/reader.
iv. Jettisoning Character
Coupland’s last chapter in Generation Xbegins with another epigraph from Rainer Maria
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Riike:
We are born, so to speak, provisionally, it doesn’t matter where. It is only
gradually that we compose within ourselves our true place oforigin so that we may be
bom there retrospectively and each day more definitely. (Gen X 145; Mulaneses Letters)
Thus begins an inquiry as to the effects of story on character, or the effects of narrative on
individual existence. Rilke’s words suggest that the narrative that govems individual lives is one
that is flot only permitted but chosen and nurtured by that individual, though edifled by the
community and culture in which he lives. The consequence ofthis is that each individual is flot
only complicit, but truly holds authority over the process ofnarrativity ofhis own life.
In Polaroidsfrom the Dead, Coupland describes the media events that were the O. J.
Simpson murder trial and the Marilyn Monroe suicide; as in Generation X he includes a
procession of demographic detail and description ofthe locale (subdivisions of Los Angeles, but
mainly Brentwood, where both famous people lived at the times oftheir deaths). It is apparent
that Coupland nurtures a sense of ‘the social’—according to Baudrillard, that which contains and
numbers each member of society—as a force or process that subsumes individuals, regardless of
their celebrity status. He accomplishes this by foregrounding sociological statistics and
demographics, first of ail, by identifying Generation X as a target market for his own novel. In
fact, the information and detaii that is required of each person or character in iiterature in order to
attribute a value (type) to them is made much more obvious by the information-gathering of the
medialpublic about celebrities. Coupland writes, “Many stars are refusing to hand out any private
details. Revelation is no longer an issue ofprivacy but of dematerialization—fear ofbecoming a
living ghost” (Polaroids 188). That is, as details of a person’s character are meted out and then
divined, by the reader/viewer, they are subsumed by the “grand narrative.” Each feature is
216
appropriated into the narratival structure, to make a better, more engaging stoly. The question is,
what happens once ail details are fully known?
For Coupland, once the literary character bas been fully delineated—psychologized and
socioiogized—or the celebrity fiuiy exposed, the resuit is that there is no more narrative left. The
story—introduction, rising action, climax, falling actionldenoument—has corne to its conclusion.
Yet, the image remains. Coupland refers to this character as having been denarrated. He writes,
“one fact or that sets us apart from ail other animais is that our lives need to be stories, narratives
and that when our stories vanish, that is when we feel lost, dangerous, out ofcontrol and
susceptible to the forces ofrandomness. It is the process whereby one loses one’s life story.”
“Denarration,” he continues, “is the technical way of saying, ‘flot having a life” (Polaroids 179).
In other words, as Fitzgerald may have intended, “rnaterial without being real” (169). Again, the
context of a character (or its physical “material”) is prioritized over its supposed humanity.
Simply put, the reader of signs considers the narrative to be more real or human than the
characters in it. Investment in a character depends on the currency ofthe image, but once the
narrative completes, the character is used up and loses ail currency. Nobody “buys into” the
same character in a different narrative (sequels work because they are predicated upon the sarne
basic narrative; the hero does flot iose his abiiity to be heroic; the love interest does flot lose her
inherent lovability). Thus, Coupland coins the “Post Fame” state, “the intersection ofhuman
biology with information overload. . . . [1]t is about the limits offame itself’ (186). He explains,
“Post Fame is when fame becomes a liabiiity to its possessor, or rather, the deficits begin to
frighteningly outweigh any conceivabie benefits. It’s when having an actual body becomes either
a liabiiity or somewhat beside the point.” The “limits of fame” or the lirnits of interpretation:
both exist at the point at which the story ofone’s life becomes more interesting, or vital, to the
217
public than the humanity of that person. To revisit Aristotle, character is subordinate to plot; in
fact, character is a mere function of plot. Coupland uses the example of Marilyn Monroe’s life
and death to clarify this:
Within the limits ofher biology and intellect, Monroe went as far as it is possible
for a human to travel into the hyperspace of fame. Afler this occurred, sex, high culture,
temptations, and the sating of earthly desires has lost ail attractive charms for her. She
had realized the limits ofhow far the body can take one.
The story of Monroe’s life had been stripped away. She had been denarrated and
there seemed no other possible narrative arc to her life. No stencil. Marnage? Who would
she have married—the president? A career? Been there; done that.
In the end it seemed she was trying too hard to put a pleasant façade onto—
nothingness. Her body had become a liability. $he had become post-famous. $he was
first; maybe JfK was second; Elvis was third.
Monroe, empty child of Los Angeles, blank screen, according to Norman Mailer,
“Free of history.”
(Potaroids 184)
There was “no stencil” left to Monroe’s life because the narrative that provided it had ended. The
character of Monroe had attained a specific meaning and the chance for reinterpretation, or
growth, was precluded, if indeed it had ever existed. As fitzgerald (in)famously conceded in The
Last Tycoon, “There are no second acts in American lives” (163). Coupiand suggests any other
information about Monroe would simply be redundant or swept away, ultimately ignored in the
“big scheme of things” that would aiways view lier through the lens depicting the sensual
Hollywood starlet type. Thus, Monroe entered into a state of “Post Fame”: an existence that
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“strips life of any conceivable narrative, leaving the famed one to merely bask in a pool of
Farnedness, with no storyline, no narrative arc and no pïcture of possible futures” (158).
“No picture of possible futures”: this recalis an illustration on the margins ofa page in
Coupland’ s earlier Generation X. A comic-book rendition of a business-suited woman sits at her
computer desk; a balloon floating over her head reads, “I try to imagine myseif in this same job
one year from now. . . but I’m just flot seeing any pictures” (34). This can only mean that
famous people are flot the only ones who are in danger ofdenarration: the common person has
also been denarrated by the narratives ofProgress and ofupward social mobility that culminate
in unmitigated success because the narratives no longer hold true. The relationship of character
to-plot thus cornes full circle, providing an analogy of the relationship ofindividual-to-situation
in the socio-ontological framework. Once the class, gender and politics that denote a particular
individual is removed, then, what is lefi over is a state of existence that can no longer be referred
to as human. In fact, what is lefi is pure event, or action. In the case of O. J. Simpson, it becomes
apparent that his ‘character’ is an empty husk that becomes infused with action. Interestingly,
Coupland begins referring to the man as ‘episode’: “the Simpson episode pomographically
exposed the full infrastructure of the farne-generating technology in all of its scope, beauty and
ugliness” (PoÏaroids 189). The concept ofthe infrastructure of the technological process that
supplies narrative applies, as well, to the image constructed by the individual in society.
y. Making Do:
Cliaracter as Overblown, Aporetic and Mïssing-in-Action
There remains something in Coupland that saves him from being relegated to the ever
expanding group of those who are simply aware of the situation of character within narrative and
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the problematic of novel-writing which yet requires a certain situated-ness. That “something” is
difficuit to define, but then, perhaps a composed and stable definition is flot what is needed. In
Folaroidsfrorn the Dead, Coupland writes,
One wonders if sentimentalizing the mid-twentieth-century notion of life seems at worst
unproductive. Buying into an untenable 1 950s narrative of what “life” is supposed to be
can only lead to useless and uncreative expenditures of energy. How are we to know that
people with “no lives” aren’t really on the new frontier ofhuman sentience and
perception? (182)
Coupland is aware that the new holy grau is a new way ofperceiving, a new capacity for “human
sentience and perception.” But, like the grau, the “new frontier” is part mythology. New ways of
understanding emerge slowÏy and with great resistance; more importantly, they are reveaïed to
philosophers and truth-seekers, not popular writers who coin neologisms, and certainly flot,
writers who are concemed with celebrity. Yet, it is the play on language that forces one to
reconsider language. And it is the play on the conventional situating of individuals within
everyday lives that forces one to reconsider situation. Thus, Coupland compels the reader to
begin reconsidering the nanatival situation given the language that describes it. By rereading
Coupland, it must be acknowledged that his offering is to juxtapose these conventional elements
and, in doing so, suggest new approaches to human sentience and perception. Whether this
suggestiveness is acknowledged, or whether the possibilities for it are “swept away as excess”
because it inhibits easy interpretations depends upon the reader.
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The Overblown
It is true that, for the most part, Coupland seems to write in closed systems. In
Generation X the storytelling betrays a repetition that appears Freudian; a classical interpretation
would find Coupland flxated on narrative. Consider also bis bouts ofnostalgic remembrances of
his family and childhood; Freud defines these as attempts to achieve mastery through repetition
of the past. Undoubtedly, there appears to be no break from the past and, as discussed earlier,
there is evidence ofcomplicity. Yet, precisety because he knows that it is the reader who wilÏ
choose Izow to read, Coupland neyer attempts to achieve mastery. Instead, he makes available the
tools that threaten the closed systems of narrative and nostalgia. While these tools are elements
of conventional narrative, it is his method ofjuxtaposition that problematizes and even negates
closed interpretations. What makes Coupland difficuit is what makes him easy for mass
consumption: he is read literally. Although the flrst descriptive word from a review or critical
reading is that he is “ironic,” no one bas bothered to read him ironically. Perhaps a contributor to
this state ofthings is the television sitcom: comedy is mistaken for humour and irony is mistaken
for wit. Irony of the verbal kind—saying one thing while intending another—is perhaps less
meaningful than situational irony. But it is oflen the situation that leads to further meaning in
Coupland. The choice of Paim Springs as a refuge of sorts may be ironie: though it can be seen
as a metaphor for minimalist longings, it has been called a “man-made” city, a constructed thing
which must oppose, or at least, object to an easy classification as a symbol for spiritual retreat.
Claire works at the Chanel counter at the mail, a meeting place for the bourgeois and decadent.
Dag is a destructive vandal, who clumsily bnngs on a mini-catastrophe by spilling radioactive
waste, though admittedly green and pretty, in Claire’s apartment. These are flot characters who
are at peace with the world and spiritually at ease. By moving to the “periphery,” these friends
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are no more “outside” the damaging effects ofcommodity culture than they were before. The
narrator describes the ‘equal’ disenfranchisement of ail members ofthe social hierarchy, whether
they know it or flot; in essence, ail are relegated to the peripheries.
This is exemplified again in Microseifs, in which a group of friends cannot withstand the
omniscient gaze of godly Bili Gates at the Microsoft Corporation, altemately despising him and
wishing to be “called up” by him. They eventually travel to Las Vegas, “Sin City,” a symbol of
excess and overindulgence. Yet, paradoxically, it is a desert to which the friends joumey in order
to find a better way of working and living while coding. The small group cycles through almost
ail forms of sociopolitical or socio-ontological alterity, trying on different forms of extreme
“bodies,” including marxist, feminist, reiigious, atheistic, asexual, hyper body conscious,
redundant (the narrator’s father loses his comfortable job), and disabled (the narrator’s mother
has a stroke and becomes paralyzed). But the ‘identifications’ neyer stick. Coupland’s protean
characters go through so many costume changes that the markers of character get lost in the
shuffle. While, at ieast, in Arnerican Psycho, the reader links ‘Patrick’ with a tailored suit and
‘model’ good looks, it is difficuit to imagine a physical likeness of any ofCoupland’s characters.
That is, it is difficuit to find a description of Coupland’s characters that wiii distinguish
onefrom the other. The physical likeness of them is basically the same, or “generic,” as the
narrator describes himself in Generation X. In the same way, although Patrick in American
Psycho ‘distinguishes’ himselfwith his expensive taste and groomed appearance, his friends and
colleagues are just as ‘distinguished’; the reader, alongside many other characters in the novel,
cannot actually describe one character in a way that would not just as easily descnbe another.
In an attempt to distinguish themseives from other members of an overindulgent,
consumerist society, characters in Generation X and in Microserfs paradoxically overindulge in
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minimalism. Essentialty, they are characterized by the clothing store, The Gap. This is
supposcdly where people go to opt out of the social system, just as opting out of a career leads
one to a series of “McJobs,” or opting out of a ‘mainstream’ lifestyle means eating “Kraft dinner
sandwiches in grimy liffle shoe boxes” (21). But is it possible to opt out, when, on an everyday
basis, they engage with the very multinational corporations they wish to resist (The Gap,
McDonalds, Kraft)? Opting out is just opting in to another type ofpre-packaged lifestyle. Indeed,
consumerism has co-opted opting out.
Coupland elaborates on this idea in Microserfs, where Todd cycles through political and
religious affiliations, and Karla chooses “flot [to] have a body” while another experiments with
extreme body consciousness. During an interview with Guy Lawson, Coupland talks about
identity transformation with respect to the city he calls home; Vancouver’s founding myth, he
says, “is that it’s the end ofthe railroad. It’s where you corne to change your narne, to re-invent
yourself, to hide, to vanish. Every day you becorne someone new” (112). He expounds on this
theme in Polaroidsfrom the Dead:
The West Coast, with its lack ofhistory, places a daily psychic pressure on its citizens for
continual seif-reinvention. If one does not change mates, religions, hairdos, bodies,
politics or residence periodically, the secret and vaguely pejorative assumption arnong
natives is: Thatperson realty isn ‘t tiying. (189)
But then, reinvention, like opting out, is only another choice on the spectrum, and flot an
engagement with the social structures that call for labels. Thus, it is inevitable that the characters
in liicroserfs exhaust themselves with identity reformations and, as a group, throw their
possessions away and convert to a minimalist way of life. But the strictures of lifestyle,
whichever lifestyle is chosen, eventually become burdensome, and ofquestionable effectiveness.
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The arbitrariness of practices ofbeliefis evident. For example, Bug decides to consume only flat
foods—which will easily siide under his door—so that he is flot calied upon to make chit-chat
with co-workers he passes in office haliways. Coupiand tends to extrapolate to the highest degree
with ail the conventions ofthe narrative, whether it 5e within the novel, or within everyday lives.
Though the aforementioned critics choose to view his approach to convention as being desirous
of a retum to tradition, the effects of lis approach dispute this. Rather, the sped-up repetitions of
story (in Genei-ation X) and identity-formation (in Microserfs) impinge upon the reader’s ability
to find stability in definitions ofeither. The reader’s knowledge ofhis characters, then, derives
from something other than merely clothing and coloration. In Coupland, the excessive
reproduction of type in each character succeeds in divesting physical rnarkers of absolute
authonty in assigning character. It is ironie that description—which is conventionally relied upon
to confer character—actuaily divests Coupland’s characters ofmeaning. In order to make sense
of these characters, then, the reader must resort to other means.
It is flot just Coupland’s characters, however, who need heÏp in conferring meaning to
themselves. Eventually, Karla, in liicroserfs, cornes to the understanding that “something
remarkable and unprecedented bas occurred to {humankind] as a species” (emphasis added):
“We’ve reached a critical mass point where the amount of memory we have extemalized
in books and databases (to name but a few sources) now exceeds the amount ofmemory
contained within our collective biological bodies. In other words, there’s more memory
‘out there’ than exists inside ‘ail of us.’ We’ve peripheralized our essence.” (253)
And so, the exercise ofmoving the disenfranchised, one by one, to the rnargins thus
becomes a mass disenfranchisement. In Generation X and in Microseifs, Coupland commits his
characters to a Baudnllardean process of hypersociahzation that functions just as the
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neverending circles ofstory in Generation Xdo. It seems that Coupland puts character and
narrative into modes ofhyperreproduction, such that the stability of one meaning is neyer secure.
But while the resultant ambiguity may suffice for some readers, it is flot a complete reading. As
Wayne C. Booth writes, in his A Rhetoric oflrony (1974),
The serious 1055 [to literature] cornes when readers, barraged with critical talk hailing the
discovery of ambiguities as a major achievement, leam to live with blurred senses and
dulled attention, and deprive themselves ofthe delights ofprecise and subtie
communication that skillful stable ironists provide. (172)
The loss Booth laments is the same as Harold Bloom’s in How to Read; Bloom also hopes for the
“recovery of the ironic.” “Blurred senses and dulled attention”: this is the resuit of a too heavy
dependence on dictionaries ofsymbols and “authorized” interpretations oftexts.
The Aporetic
In his Postmodernism, or the Culturat Logic ofLate Capitalism, fredric Jameson writes,
“Representation” is both some vague bourgeois conception ofreality and also a specific
sign system (in the event Hollywood film), and it must now be defamiliarized not by the
intervention of great or authentic art but by another art, by a radically different practice
ofsigns. (122)
By arguing for a “radically different practice of signs,” Jameson is calling for a new
method of exegesis, suggesting that the classic mode! of interpretation—with its privileged
meanings—no longer communicates in an effective and valuable way. With respect to characters
in a novel, what happens when the last of the physical descriptions is identified and read
“correctly” by the reader? Or, when the last “green light at the end of the dock” is invested with
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consensual meaning? It is interesting to note that the Scribner’s Paperback fiction edition of The
Great Gatsby (1991) advertises “the authonzed text”; more intriguing is the gloss at the end of
the book. Entitled “Explanatory Notes,” it includes a list of conventional (“authorized”)
rneanings of elernents in the story. For example, under “Gatsby,” the interpretation reads, “The
pun on gat, the siang term for pistol, is obvious” (208). The student of literature, supposedly
encouraged to divine and interpret, is thus able to forego the work of interpretation because, the
assumption is, ail rneanings have already been interrogated and the system is now ctosed.
Oflen, however, Coupland’s injection of arnbiguity into detail and description allows for
more than a single, unified reading. Readerly expectation is thwarted. for example, while
Generation X effectively chums out the beginning-middle-end narrative structure, the point at
which the reader would traditionally expect the character to experience epiphany is
probiematized. The expectation is that the main character will eventually corne to a realization
that clarifies his role in the world, or at least provides him with some insight (preferably
religious). In most fiction, the assurnptions of gradually-building plot and character development
‘naturally’ lead towards epiphany. For Andy, although the appearance of epiphany (through
traditional symbol and indication of catharsis) may be present at the end ofthe novel, there are
other indications that just as convincingly indicate that epiphany was flot truly experienced. The
effect is ironie; however, if the irony is lost on the reader, it may simply suggest loss of affect.
This is the case for those critics who read Coupland as highly religious, yeaming for divine
intervention. Andrew Tate, in fact, examines epiphany in Coupland’s works as a “structuring
motif’ (327) that builds upon the privileged positions of”conversion, baptism and parable.”
But Coupland’s characters do not know this language; they were, afier ail, raised without
religion. lnstead, theirs is the language of cancer and non-combat war. b fully understand them,
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it is important to visit the scene in Generation Xthat lias been popularized as epiphanic. While
driving on a highway, Andy cornes across “a vision that could only have corne from one of
Dag’s bedtime stories: it was a thennonuclear cloud—as high in the sky as the horizon is far
away—angry and thick, with an anvil-shaped head the size of a medieval kingdom and as black
as a bedroom at night” (176). Andy narrates, “I saw a sight that made my heart almost hop out of
my mouth, a sight that made my feet reflexiveiy hit the brakes. . .. I panicked; blood mshed to
my ears; I waited for the sirens; I tumed on the radio. The biopsy had come back positive. Could
a critical situation have occurred since the noon news?” Once Andy investigates, however, he
finds that the mushroom cioud is being produced by farmers buming off theïr fields. $till, the
enormous cloud that “defie[s] perspective” (176) attracts a great crowd; other motorists stop and
get out oftheir cars. Eventualiy, when lie cairns hirnse1f, Andy feeis that lis experience is “a
restful and unifying” one (177).
Soon, a van pulls over, and “out ofit emerge[s] . . . a dozen or so rnentally retarded
young teenagers, male and female, gregarious and noisy, in high spirits and good moods with an
assortment of flailing limbs and happy shouts of ‘hello!” (177). They are “herded” by a
chaperone who acts “with a kind but rigid discipline, as might a mother goose tending lier
goslings, forcefully but with obvious kindness, grabbing them by the neck, offering them
redirection.” Within moments, the “garrulous teens become suent.” Andy follows their gaze and
into his une of sight flues a “cocaine white egret.” As the bird glides back and forth across a
blackened field, Andy can only think that he has neyer before seen it in “real life.” It must, he
thinks, have been attracted to the area because of the “delicious offerings the bumed fields would
soon be bringing forth—now that so many new and wonderful tropisms had been activated by
fire” (177). Then, suddenly, the egret swoops across the field and through the air inmiediately
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above him, “ripp[ing hisJ scalp” in the process (17$).
The blood from his wound is cleansing, perhaps cathartic. Witnessing the injury, OIIC of
the mentally chailenged teenagers grabs him. Andy “bow[s] down on his knees again before lier
while she inspect[s lis] talon cut, hitting it gently with an optirnistic and healing staccato caress”
(178-79). Bowing down before a youthflil and challenged girl is an action that suggests his own
redemption. This is because the figure of the inferior in literature—deaf, dumb, physically or
mentally disabled or even merely unattractive—aiways tums out to be a superior being. It largely
depends upon the common theme of appearance versus reality; the hero passes the test when he
realizes that the extemal does flot aiways match what is inside. In this scene, then, Andy stages
the epiphany that the reader has corne to expect in literature. It is especially powerfiul here
because ofthe apparent paradox ofa youth comforting an ‘eider,’ ofa child who is physically or
mentaliy chailenged wordlessly imparting wisdom to one wlio ‘should know better.’ These are
‘inversions’ ofthe Great Chain ofBeing—the divine hierarchy of the universe—and, as such,
fate is asked to step in (see “inversion” in Cirlot). Perhaps, afler ail, it is ail up to Fate, Destiny
and Love—those things which generaliy bnng the Hero frorn his lowest point back up to the top
ofthc Wheel offire.
Though Andy is “dog-piled’ by the youths in an “adoring, healing, uncntical embrace,”
and is being “winded—crushed—pinched and trampled,” he explains to the chaperone that “this
discornfort, no this pain, [he] was experiencing was no problem at ail, that in fact, this crush of
love was uniike anything [he] lad ever known” (179).The “crush of love” will infuse him with
hfe and meaning, and aiiow him to take part in lis own renewal. The egret, flying low across the
burnt fieids, adds to this scene of rebirth because it is suggestive of a phoenix-like rising frorn the
ashes. The fieids themselves are being bumed in order to bnng forth new life. In addition, the
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fact that the egret—a symbol ofmajesty, wisdom and keen sight—skims over Andy close
enough to cut his scalp is suggestive of a kind of penance, a way for Andy to atone for lis past
sins (of emptiness).
But because the narrator describes the girl’s act as “the faith-healing gesture of a child
consoling a dol! that bas been dropped” (179), there is a strong indication that the redemption is
faked. A doli does flot feel saved or secure in being picked up; in fact, it does flot know it has
been dropped in the first place. Yet the teenagers hug him “as though [he] were a doli” (original
emphasis). Throughout this, he is struck by the feeling that he is “occupying a position of
absolute privilege” in being able to witness the scene before him, emphasizing an empty seat that
must be fihled, and not the person who must bring substance to the position. Though several
indications ofredemption may be found here, they are presented in the narrative in a way that is
sufficiently suggestive of a vacuity. After ah, the character thinks ofhimself as a dohi, and
regards his existence in terms of fihling a void. For some critics to conclude that the narrator is
rejuvenated by this scene wouhd signify nothing but that they have succumbed to easy
accommodations of the narrative and the character to received concepts—of symbol, epiphany,
redemption, the Wheel of Fire, and the Great Chain of Being.
By stopping his car on the side ofthe road andjoining the others who gather to witness
the buming fields, Andy characterizes himself as one ofthose organisms affected by the new
tropisms. He is “hefi with no choice; possessed with lund curiosity, [he drives] on” (176). But the
term “tropism” slips easily into “trope-ism,” which is a tum of language that reverses the
conventional attributes ofwords and things (de Man 38). If the character, Dag, becomes a “play
on words,” can the character of Andy become “a tum of language”? Or else, in this novel, in
which things are meant to be taken literally, perhaps trope itself has become symbolic. Andy’s
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conversion is flot meant to be religious; instead, he converts language, tuming it against
convention. It is fitting that lie evokes the Great Chain of Being, and not only because the
classical hierarchy is basically the same as the hierarchy that underlies contemporary society.
The Great Chain ofBeing held its greatest command in society until the Renaissance; as such,
the ail-powerful social hierarchy in Generation X indicates that a renaissance of symbol, and
thus, a renaissance of character, must be on the horizon. When Andy thinks of the many tropisms
that have been activated by the field’s regeneration, lie refers, as well, to the regeneration of
character and symbol through trope-isms. The buming of the fields marks the end of life and,
paradoxically, the beginning oflife. But in Andy’s case, the ‘symbolic rebirth’ ofcharacter is
actually meant quite literally—as in the rebirth of ‘symbol.’
An earlier indication that Coupland may wish the reader to corne to a non-conventional
interpretation is found in the chapter “Don’t Eat Yourself’ (Generation )i) in which the narrator
documents Claire’s relationship with Tobias. He refers to Tobias as a “control freak who
considers himself informed” and has “one ofthose bankish money jobs” ($0). He dislikes Tobias
greatly, saying, “To borrow a phrase from a popular song, he’s loyal to the Bank ofAmerica.
He’s thrown something away and he’s mean.” But when Tobias cornes to visit the friends in
Paim Springs, Claire reveals to lier friends that she is deeply in love with him, and that much of
her emotion was won by Tobias because of his romantic interlude on their first night together.
Andy narrates,
Tobias waltzed into the bedroom with one hundred long-stemmed roses, and lie woke
Claire up by gently lobbing them into lier face, one by one. Then once she was fully
awake, he heaped blood red Niagaras of stem and petal onto her body, and when Claire
told Dag and me about this, even we had to concede that it was a wonderful gesture on
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his part. (80).
To be sure, roses are aiways romantic, let alone one hundred long-stemmed roses that are
waltzed in by a lover. Claire daims, “It had to be the most romantic moment ofmy life... . I
mean, is it possible to die from roses? from pleasure?” (80). But “lobbing” roses into a woman’s
face is decidedly unromantic. It betrays, perhaps, a casualness that detracts from the formality of
roses and romance; in any case, Claire’s need (and the reader’s need) is to fulfiul the romantic
story that is running in her mmd. Even Andy and Dag fall for the red roses as a symbol of love,
the number of stems indicating a love that is much greater in magnitude. But since the boys are
truly convinced of Tobias’s true love because ofClaire’s description ofthe scene, then for Andy
to consider the act merely a “gesture” seems derivative. Therefore, either the narrator or
Coupland is unconvinced. When Claire continues with her relation of events that moming, it is
easy to see why. She and Tobias drive to a restaurant for breakfast, and then, Claire says,
I saw this huge plywood sign with the words 100 Roses onÏy $9.95 spray-painted on it,
and my heart just sank like a corpse wrapped in steel and tossed into the Hudson River.
Tobias slunk down in his seat really low. Then things got worse. There was a red light
and the guy from the booth cornes over to the car and says something like, “Mr. Tobias!
My best custorner! You’re some lucky young lady to be aiways getting flowers frorn Mr.
Tobias here!” As you can imagine, there was a pal! over breakfast.” (80-81)
b take this simple example, one can see that while the situation may appear one way in a certain
light, Coupland himselfundercuts first-level interpretations; as a resuit, events are able to take on
very different meanings. However, if Claire and Tobias had not happened to pass the billboard, it
rernains to be seen whether “true,” or filer, meanings would have had a chance to emerge. By
viewing this story as an analogy of interpretation, the indication is that, lacking only one or two
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simple details, a very dfferent story may be gleaned from the same events. Coupland believes,
“In the event of no narrative of ail, fantastic narratives have forever zoomed in to fil the void”
(Polaroids 185). However, it must be noted that, when there is a narrative, fantastic details also
zoom in to fil in gaps in the storyline. In the example above, the interpreter becomes privy to the
extraneous information, in the form ofthe advertising biliboard, that negates the typicaiiy
romantic storyline. In much of Coupland, however, the “biilboard” is flot as blatant; at best, it
offers ambiguous detaiis from which to divine meaning. If it is truc of human nature that the
individual naturally seeks the better story, then these ambiguities will remain uninvestigated.
But the matter of ambiguity in late twentieth century has become something of a shady
one. It adds another level of complexity that the reader must navigate successfully to gain a full
comprehension of the text; or, to be precise, it presents itself as less compiicated and thus easier
to relegate to “understanding” than a process that requires further thought. In other words, as
Booth compiains, the reader is taught to identify ambiguity as characteristic of late twentieth
century and, thus, as an end in itseif; rather, it is a site upon which to begin exploration. What is
useful in Coupiand is something that has flot yet been identified. Scholarship on Coupland
generally discusses the themes of surface and comic-book characters, perhaps finding enough to
say that he reinscribes the overarching strategies of narrative. What is important about Coupland
is his ironic stance on events; thus, perhaps, what is important about Coupland is his reader.
In a 2001 interview with Linda Richards for Januaîy Magazine, Coupiand says,
“Everything I’ve donc lias always been reaily from a distance, geographically.” Writing from
Vancouver, he feeis he is on the penpliery, observing culturai events from afar. But Richards
maintains that his bestsellers have contnbuted to the culture from which lie daims to be apart, in
that they provide “a series of Coupland-created lenses through which many of us have viewed
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our world.” But looking through the Coupland lens does flot necessarily mean attributing values
where they could and should be warranted. Though he is consistently described as having an
ironie voice, readers and crities simply do flot look beyond explicit associations that yield thernes
of yeamings for God and religion, and the nostalgia for lives that were apparentty more
“simple.” They do flot take up the ironie stance that Coupland’s writing consistently encourages.
In Generation X the narrator worries sadly that his younger brother, Tyler, lacks a sense of
irony. In Andy’s eyes, Tyler and lis friends are suspect because of their apparent acceptance of
the world as they have received it. Andy suggests these easy acceptances are signs of a deeper,
perhaps even horrifie, pathology:
The Tyler set can be really sucky too—no drugs, no irony, and only moderate booze,
popeom, cocoa, and videos on Friday nights. .. . They’re nice kids. None of their folks
can complain. They’re perky. They embrace and believe the pseudo-globalism and ersatz
racial harmony of ad campaigns engineered by the makers of soft drinks and computer
inventoried sweaters. Many want to work for IBM when their lives end at the age of 25
(excuse me, but can you teil me more about your pension plan?). But in some dark and
undefinable way, these kids are also Dow, Union Carbide, General Dynamics, and the
militaiy. And I suspect... were their Airbus to crash on a frosty Andean plateau, they
would have littie, if any, compunction about eating dead fellow passengers. Only a
theory. (106)
The suggestion here is that the mild-mannered “perkiness” cloaks a “dark and undefinable”
nature; the narrator goes so far as to suggest that, under the proper circumstances, cannibalism
would flot be out of the question.
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It is interesting, at this point, to consider the pages of”code” hidden in Microserfs (208-
9); here, the narrator decides to experiment with language, separating ail vowels and consonants
into two pages, possibly as an exercise to show how the mmd fus in information that may not, in
actuality, be present in a text. But what is more intriguing is that, when “deciphered,” the pages
ofletters combine to produce a message written by a young person to his parents. It begins,
“Mom, Dad, I’m OK,” and proceeds to teli a tale ofhis kidnapping and treatment by the SLA.
The Symbionese Liberation Army became famous in the 1 970s for its kidnapping and
brainwashing ofheiress Patty Hearst. The SLA manifesto, Declaration ofRevolutiona,y War
and the Symbionese Program, states, “The name ‘symbionese’ is taken from the word symbiosis
and we define its meaning as a body of dissimilar bodies and organisms living in deep and loving
harmony and partnership in the best interest of ah within the body.” The seeming simplicity of
working towards a “deep and loving harmony and partnership” recails Coupland’s views on
those who “embrace and believe the pseudo-globalism and ersatz racial harmony of ad
campaigns.” But the supposed “harmony” ofthe SLA’s utopic outlook is cornpiicated flot only
by the kidnapping and brainwashing, but also by their tactics ofmurder, robbery and terrorism.
The terror of the Tyler-set agenda is, obviously, not as covert in the SLA; perhaps it is less of an
agenda because it does not exhibit itself on a conscious level: much of the terror, Coupland
suggests, remains in the form of potentiai. However, the smooth sheen of the surface—a cairn,
cool collectedness—is an interesting one in Coupland. Its force is such that the reader skims over
the narrator’s suspicion that members ofTyler’s faction could unproblematïcally resort to
cannibalism. But when the narrator compares this faction “in some dark and undefinable way,”
to the leaders of Dow, Union Carbide, General Dynamics, and the military,” the suggestion is
that the bankruptcy of character will produce a future fihled with people who follow orders and
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ailow others to ascribe meaning to those orders. Foliowing orders, remaining “cairn,” espousing
“harrnony”: these are ail things that, in smoothing terror (excess) into a “business-casual”
presentation, preclude irony. For if irony is anything, it is decidedly “excess.” This brings to
mmd the next question: Given the reception ofhis works, how many ofhis readers, in
Coupiand’s estimation, faïl into Tyler’s “no irony” set? In fact, it may be rnany, rnany more than
the narrator lets on.
When Dag teils the story of why he ends up in Paim Springs to begin again with a “clean
siate” (31), tlie suggestion is that he was motivated to make a move because he, too, was falling
in with the “no irony” camp. “Ail events,” lie says, “became omens. I lost the ability to take
anything iiterally” (31). Because of this, lie would read “Accidentai eye contact with the 7-
Eieven grocery cierk [as being] charged with vile meaning.” (30). His crisis, he explains, “wasn’t
just the failure of youth but also a failure of class and of sex and the future and I stili don’t know
what.” But Dag’s confusion arises from his feeling that taking things “literally” has corne to
mean symbolically: the symbol lias lost tlie power of suggestion and introspection, paradoxicaiiy,
merely denoting and defining in a way that does flot allow for deviation. Wayne C. Booth writes
that metaphor
has ranged from a minute oratorical device, one among many, to an impenalistic world
conqueror. Traditionally, the capacity to make original metaphors was [in Aristotle, for
example,] the most important single gift of the poet. But. . . tlie device was not content
until it had become a concept, an Idea. And with romanticism, it began to expand its
domain, until it finally became for sorne the whole ofthe poetic art.
(A Rhetoric oflrony 177).
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In other words, over time, the majesty of the metaphor came to overshadow ail other
devices, ail other methods of artistic expression, in the work of art. The emphasis on metaphor or
symbol means that the reader is taught to focus on it, perhaps in an unwarranted fashion. The
symbol has corne to magneticaily attract the energies ofthe reader, becorning a spectacle in
itself. The symbol is meant to work, together with other authorial devices, within the story.
Oflentimes, however, it can be seen to take over the entire enterprise ofthe literary art, as one
particular symbol cornes to embody the meaning of an entire story, for exampie, Gatsby’s green
light at the end of the dock. Booth notes that Wallace $tevens has “oflen talked as if the whole
poem were a metaphor (sornetirnes a “symbol”) and as if its raison d’être were to be rnetaphoric”
(177). In general, then, the green light that came to symbolize one man’s hope, or the red rose
which came to mean another man’s true love, have been so overly processed in titerature that
they have flattened. In fact, even the disenchanted young male bas corne to signify a type, rather
than embody a living person engaged in conflicts and desires. No longer windows to deeper
understanding, symbols are literally the words that represent them, to be looked up in
dictionaries and glosses by Tyler’s obedient faction. This is part ofthe/iture that Dag and
Coupland believe is lost, for the future is possibility, and ail possibilities ofthe symbol, other
than those which are conventionaily agreed upon, are thus closed. Dag “needed a clean siate with
no one to read it” (31), no one to read pre-set meanings into syrnbolic or characterological
elements which were flot intended. Taking things literally, flot with a literaiy eye, is a place to
start.
Coupland’ s literalness is mistaken for detacbment and as indicative merely of a surface
treatment of characters who lead lives “on the surface.” Many literary critics read him as
expressing a need for the boundaries and clean unes that were once given unerringly by tradition
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and history (for example, see Tate and Young), and he has been taken up by Christian critics as a
man looking for spiritual answers in a secular world (sec McCiure, among others). Yet, each of
these approaches yieids a reading that unproblematicaily accepts the very elements of narrative
and characterization that he is known to play with in lis texts. This conundrum is produced, in
Generation X, from the completeness of these elernents. Ail of the information that is required to
corne to a kind ofperfected conclusion is available in the text. Whatever is lefi over remains
unacknowledged by the reader because it does flot fit into the traditionai expectations of story—
or character, symbol and epiphany. On top of this, the nanator’s detachment does not express a
need for further interpretation, so that readers are lefi confident in the apparent simplicity ofthe
narrative. That is, Coupiand does not care to teil the reader how to interpret beyond the literai.
This is because, in doing so, he would obviously disann the irony ofhis own structures. As
Linda Hutcheon reminds the reader in her Irony Edge (1994), “Critics agree that the analysis of
irony is usualiy complex and laborious, while the practice ofit appears defi and graceful. It’s not
unlike the difference between ajoke and explaining ajoke: irony ‘cancels itselfout the moment
it adds a word ofinterpretation” (Hutcheon 7).
As well, Coupland is highly knowiedgeable about theories that atternpt to take a
cornmodity- and media-saturated culture into account. Perhaps it is helpful to approach Coupland
from the combined repertoires ofthe novel-as-cornmodity and the media: can Generation Xbe
seen as a demonstration ofMcLuhan’s “cool” media? Printed matter, after ail, may be ciassified
as either “hot” or “cool” depending on different variables, such as context. Rather than being
filled with information, “cool” media depend on the viewer fihling in the empty spots. Coupland,
as author, utilizes a postmodern distancing to attempt to communicate via a kind of non-
communication; that is, by not fihhing in ail the information, his narratives “cooiiy” ailow the
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viewer/reader to extrapolate on given information through their greater participation. Coupland’ s
“cool” comic strips, found in Generation X are flot only “cool” by virtue of their 70s era
sensibilities, but also by their designated McLuhanite status. While a photograph is considered
an example of “hot” media because of its ability to provide information, a “cartoon is low
definition simply because very littie visual information is provided” (Gow). But in Generation X
cartoons are not only found in between chapters, or on the margins of the page, but, as Lainsbury
suggests, in his characters (230). Indeed, Claire “feel[s] like a character in a color cartoon” (6).
Clues to another way of thinking Coupland’s approach to narrative are found in one of
his themes in Microserfs. The narrator’s sumame, Dan Underwood, is a brand oftypewriter.
Throughout the story, the characters engage with the concept of naming. Bug already goes by a
nickname, rather than his given name. He thinks that eventually people will start using their
online “handles” as their real names. Another character, Abe, concludes that people wilÏ begin
referring to themselves using aiphanumeric combinations, or “other letters ofthe keyboard...
like %, , TM, and ©“ (91). Both typewriter and computer keyboard are made up of ‘characters’
which are situated in a particular spot and are immovable. Their stations do not change. This can,
in fact, suggest a very dystopic view of modem society. But when, at the end ofthe novel, Dan’s
mother suffers a stroke, something occurs which definitely lends a view to thinking differently
about a society that depends upon computers and one that used to depend on typewriters. Mrs.
Underwood is left unable to communicate with the others except when connected to her
computer; Dan says she has become “part womanlpart machine, emanating blue Mclntosh light”
(367). Thinking her thoughts out through her keyboard, she becomes the other hall’, the ‘key,’ to
the ‘encrypted’ pages; the computer is a necessary complement to her humanity, allowing her to
‘upload’ her information which is then processed into a comprehensible format that her audience
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will understand. With the machine, Dan thinks, she speaks “like a license plate. . . like the lyrics
to a Prince song. . . like a page without vowels.. . like encryption. Ail ofmy messing around
with words last year and now, well. . . it’s real life” (370). Perhaps, in this light, it makes sense
that a iist of apparently random words and phrases—a computer file meant to mirror the human
subconscious—inciudes the phrase, “I am your Personal Computer” (Microseifs 46). To begin
formulating answers for human questions, the message is that the products ofthe human mmd
must be utilized to improve upon methods of human communication, flot degrade it. But the
improvements, Coupland suggests, must 5e made to the software, flot the hardware. The
reader/viewer needs to apply himself to the structure in order to get out of it what he needs,
rather than allowing himself to be fixed in situ, his only tool a bank ofknowledge that interprets
reflexively rather than intuitively. This human ‘application’ (another word for software) is what
Dan thinks is missing from much of modem life. This is why, by the last une ofthe novel, he
realizes “that what’s been missing for so long isn’t missing anymore” (371). For the individual,
the only option other than applying himselfto the active informing ofthe structures ofProgress,
Technology, Narrative and the Social is to have those structures format and insert him where it
deems necessary. But the active informing of the structures—intuitively-—can shape an altemate
interpretation, thus subverting the absolute power of institutionalized knowledge-gathering.
The positivity of Microserfs as signaled by the completeness ofits story and its characters
is not found in Generation X, where there is only a surface alliance between overarching
structures and the individual. Yet, in this way, it is far more interesting. Underlying this
supposed alliance—the popular notion ofCoupland’s capitulation to the “grand narratives”—is a
tension that erupts from time to time in the storytelling, as weli as in the everyday realities of
Andy, Claire and Dag. The novel is “Achingly funny, wistfully observant” (Sante Fe Reporter),
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and “amusingly” engaged with the concems of the twentysomething generation (Cleveland Plain
Dealer). But these pat reductions ignore the perturbations that find expression through various
narratives told by the group. Even in the desert, where things are “much, much better” (11) than
the cities from which they had traveled, Andy admits (though oniy to himself) that there rernains
a “carapace of coolness” (8) surroundïng his own storytelling. According to Hutcheon,
{M]any argue that ironists only appear cool and restrained on the surface as a way to
mask actual hostility and emotional invoivement. . . . Yet flot ail commentators see such a
stand as utterly negative: for the ironist, some argue, it has the potential to moderate and
to regulate excess; it can even alleviate tension. (Irony Edge 41)
Irony’s potential to “moderate and regulate excess” is a function of which the characters are fuiiy
aware. As has been noted by critics, the friends each maintain a deflective shield around
themselves, even while engaging in storytelling-as-therapy. Claire’s family seems uninterested in
her life; Andy camiot recali ever being “hugged by a parental unit” (134). And while Andy is
cognizant ofhis own emotional armor, he also notices something ofthe “carapace ofcoolness”
in his friends, as well. He thinks,
You know, Dag and Claire smile a lot, as do many people I know. But I have always
wondered if there is something either mechanical or malignant to their smiles, for the
way they keep their outer lips propped up seems a bit, not false, but protective. A minor
realization hits me as I sit with the two ofthem. It is the realization that the smiles that
they wear in their daily lives are the same as the smiles wom by people who have been
good-naturedly fleeced, but fleeced nonetheless, in public and on a New York sidewalk
by card sharks, and who are unable because of social convention to show their anger,
who don’t want to look like poor sports. The thought is fteeting. (7)
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Whule lie attempts to discredit the thought by describing it only as “fleeting,” Andy’s awareness
that there are conventions to be maintained is significant. The indication is that there are strong
emotions under the surface that arise from the feeling ofhaving been exploited or
disenfranchised in some manner. And emotions such as these are invariably powerful, regardless
of whether they are harnessed or not. This is one of several signais that point towards resultant
ernotions undemeath socialized disguises: the exploited generally cannot help but be subject to
feelings ofresentment or hostility. In fact, at several junctures, throughout the novel, these
feelings do impinge upon their restful so-called rehabilitation in the desert. Even on the first page
ofthe novel, Andy relates a memory of going out into a comfield and waiting for an eclipse, in
“a mood that I have neyer really been able to shake completely—a mood ofdarkness and
inevitability and fascination” (3). This mood is an uneasy one, hovering upon self-destruction, as
the eclipse conjures feelings ofthe end ofthe world: he watches the “sky go out” (4), as others
have “since the dawn oftime,” and, one assumes, until the end oftime.
Visions ofthe end ofthe world, unrepentant gluttony, and utter rneanness are found at
some point or other in each ofthe character’s stories. Even simple descriptive language finds a
way to release tension by expressing some degree of aggression. For Andy, it is often self
directed. He describes Paim Springs as having “so littie pollution that perspective is warped; the
mountains want to smash themselves into my face” (114). Later, he and his friends
peek into shop windows that hawk fluorescent swimwear, date samplers, awful abstract
paintings that look like roadkill covered in sparkles. I sec hats and gems and pies—such
lovely bot, begging for attention like a child who doesn’t want to go to bed yet. I want to
sut open my stomacli and np out my eyes and cram these sights inside me. Earth. (114)
Yet, Andy is possibly the least expressive in the group ofthese tendencies. In this way, lie is
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similar to Dan Underwood, the narrator of Microseijs. Dan presumes to create, in bis computer,
an “unconscious” of sorts—apparently random pages that express his anxieties and ftee
associations—that would seem to allow him better control ofhimself, and bis narrative.
Microseijs is indeed a more “controlled” novel than any of Coupland’s others. That is, it is
grounded in the conceit of “everyday reality.” However, the ‘hijacking’ of pages in the novel is
new, and may be seen as a kind ofoffenng to the “other.” This is especially applicable in the
instance ofthe ‘encrypted’ note, apparently from the teenager who is kidnapped by the SLA.
$till, for the contemporary reader, the note may require too much input: it is easy to imagine that
many people flip past these pages, assuming it is gibberish. This underlying violence in
Coupland gains ground in his Hev Nostradamus (2003), in which the surface tensions of
everyday tife culminate irrevocabty in Columbine-like terror and killing. Significantty, the
parents in the story are shaken by the events. 0f course, for Coupland as well as many others, the
parental generation signifies convention and authority. However, for the reader of Generation X,
it is simpÏy easier to ingest the colourful cartoon images and consumer items offered by the text;
it is, as Andy says, “such lovely bot” (Generation X).
Claire and Dag find themselves, more oflen than Andy, at that point at which gazing
through shop windows tums into self-destructive hyperconsumption, and the lovely consumables
transform into roadkill. The attraction quickly turns into disgust, and reminds them ofthose
feelings ofresentment and violence that had scared them into coming to the desert in the first
place:
“Sometimes,” says Claire, as we drive past the I. Magnin where she works, “I devebop
this weird feeling when I watch these endless waves of gray hair gobbling up the jewels
and perfumes at work. I feel like I’m watching this enormous dinner table surrounded by
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hundreds of greedy littie chiidren who are so spoiled, and so impatient, that they can’t
even wait for food to be prepared. They have to reach for live animais piaced on the table
and suck the food right out ofthem.” (9)
The “weird feeling” that Claire experiences resuits ftom her recognition, to some degree, that
this “gobbling” is the same as Andy’s desire to “cram” the lovely bot inside him. Andy
describes Claire as “peddling five-thousand-dollar purses to old bags” (67), the play on “old bag”
and “purse” suggesting that consumers are no more than that which they consume. Dag, too, is
gullty: he eats a fifty-dollar bili and jokes, “Hey, Andy. You are what you eat” (1$). Dag is the
one who expresses this “weird feeling” through some sort of action. He says, “I don’t know...
whether I feel more that I want to punish some aging crock for frittering away my world, or
whether I’m just upset that the world has gotten too big—way beyond our capacity to tell stories
about it, and so ail we’re ail stuck with are these biips and chunks and snippets on bumpers .
I feei insulted either way” (5). Dag then proceeds to effect his personal retribution on a car that
sports a bumper sticker that reads, “WE’RE SPENDING OUR CHILDREN’S [NUERITANCE.”
Dag enjoys vandalizing personal property. This is true whether it is intentional or flot, as he
inadvertently dumps radioactive waste in Claire’s apartment, leaving it uninhabitable. Andy
seems flot to understand why he acts this way. He thinks, “I wish I understood this destructive
tendency in Dag; otherwise he is such a considerate guy—to the point where once he wouldn’t
bathe for a week when a spider spun a web in his bathtub.” Later, he continues, “Dag. . . is a
vandal. I try to understand his behaviour but fail. Last week’s scraping of the Cutlass Supreme
was mereiy one incident in a long strand of such events. He seems to confine himself exclusively
to vehicles bearing bumper stickers that he finds repugnant. Sure enough, an inspection of [the
car he is currently vandalizing] reveals a sticker saying ASK ME ABOUT MY
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GRANDCHILDREN” (113). Dag’s emotions also shift ftom objects ofwasteful consumerism to
those who consume them. He begins to “find humanity repulsive, reducing it to hormones,
flanks, mounds, secretions, and compelling methanous stinks” (30). Eventually, the degree ofhis
disgust causes him to find refugefrom the desert, just as lie had originally sought refuge in it.
Andy also feels this way; he despises the fact that his own parents neyer worry about the
state of the world, fihling their huge cars with leaded gas, and tossing non-biodegradable trash
away with abandon. He mentions that his brother, who writes jingles, aiways haggies with his
agent over “who eats the fax—who’s going to write it off as a business expense.” So, he
suggests, the only way to deal with it is to do “the same thing with your parents. Eat them.
Accept them as a part of getting you to here, and get on with life. Write them off as a business
expense” (85). But he does flot seem able to do this himself. “Sometimes,” he continues, “I’d just
like to mace them. I want to teil them that I envy their upbringings that were 50 clean, so ftee of
fiauretessness. And I want to throttle them for blithely handing over the world to us like so much
skid-marked underwear” (86).
Even with the growing evidence of Andy and Dag’s emotions, the language of violence is
skimmed over in Generation X. Such skimming renders an ‘outsider’, Tobias, ineffectual, as
weIl. In this circle offriends, the epitome ofevil in the Western world is Tobias, aman with
“predatory eyes” (90). When Claire finds that he has been sleeping with someone else, Tobias,
already defensive, begins attacking:
“You know, when I first met you Claire, I thought that here might finally be a chance for
me to be a class-act for once. To develop something sublime about myseif. Well,fitck
sublime, Claire. I don’t want dainty little moments ofinsight. I want everything and I
244
want it now. I want to be ice-picked on the head by a herd of angry cheerleaders, Claire.
Angry cheerleaders on drugs. You don’t get that, do you?
I want action. I want to be radiator steam hissing on the cernent ofthe $anta
Monica fteeway after a thousand-car pile up—with acid rock from the srnashed cars
roaring in the background. I want to be the man in the black hood who switches on the air
raid sirens. I want to be naked and windbumed and nding the iead missile of a herd
heading over to bornb every fucking littie village in New Zealand. (159)
Tobias’s tirade rnakes him a contender for the consurner of excess taken to its lirnits: the desire
for desire plus a sense of loathing that is less directed at lis parents than at hirnself. He may flot
be the future President of Dow, or Union Carbide, but he rnay make it to the leadership of the
country. He ends his argument with Claire, saying, “but hey—if more people like you choose not
to play the game, it’s easier for people like me to vin” (160). But “opting out,” as has been
suggested, is just piaying the game differently. Though he becomes furious at being found out,
his force of emotion is eventually accommodated by the narrator and rendered ineffectual. Not
much changes for the friends in Paim Springs; they stiil have the same worries and anxieties. As
Andy says, “life goes on” (68). Disturbingly, Andy’s remarks on Tobias’s character reveai that
he is not ail that different frorn the rest of them. At first, Andy thinks,
I see in [Tobias] something that I rnight have become, something that ail of us can
become in the absence of vigilance. Something bland and smug that trades on its rnask,
filled with such rage and such contempt for hurnanity, such need, that the only food lefi
for such a creature is their own flesh. He is like a passenger on a plane full of diseased
people that crashes high in the mountain, and the survivors, not trusting each other’s
organs, snack on their own forearms. ($1)
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But “rage and contempt for humanity” are the very emotions that Andy, Claire and Dag are
coping with in their storytelling. And their various expressions of violence or disgust for others,
even their own parents, cannot be dismissed. It would be difficult to consider the trio as being
“vigilant” with their own lives. In addition, when Tobias reveals later that he also has problems
making ends meet, that lie is not “rich enough,” Andy is overjoyed: this means lie isjust like us!
lie thinks. But Andy is comparing himselfto tlie man he has been denouncing as a threat to
humanity. Thus, like Dag, though he fears acquiring the cannibalistic tendencies that underlie the
conformity of the Tyler set, his fears have not been assuaged by coming to the desert. Like the
classic conclusion to the horror film in which the dead risc again in a kind of encore, the terror
which the friends think they are leaving behind cannot 5e rid of so easily.
The Missing-in-Action
Horror in Coupland is produced from the strength of emotion running through, and
around, the characters. It is wliat gives the semblance of life to the surface sheen of apathy or
coolness. Andy thinks that perhaps it is this horror that will force others to engage in a purging of
common anxieties. He arrives at his method of therapeutic storytelling by having frequented
Alcoholics Anonymous meetings:
At meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous, fellow drinksters will get angry with you
if you won’t puke for the audience. By that, I mean, spiil your guts—really dredge up
those rotted baskets of fermented kittens and murder implements that lie at the bottoms of
all ofour personal lakes. AA members want to hear the horror stories ofhow far you’ve
sunk in life, and no low is low enough. Tales of spouse abuse, embezzlement, and public
incontinence are both appreciated and expected. I know this as a fact because I’ve been to
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those meetings (lund details ofmy own life wlll follow at a later date), and I’ve seen the
process of onedownmanship in action—and been angry at flot having sordid enough tales
ofdebauchery ofmy own to share.
“Neyer be aftaid to cough up a bit of diseased lung for the spectators,” said a man
who sat next to me at a meeting once, a man with skin like a half-cooked pie crust and
who had five grown chiidren who would no longer retum his phone calls: “How are
people ever going to help themselves if they can’t grab onto a fragment of your own
horror? People want that littie fragment, they need it. That littie piece of lung makes their
own fragments less scary.” I’m stiil looking for a description of storytelling as vital as
this. (Generation X 13)
One wonders whether the therapeutic nature of horror stories is meant to alleviate the teller or the
listener. The “spectators” want that “littie fragment” oflung; “they need it.” The language is
reminiscent ofTobias’s tirade on his need for “action,” for spectacle. This does flot do much for
those who are really looking for communal healing and nurtunng. The man who is speaking
himself is flot in touch with his own large family, and thus, makes the reader wonder just how
successful this kind oftherapy is. And, again, the aim in this endeavour becomes a competitive
one: impressing one another with stories of depravity in order to see who can shock to the
highest degTee.
This is illustrated by Tobias’s “game” which he is focused on winning. This is flot a new
theme, but an old one. In Sister C’arne, Dreiser was criticised for his rendenng of Carne as a
rnoney-hungry opportunist, without indictment. The theme of survival of the fittest was also
found in Sinclair Lewis. Even now, there are strong indications that the storytellers in
Generation X are under this social pressure: to “succeed,” where the meaning of success
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continually shifis to mean more and more. They tried to leave the city behind, but in the desert,
they find the same things they so despised. They are comered; that is, they are stuck in the
system and cannot avoid “class,” “sex,” and “the future,” because they cannot change or affect
that which they were bom into. In what was to have been their chosen paradise, Andy, Claire and
Dag “eat a box lunch on a land that is barren—the equivalent of blank space at the end of a
chapter—and a land so empty that ail objects placed on its breathing, hot skin become objects of
irony” (16). They have tried to escape, and think they have achieved the social and historical
fteedom that is “the equivalent of blank space at the end of a chapter.” However, like Edward
without his map, they are impinged upon by excesses of information. The landscape is too “hot,”
too full of information. To make any kind of difference, to impress their own identities upon the
landscape, perhaps their only refuge is to be cool, and remain disinterested, even empty.
In his attempt to locate this refuge, Dag drops out. Andy and Claire cannot find him, and
he provides no explanation for where he has gone. Before this episode, Dag had attempted the
same thing in Toronto. He became what he referred to as a “Basement Person” because doing so
allowed him to “drop out ofthe system. . . . Basement People rent basement suites; the air above
is too middie class” (26). He even “began occupational siumming: taking jobs so beneath my
abilities that people would have to look at me and say, ‘Well, of course he could do better.”
Dag’ s desperate attempt to outsmart the system is to underachieve, believing he will have
contributed to a kind of siippage in the system, whereupon his eventual social position, as it
relates to his occupation, is flot indicative ofhis potential. But he realizes that he “needed to drop
out even further” (31). Eventually, the narrator’s voice seems to lend credence to this; by
wanting to drop out of the system, Dag seems f0 have lost his place in the narrative: he becomes
less of a character, and more of a word that provides a function. for example, when Dag
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disappears, the narrator assumes that he is “obviously just Dagged-out someplace” (67). Later,
when Dag returns, he is flot in good shape, and Andy refers to “Dag’s distress-saie condition”
(74). Later, he goes to Claire’s apartment and finds the place “empty save for a heap ofDag”
(81). It is as if, in dropping out of the system, one ioses his substance, or Subjectivity.
American Generic
Andy, too, is on the verge of disappearing. He describes himself as “being pencil thin and
practically albino” (3), and that he was “bom with an ectomorphic body, ail skin and bones”
(47). Later, he says, “I dress to be obscure, to be hidden—to be generic. Camouflaged” (15).
These are the only physical descriptions ofAndy afforded the reader. He is colourless, bodiless,
unmarked. In this way, he expresses an almost anorexic need to take up as littie space as
possible. The “generic” look that Coupland introduces here is taken up in Microseifs where The
Gap is ubiquitous. At one point, there is a spot-check in the office and ail but one person are
wearing the label. In her article on Coupland in The Midwest Quarterly, Martine Delveaux
writes, “More than a representation ofits clientele, Gap advertising participates in the
construction ofa generational look: the “gap” look of the disappearing body, ofthe fashionable
societal void” (175). A “societal void” is just what these young people have been looking for.
The Gap is as “brand-free” as clothing can get; it does flot impress a personaÏity onto its wearers,
but sinks them deeper into anonymity.
Coupland’s aim is to preciude stable, closed definitions ofcharacter, and characters who
remain anonymous undoubtedly achieve this. That no conclusive ‘identifying marks’ may be
found on his characters in Generation Xis certainly an accomplishment that resists the
conventions of description-as-character. Even the generally stable category of gender is shaky in
this novel, as some readers find Andy to be a homosexual man masquerading as a heterosexual
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one. To be sure, he does flot perforrn a decisively “male” gender. He says, “Claire and I neyer
feu in love, even though we both tned liard,” and while this is flot conclusive of anything, lie
goes on to say, “I’ve neyer been in love, and that a problem. I just seem to end up asfrïends
with everyone, and I teli you, I reaily hate it. I want to fali in love. Or at ieast I think I do” (47).
More suggestive is the scene outside Bunny’s party, where Dag and Andy smoke a last cigarette
together before Dag goes into the house to confess his crimes ofvandalism to the police:
“Weli, Andy. Wish me luck,” he says, hopping down offofthe cernent pipe, then
taking a few steps, stopping, tuming around then saying to me, “Here, bend over to me a
second.” I comply, whereupon he kisses me, triggering films in my mmd of liquefied
supermarket ceilings cascading upward toward heaven. “There. I’ve aiways wanted to do
that.”
He retums to the big shiny party. (16$)
The visions of liquefied supermarket ceilings refer to Dag’s earlier story about how he envisions
the end of world via nuclear aftack:
“. . .just before the fat man [ahead of you in the checkout une] is lified off lis feet, hung
in suspended animation, and bursts into flames while the liquefied ceiling lifts and drips
upward—
“Just before ail of this, your best friend cranes his beck, lurches over to where you lie,
and kisses you on the mouth, after which he says to you, ‘There. I’ve aiways wanted to
do that.” (64)
Because of the replay ofDag’s “bedtime stoiy” in the reai-life narrative of the novel, the
repetition of ciimactic moment (the kiss) seems more of an engagement with the manipulation of
identity rather than a viable “proof’ ofhomosexuality that closes the question. Dag and Andy’s
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kiss has less to do with finding one’s sexual identity than with Dag’s realization that he has corne
to “the end of the world”: he has finally been caught, and the police are waiting to arrest him. He
is relieved, confessing to Andy that he had wanted to get caught; his confession, however, is
weak and unconvincing in its impact. Perhaps this is because, as Andrew Tate points out,
The trivial acts ofvandalism committed by Dag. . . underline the sense of irnpotency that
characterizes Coupland’s fictional universe. The casual defacement of an expensive car
sporting the baby boomer sticker ‘WE’RE SPENDING OUR CHILDREN’S
INHERITANCE’ is certainly anti-social but it can hardly be interpreted as politically
seditious. (32$)
The fact that it tums out to have been the car of their friend and host, Bunny, adds to this
impotency. So does the fact that antisocial Dag, having attempted to create some disorder in the
system, goes back into the “big shiny party.” One gets the feeling that his slight rebellions—like
the revolutions in building character or narrative—will be repeated later on, in sorne slightly
different manner, but hardly with whole-hearted commitment.
The rnethods of resistïng conforrnity, then, are ineffective in narrative and character
because they are read in overly specific and predetermined ways. In fact, Dag seems to be
describing the conventional reader when he airs his opinion of yuppies:
Yuppies neyer gamble, they calculate. They have no aura: ever been to a yuppie party?
It’s like being in an empty room: empty hologram people walking around peeking at
themselves in mirrors and surreptitiously misting their tonsils with Binaca spray, just in
case they have to kiss another ghost like themselves. There’sjust nothing there. (21)
Approaching the act of reading with this point of view is helpful. In reading traditionally,
responses are more “calculated” than constmed. Perhaps because of the grand attention-seizing
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spectacles of everyday life, the power of speculation is no longer as easily available to the reader.
Instead, a list of “proofs” that may be sufficiently calculated into a nicely balanced equation is
the proper end ofinterpretation. But if the majority of literary works may be reduced to
“universal” themes with “universal” symbols, then literature is merely calculus: no wonder
people read less in the twentieth century, if the same things may be denved from almost all
stories.
Perhaps, then, a reading which approaches the novel differently will yield new products.
Rather than negate “feeling” and replace it with the “knowing” that cornes frorn encyclopaedic
information, a reading that privileges “feeling” may bring something truly original to texts which
necessarily rely on conventions of the novel to gamer a wide readership. First, the narrator
describes the life which they have abandoned in the hopes of something rnore:
We live small lives on the periphery; we are rnarginalized and there’s a great deal in
which we choose flot to participate. We wanted silence and we have that silence now.
We arrived here speckled in sores and zits, our colons so tied up in knots that we neyer
thought we’d have a bowel rnovernent again. Our systems had stopped working, jammed
with the odor of copy machines, Wite-Out, the smell of bond paper, and the endless stress
ofpointless jobs done grudgingly to littie applause. We had compulsions that made us
confuse shopping with creativity, to take downers and assume that merely renting a video
on a Saturday night was enough. But now that we live here in the desert, things are
much, much better. (11)
The urge to quit a life, as one may quit a job, is inherent in many people in North American
society. Abandonment, as if one could “abandon” that which controls one, is seductive. As Tate
writes, “The desire to escape a pampered and preordained western life [in Generation X]
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echoes Henry David Thoreau’s project of self-sufficiency at Walden Pond. . . [and] the
Transcendentalist desire for ‘an original relation to the universe’ by stripping away the burdens
of history” (330-31). But this is also found in the tropes of the road-trip popularized by the Beat
poets, the government worker “gone postal,” and even the typical mid-life crisis. And this
passage from Generation X, while important in its revelation of the purpose towards which the
storytellers are working, is severely undercut by the words that immediately follow it: the titie of
the next chapter, “Quit Recycling the Past.” Andy’s pretence that his new existence is “much,
much better” is unconvincing; the emphasis seems uncalled for, since he has flot provided the
details ofwhat has taken the place of the business oftheir everyday lives. How is it better? In
essence, the lives of the characters have flot changed. Perhaps, also, his words are unpersuasive
because he has only divulged a change of situation, and flot a change of attitude or behaviour or
spirituality: things that commonly indicate interiority.
Characterizing Landscape
The heavy burden ofhistory is that which denotes character. The wish to act ‘out of
character’ is gratifying, but also fraught with anxiety, as the fear of freeing oneseif from earthly
constraints is itselfa kind ofdeath. It is interesting, then, that Coup!and’s nove!, Gir(friend in a
Coma, begins and ends with the narrative ofJared, a ghost; and Andy, the narrator ofliicroserfs,
frames the nove! with his yearning to communicate with the spirit ofhis dead brother, Jed.
But once boundaries are perforated, “character” will neyer be “complete” again.
AÏthough Claire says, “I prefer ta!king with incomplete people; they’re more complete” (36),
Andy goes to the opposite extreme by “refus[ing] to put people in [his] vision” (8). In fact, he
appreciates that “There’s more space over here [in the western world] to hide in—to get !ost in—
to use as camouflage” (56). In the light ofthis statement, it may be seen that Andy’s “visions,” or
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stories, tend to become “peopled” with landscape. As in Ellis, characterization lias shifted its
focus from the physical and emotional description of character to that of landscape. In a way,
this eventuality was predictable. If the traditional methods of characterization described, for
example, the “distant huis” as a way to signify an individual’s emotional state (as in
Hemingway’s “Huis like White Elephants”), then it seems logical that the tipping ofthe subject
object balance that postmodemity initiated would eventually produce character that functions
merely as a descriptor of the iandscape. Cities thernselves are considered to possess fuily
rounded personalities, and how else is personality conveyed by a city than through the people
that inhabit it?
The main voice ofresistance to this new, postmodem ‘balance’ wouid be a moral one. To
suggest that man is secondary to his environment, flot simpiy in magnificence or force, but in
“personaiity” would be hard to accept for a person oforthodox conventionai views. But the
constant increase ofoutput lias moved the stage from one of production to hyperproduction;
subsequentiy, what society is workingfor is flot something that may be found in a grand world
view any longer. Where, in the past, Progress—having taken over from Providence—had seemed
a catch-ail term for growth, increasing independence and success, it now cornes loose from moral
significance or rneaning and attaches itselfto the common landscape of everyday life: the
detntus of obsoiete ceil phones, computers, videocassette recorders and televisions that appears
at low tide. These are the images of”technology” and “progress.” The moral bliss that came
from a reiigious belief in Progress and the continuai rise in technological innovation towards the
greater good dissipates, leaving a general sense of shame and disgust when faced with the
constant onslaught of non-biodegradable waste. Ami—a sneaking feeling that the world is
crowding in on the individual. The land that once begged for discovery and appropriation is now
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fully “occupied,” while on the other hand, any sense of the intenor life ofthe character has been
evacuated or, as Coupland might say, jettisoned. While description of the landscape once served
as an extension ofthe individual’s character or inner self it seems that the individual now
merges with the greater essence: the individual, infact, becomes one with the scene. What
maximizes the difficulty of accepting this concept is that the landscapes oftoday are not
“natural,” but man-made. Paim $prings (Generation X), as well as Las Vegas (Microseifs), are
“place[s] that shouid flot exist—the city brought into the desert, manufactured and, like Eliot’s
London, unreal” (Tate 330). Consider again the following passage from Generation X:
Here [in Paim Springs] the three of us merely eat a box lunch on a land that is
barren—the equivalent ofbÏank space at the end of a chapter—and a land so empty that
ail objects placed on its breathing, hot skin become objects of irony. (16)
The narrator indicates that the “objects” on the landscape (Andy, Dag and Claire) are “objects of
irony.” But, in fact, what irony is produced at ail in this scene except that the “characters” are
empty, “cool” and have nothing to say while the landscape is “hot” or full of information? The
irony is that each ofthese characters is actually the “blank space.”
In Folaroids from the Dead, Coupland also departs from the convention of character
because his conceit is flot one that is completely fictional. But again, he substitutes a particular
landscape for the “characters,” such as Brentwood, Califomia, for O. J. $impson, and PaIm
Springs for Marilyn Monroe. In this text, the pages that discuss place or neighbourhood rival
those that focus on character. As the character fails into the background, the balance between
subject and object suddenly tilts, and the reader finds himselfconsidering the landscape as
primary to the purpose. Subsequent to Folaroids, in fact, Coupland writes City ofGlass, a book
that takes as its primary subject the city ofVancouver. In other words, once character becornes
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so undefined as to require contextual evidence to support its existence, landscape becornes
character.
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Conclusion:
Missing-in-Action
In Generation X, Andy disparages his parents because, he says, “{t]hey take shopping at
face value” (133). He suggests that they, along with much ofsociety, consume product
unconsciously; that is, they do flot interrogate the une between consumer and consumed. They
are not vigilant buyers and, as such, lack the awareness that by propagating labels, they
contribute to the edification of a world that priviieges sarneness and famiiiarity over the
continuai adjustment of cognitive paradigms. “New” knowiedge cannot be gained when there are
a finite number of perfected modeis from which to work. In the literary world, the reader who
lacks this kind of vigilance “buys into” the propagation of types: both narrative and character
ones. Andy’s criticism contains a warning for the reader: the reader must flot take interpretation
at face value either, where face value is the denotation of value to the interior of a commodity
without further investigation as to its ‘true’ value. Face value is market value. It appraises a
Ïiterary type according to its similarity to other products in the same genre. But, in sorne cases,
the reader is iii equipped to assess the value of certain ‘products,’ and must resort to accepting
market value without question. This means that a character that exhibits some elements of a
certain type will be assimilated within that certain type; any excess information that does flot fit
into this process oftypification will fade away from consciousness. The common reader,
including Andy’s parents, generally does flot have good (literary) value judgement; resorting to
the mIe of convention, her readings are uncritical, unconscious and exclusive.
In a contemporary postindustrial society, characters are constructed by readeriy
expectations that process information according to recognizable ‘type.’ That is, by
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accommodating certain details—behaviour, language, inner dialogue—the reader constructs a
popular storyline or narrative around the character, such that the character itseifoften seems, in
the end, inconsequentiai (“flat,” “empty,” “stereotypical”). In accordance with these mies of
convention, character in the fictions of Ellis and Coupland is put into motion, ail the time
beginning to suspect the vapidity ofhis inner self.
These authors, along with other writers of so-called “blank fictions,” accept that the
interchange of labels is commonpiace in a postmodem culture, where the slickness of a literary
product is valorized over human imperfection. In this culture, character depends upon product or
‘lifestyle’ (which is mereiy viewed as a succession ofproduct) to indicate what he feels or what
lie thinks; thus, in reiegating bis human essence to expressions ofcommodity consumption, he
dispenses his ‘liumanity.’ There is an evacuation ofhis intenor life as more and more ofhis
humanity is expressed through extemai markings. Eventuaily, any expression of bis ‘true self
yieids only more product. When so much ofhis interiority is indicated through extemal products,
he becomes an expression of the product that flows through him (giving an entirely new meaning
to human productivity). He becomes ‘a waiking biliboard,’ characterizing or giving character to
the product more than the product could ever characterize him. In both authors’ works, the
landscape or cityscape figures into this equation. Popular tourist sites become commodities
themseives, and since the characters in the novels have been ‘emptied out,’ the city or iandscape
rushes in to appropnate these spaces. Afier ail, the absolute nght ofthe American marketpiace
(as it takes over ftom the spirit of manifest destiny) is to ever-increasingly expand, looking for
new frontiers to be appropriated.
Earlier authors, including Melville, have deait with complex issues of characterization in
a culture based on reproduction. Ellis and Couptand, however, problematize the negation of
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character as well as the negation of the process of characterization. Clearly, some of the elements
of characterization that negate themselves are physical description, speech and action. As well,
where conventional symbols are commonly used in fiction to indicate the interiority of a
character, Ellis and Coupland’s method ofjuxtaposing those symbols with other elements serves
to bind resultant meaning in a deadlock. In the end, the power of convention is severely
undercut. For example, in Coupland’s fiction, subject-positions are aiways in the process of
destabilizing themselves. For these characters, links to their own subjectivities and bodies are
tenuous, at best. Even so, Dag decides to drop out even further from this narrative system.
Consequently, he becomes a play on words; his character literally becomes a twist in language.
In an attempt to make an impression on the dehumanizing society in which lie lives, lie
ineffectually starts fires or commits small acts of vandalism. In the end, he admits to Andy that
lie wanted to get caught, confess, and be punished. Strangely, Ellis’s Patrick Bateman follows the
same narrative. Though his crimes against society are much higher in degree, they too must be
‘ineffectual’ because they go unnoticed by society. Moreover, those who hear lis confessions
flatly decline the narratives ofhis actions, whether or flot they actually occurred. Thus, the reader
is precluded from attaching lierseif to one version of events or another. In this way, there can be
no defining dharacteristic of Patrick because the boundaries ofpersonality, and the une between
antisocial tendencies and psydhosis are neyer quite defined. Similarly, in Less than Zero, the
point at which Clay would be moved to action is neyer quite established. In eadli case,
boundanes are bluned sud that readerly consensus is tliwarted. Witliout ever becoming privy to
a dliaracter’s intentions and motivations, the reader can only attempt to determine dliaracter from
the accompanying action. Thus, Patrick literally goes missing-in-action whule, in Less Than Zero,
Clay becomes missing-inaction.
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In response to overarching domination ofthe narrative, Ellis’s characters default to a
hyperconsumption of narrative in an attempt to confer character. In Arnerican Psycho, Patrick
Bateman becomes the subject of several stock narratives, such as the murder mystery, the
conspiracy theory, the disenchantment ofthe Gen Xer, the boredom ofthe very nch and
privileged, the desperation of the man on the mn from the authorities, and even the romance. The
tendency of the conventional reader is to apply these narratives to Patrick and then conforrn him
to the pre-forrned roles that are intertwined with each narrative type. However, the contradictions
that arise are too much for such easy accommodations, and the end resuit is that Patrick himself
cannot be cleanly accommodated within any of these roles. Without these roles or boundaries, I
hope I have shown, Patrick successfully thwarts traditional characterization and regains an
agency that had been lost in type.
In his own quest to confer agency to the individual within dominating structures,
Coupland first tries to recycle narrative, to overcome it by putting narrative into fast-forward,
rewind and circular repetition. In his Generation X and Microse,fs, character consumes event
and description in order to confer character. In a bid to gain identity, for example, Andy engages
in compulsive and repeated attempts to get to the end ofstory: he erroneously believes that once
he narrates the end ofhis own story, he will finally be able to know who his character is. Afier
ah, it is only when the story finishes that the reader can conclusively establish whether she has
read a spiritual quest, a romance, a comedy or a tragedy. But in Coupland, one stoiy ends where
another begins; character identification is deferred again and again. The quest of ‘finding
oneseif,’ of finding one’s truc identity through the act oftelling stories, fails. In Polaroidsfrom
the Dead, however, Coupland resumes his quest from a different angle. This time, he engages
head-on with narrative, inquiring as to the possibihity of finally ‘denarrating’ character. f-le
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problematizes the assumption that a ‘true’ character underlies the projected image. And again, he
ends with an image while the ‘truc’ character remains missing in action.
Ellis’s and Coupland’s approaches to character represent a larger movement in late
Modem North American literature that takes as its focus the problematization of the popular and
conventional function of character. Realistic charactenzation is perverted as a reaction against
the devolution ofpersonality and characterization under the pressures of a commodity culture.
These authors write characters that fail to act under the pressure of consumerism’ s assault in
economies both real and imagined (literary). What the reader is left with are merely husks that
once housed an event or act: the $impson episode, Patrick-in-description, Clay-inaction and
even, in Lewis’s Main Street, Carol-in-(Brownian)motion.
Overblown characters create a slightly skewed effect that alienates the reader from
making easy accommodations. Similar to de Lauretis’s reinscription of types “in excess as
excess,” this approach defamiliarizes by allowing recognition while preventing cognition. On the
one hand, Patnck presents as a psychopathic degenerate; on the other, there are indications
(information in excess) that he would like to fit into an idyllic, Harlequin romance. He is the
murderer, the lover; the overprivileged, the underdog; the successful businessman, the powerless
social climber; and the ‘model,’ yet also, the generic. Descriptive types are ‘overblown’ because
they are recycÏed throughout the character’ s progression in the story and retain no coherent social
value; in other words, readerly knowing is problematized. In Generation X Coupland’s practice
ofrepetitive social labeling (some ofthe subgroups ofhis conception ofGeneration X are black
holes, squires, and earth tones) makes the reader averse to grouping according to type because it
is so overdone that its usefulness is greatly undermined. At the same time, it is difficuit to
ascertain any knowledge ofhis characters other than the ascription ofthese labels. His characters
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convey the sense that they are aware of their own replaceability, their own redundancy. This is
signified, as well, in their compulsive approach to storytelling which constantly highlights the
process of creating fiction such that the reader is aiways aware that she is reading afiction. To
the extent that the novel acknowledges its own fictiveness, reader identification with the
characters is always kept at a distance.
In this study, the locus or point at which character should be afflrmed proves to be
vacant. The ‘action’ is often the character’s shedding and donning ofmasks and disguises to
cover a self that is missing in action. In Microserfs, the theme ofidentity and ‘finding oneseW is
overplayed by the characters’ presentation of themselves in various extremes, and the expected
enlightenment that the transformation traditionally promises in literature does not visit the
characters. for example, Karla is psychologically detached from her body whiÏe Sue is extremely
body-conscious (working out, accumulating muscle, tattoos and body-art); Todd identifies
himself as a marxist socialist one day, and staunchly on the political right the next; the entire
group is dedicated to consumerism until they decide to become minimalists and seli all their
belongings in a garage sale. What becomes shady is the line between identity as something
extemal and constructed, and identity as an ‘inner self.’ This ‘shadiness’ occurs because
character does flot simply exist within the socioeconomic framework in the novel, but is
constructed by this socioeconomic world (or a microcosm ofit, such as the workplace). In Ellis,
the products ofthis framework are Clay and Patrick, both of whom exhibit indications of
‘emptiness.’ By the end ofthe novels, the reader accepts them more as place-markers on a
plotiine rather thanpeople in the possibly real world. Charles Child Walcutt’s Man ‘s Changing
Mask sets out to “show how characterization depends upon plot” (i), or a map of ascending and
descending action. The only thing that is truly ‘dependable’ is this hierarchical schema that holds
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human relations in place.
Even in an age in which characters are often described as “flat” ami “schematized,” as
William E. Gruber terrns it, we are given dues that “the individual’s place in the world is flot as
secure or central as we imagine it once was” (1). While feeling secure is a common human
desire, the insecurity ofplace also opens up possibilities for an increasing ‘solidity’ ofcharacter.
When the extemal elements ofeharacterization are found to 5e changeable and therefore
unpredictable, the focus on those elements in analyzing character must dissipate. Thus, the reader
must resort, as a default, to other indications ofa character’s inner life. Vida E. Markovic states
that the individual’s struggie with and against the institutions of everyday life “can be a threat to
human destiny (individuality, agency, humanity, etc.)” (xvii). Indeed, in conternporary society,
the character is basically rnobilized into its primary mode of action by whatever institution it is
subject to: symbolically, the panopticon, the corporate building or the world ofwork, or the
institutions of law, the patriarchy and other “grand narratives.” His is a body that is assembled by
the overarching strategies of narrative, whether it is the character’s intention to work with or
against them. This is what Aristotie described in his Poetics as a characterization built from a
character’s reactions to sititation. However, when one scrutinizes the characters in certain works,
such as those by Ellis and Coupland, characterizations tend to ‘slip,’ revealing an indeterminacy
that cannot 5e resolved. This type of reading redeems character from Seing wholly subsumed by
its socioeconomic or narrative framework. The shifi is from a thoroughly knowable subject, a
subject from which one may draw every unconscious urge, every motivation, every want,
conscious or unconscious. In the works of fiction analyzed here, a conventional reading cannot
reveal ail. In them, there is a growing resistance to providing a ‘roundness’ to characters that
paradoxically flattens them into type; this is a ‘roundness’ that allows the reader to ‘know’ the
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character before getting very far in the story. Instead, these authors approach character in
different ways which allow for a gap, a space of not-knowing, that problematizes easy
interpretations of character. These characters have flot only been taken in but have beenformed
by the socioeconomic sphere; Ellis, Coupland and other writers of”blank fiction,” however,
succeed in leaving their characters some space to breathe among the grooves of their negative
impressions, so that they may inhabit a society without allowing their social role to inhabit them.
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